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It is now over 150 years since the death of Edward Irving. In that time 
very little has been done to establish his name as a credible theologian. 
However, the little that has been published suggests that Irving is a 
neglected theologian of the last century, whose christology offers 
perceptive insights for the present debate. This thesis is not, however, 
an apologetic for Irving. Rather it is an attempt to present a christology 
which attributes a meaningful place to the Spirit in incarnation, Irving's 
significance lies in the fact that his is such a christology. By 
presenting his understanding of the being of God and that of human being, 
we are able to see how he brings together the persons of the Son and 
Spirit in the act of incarnation, 
Parts I and II are a presentation of Irving's doctrines of God as Trinity 
and of human being respectively. Each provides us with an understanding 
of the relation which both the Son and Spirit have to the divine and human 
in incarnation. Consequently, they provide the framework within which we 
are able to understand better Irving's overall christology: of how he 
brings together the being of God and that of human being in incarnation. 
The major thrust of the thesis is expanded in Part III, where Irving's 
christology is expanded in light of that which is raised in Parts I and II. 
Woven throughout Parts I, II and III, has been the attempt to contextualise 
Irving's theology within the history and development of Christian doctrine. 
As a result, an indirect aim of the thesis has been to show not only that 
Irving's christology develops from within mainstream theology, but that it 
does so by developing data which is essential to that traditional 
interpretation of incarnation. 
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Certain authors, speaking of their works, say, "my book, " "my 
commentary, " "my history, " ... They resemble middle class people who 
have a house of their own, and always have "my house" on their 
tongue. They would do better to say, "our book, " "our comment- 
ary, " "our history" ... because there 
is in them usually more of 
other people's than their own, 
(Pascal, Pen_-_ý6es, #43) 
This is not "my" thesis- it's existence owes as much to others as it does 
to myself. Were it not for that rare breed of humanity, Ronnie and 
Caroline, Charles and Alison, Jean-Marc and Jenny, Kenny and Shona, who 
have cultivated the art of an 'open-door, ' the troughs and isolation of 
research would have been that much more difficult to put up with. 
Neither can it be "my" thesis, for it has grown out of discussion, 
argument, advice and criticism from a very intimate coterie: my thanks to 
Al Spence and Bev Clack. 
In addition, the theological content of this thesis cannot be claimed to be 
"mine, " My theological training has been greatly influenced and encouraged 
by the theological forum at King's College. In particular, I am indebted to 
my supervisor, Professor Colin Gunton for introducing me to the theology 
of Edward Irving. I owe him a heartfelt thanks both for his faith in me 
and his careful directing and encouraging supervision, 
I am greatly indebted to the Whitefield Institute for its f inancial. 
support: without it there would have been "no" thesis, Also, I owe a 
heartfelt thanks to Dr, Mary Clark for her generosity in giving me a home 
of my own in London. 
Lastly, this work owes its genesis to the suggestion and encouragement of 
my parents. Their love and support throughout my theological training 
deserves more than 'thanks'. To them I dedicate this thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
To change our standpoint is to transform our habits of 
thought. It is not to exchange one theory for another, 
but to change the basis of all theory. To achieve this 
must ... be a long, co-operative process; a stumbling advance 
in country where there are no beaten paths to follow, and 
where every step may lead us astray. ' 
Why is it we are so wary of another's ideology, so quick to defend 
our own and so indisposed to the unfamiliar and untried? Why is it 
we are so unwilling to detach ourselves from the 'herd' and stumble 
along uncharted paths? Is it not, perhaps, because our own ideas and 
'habits of thought' represent not merely lightly held opinions but the 
very means by which each of us makes sense of the world about? 
Indeed, do they not become the very means by which we identify 
ourselves: that complex personal identity of 'P, 'me', in relation to 
or over against 'you', 'them'? If so, it is hardly surpising, then, 
that the process by which we come to accept another's perspective is 
often a tortuous affair, fraught with difficulties: for in that 
process we do not simply exchange new theories but touch on and 
question the very way in which we perceive ourselves. Such are the 
dynamics involved in the human need to understand and make sense of 
its own being. 
When we consider the various Christian understandings of reality we 
find in each a similar outlook, for lying at the very heart of 
Christian faith is a fundamentally personal assertion: truth comes to 
us in and through the person of Jesus Christ, With this notion comes 
a certain degree of obscurity, for like a person, 'truth' cannot be 
apportioned into neat definitions. Like a person, it defies dogmatic 
categorisation. It can be as self-effacing as it is self-revealing. 
In a sense it is defined apophatically, for like a person, it can be 
more neatly defined negatively, than by means of a comprehensive 
series of enlightening assertions. And, again, as in personal contact 
where more can be communicated in the silence that exists between 
friends than in the din of excessive chatter, so the way of truth can 
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be as contemplative as it is discursive: 'I never suspected the way 
of truth was a way of silence where affectionate chat is but a 
robbers' ambush and even good music in shocking taste' (Auden). 
However, perhaps the personal parallelism with the way in which we 
establish our epistemic priorities is best highlighted in the dynamics 
involved in the compatibility and exchange of theories. And here it 
is at its most provocative: does one theory hold preference over all 
others or to the exclusion of all others? It is this aspect of 
epistemology which has characterised the debate between Karl Popper, 
the scientist, ' and the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn.: 3 It is a 
debate which offers valuable insight for the historical and sytematic 
theologian. 
Popper argues simply that from out of the plethora of scientific 
hypotheses erected in order to make sense of data, we choose one 
over against the others. Such a hypothesis or scientific truth-claim 
is conjectural: it is hypothetically deduced by 'trial and the 
elimination of error. ' Good science, therefore, consists in being able 
to reject one hypothesis for a better. However, until then, there is 
a level of commensurability between differing hypotheses. Scientific 
truth-claims, in a sense, parallel the composite knowledge by which 
we build up personal knowledge of those around us. Such knowledge 
may even become consistent to the degree that we feel able to say we 
'know' a person. Yet such knowledge is fragile- one indeterminable 
dction, statement or event may set the 'character-hypothesis' in 
disarray, necessitating another 'character-hypothesis' to be 
established. 
On the other hand, Kuhn argues that we operate within only one frame 
of reference, with only one set of prejudices, which Kuhn identifies 
as a 'paradigm'. Normal science consists in identifying data in 
accord with this paradigm: the latter precedes the former. This 
paradigm's priority can be challenged only by means of a 'revolution' 
in thought, Until then, it accomodates no rival. There can be no 
dialogue between paradigms: they are incommensurable. 
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Whilst Kuhn limits his own theory to the history of scientific 
development, it is possible to say that in as much as we all hold to 
certain prejudices in order to make sense of reality, so theological 
data is interpreted through often unquestioned prejudices, through a 
particular paradigm, And perhaps more so in theology than in other 
disciplines: for are we not concerned in theology with the ultimate, 
the divine, and with knowledge of the Creator in our hands have we 
not the key to all understanding? Surely such a hermeneutic resists 
all rivals'? 
Perhaps ideally, the Popperian notion of preference is worthy of our 
consideration, wherein one hypothesis is preferred within the wider 
context of alternative hypotheses until new data causes another to be 
preferred in its place, and so on. It is certainly true that at any 
given moment there may be several different sets of prejudices being 
applied to a particular topic, However, and certainly in the history 
of theological development, the Kuhnian assertion appears to be 
nearer reality: that only one paradigm rules supreme at a time, 
dictating the manner in which subsequent data is examined and 
interpreted. 
It is this methodological tension in which theologians find 
themselves, And in their habitual dealing with the holy they run the 
risk of developing theological myopia when their prejudices become 
too rigid. Yet it is a risk from which they can never escape: it 
constitutes the very essence of theological exploration, of 'normal 
theology, ' the theological parallel to the Kuhnian understanding of 
'normal' science, wherein data is evaluated from within an accepted 
paradigm. Only as the normal theological paradigm becomes 
intransigent and intractable does the need for a revolution in 
perspective arise and become possible. It is a revolution in thought 
which demands not merely an 'exchange' of one theory for another, but 
a 'change in the basis of all theory'. 
The insights from Popper and Kuhn highlight the dynamics involved in 
early christological development. On the one hand, certain 
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@conjectures' (Popper) come to be 'preferred' over others, for example, 
that Jesus Christ is both very God and very man; only that which is 
assumed is healed, that Jesus Christ is equal in beInE to God the 
Father rather than a creature, however exalted. These 'conjectures, 
serve to earth christological talk within a meaningful understanding 
of salvation. They make sense of faith, of talk about Jesus Christ. 
However, these 'preferred conjectures' are themselves interpreted 
within an accepted set of 'prejudices': within a specific 'paradigm, 
(Kuhn), If we turn to that period of greatest christological 
development, the third, fourth and fifth centuries, we begin to see an 
over-play between the Popperian and Kuhnian epistemologies. On the 
one hand, we find a Popperian development occurring, where primacy 
was sought for certain hypotheses. If it is possible to indulge in 
simplification, we could say that the 'Alexandrian' christological 
paradigm, the Word-flesh paradigm refused to compromise with its 
nearest competitor, the 'Antiochene' Word-man paradigm. In the end, 
whether for better or worse, the former became dominant over the 
latter. As a result, a 'settlement' in theological perception and 
priority occurred. The dominant Word-flesh paradigm came to exercise 
greater influence than that of its increasingly incommensurable 
Antiochene counterpart. 
Perhaps from herein a more Kuhnian development is observable. For 
once primacy was established, the dominant Alexandrian prejudice or 
paradigm set the course of subsequent development, As a result 
those who clung to alternative paradigms had to make a geographical 
move in order to maintain it, It appeared inadvisable to be a party 
to more than one set of prejudices. 
What we have, therefore, in this simplified example, is an 
illustration of how the Popperian and Kuhnian epistemologies can be 
seen to be at w ork in the history of theological development. On the 
one hand, there will always be competing paradigms, On the other, 
they appear to be unable to exist side by side, They vie to become 
the standard for 'normal' theology. On the whole, western 
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christological investigation has followed a 
'Word-flesh' prejudice, 
Subsequent anomalies discovered, have been discussed in relation to 
the expected Word-flesh goal. In addition, the history of 
christological development suggests the impossibility of 
commensurability between conflicting prejudices. What has Alexandria 
to do with Lyons, Wittenburg, Canterbury, let alone Antioch? Perhaps 
more than has been historically credited: for each suggests a 
possible framework within which faith may seek understanding, and 
each is therefore of value in that goal. However, the Popperian 
response, wherein alternative sets of prejudices are held together, 
has not been the historical norm in theology. 
Amidst the babble of such ancient and conflicting prejudices one 
modern response has been to perform a 'theological revolution, ' to 
reject one paradigm in favour of another, which it was hoped, could 
make more sense of the data. Such was the response of the 
Enlightened philisophe. That some response was necessary in light of 
the conflict developing between the entrenched dominant theological 
paradigm and contemporary philosophy is beyond question, An 
alternative theological paradigm was to emerge that would 
revolutionise the way in which the being of God, Christ and human 
being were to be understood. However, the babble that followed 
affirmed the incommensurability of subsequent contending theological 
paradigms: their prejudices precluded dialogue. 
But if this is so, have we not come to an impasse? What alternative 
is there - another theological revolution? Whilst it was, perhaps, an 
inevitable consequence of the inherent inadequacies of the dominant 
western theological paradigm against which it came into conflict, the 
assurance displayed in its rejection was itself misplaced. 
Consequently, its solution was misguided. But such a criticism does 
not lead necessarily to an impasse, for there is a possible via media. 
Perhaps here I should introduce my own 'prejudice: ' it is one 
grounded in the belief that the way forward in christological 
interpretation is to be found not in a revolution over but within the 
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dominant paradigm. At the very heart of the data inherent to early 
Christian prejudices, to the earliest of paradigms iiP essential 
components left undeveloped not only at their initial formulation but 
alsu in subsequent development. There is, firstly, the belief that we 
meet the threefoldness of God in the act of incarnation, and that 
secondly, the Son becomes incarnate by the power of the Spirit and as 
human being receives the Spirit at baptism. At the very least, we 
may say that on both accounts there aPPears to be an intimate 
relation between the being of God as Son in incarnation and that of 
the Spirit. 
So why has this relation not been expanded in any significant way? 
The answer lies, perhaps, in the way by which this data has been 
filtered through a particular paradigm or set of prejudices, By 
preferring a paradigm which stressed the primacy of the Word in 
incarnation to the exclusion of the Spirit, a foundation has been 
established which unconsciously precludes any serious development in 
understanding and interpreting the Spirit's relation to the Son in 
incarnation. 
My concern, therefore, is with the place attributed to the Spirit in 
incarnat ion: a pneumatological interest within a thoroughly 
christological setting, demanding a re-orientation of our dominant 
christological prejudice. As Macmurray points out, this involves 
entering relatively uncharted territory 'where every step may lead us 
astray. ' It is my belief, however, that until we do so, our competing 
paradigms will remain incommensurable, (Kuhn). However, I also 
believe that there can be a level of commensurability between 
paradigms, (Popper). In relation to our consideration of the two 
dominant and competing sets of prejudices of Antioch and Alexandria, 
I believe they will only become commensurable once we begin to take 
seriously the place scripture, tradition and Christian experience 
attribute the Spirit in incarnation. Only then shall we be more 
adequately furnished with the means to ascertain whether our 
historical prejudices have been truly benefical in the believer's 
quest of fide-s quaerens intelleCtLIM. 
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Our task is, therefore, to present a meaningful interpretation of the 
Spirit's role in incarnation within the predominant christological 
paradigm. It is this goal towards which this thesis has striven. 
Like Macmurray, I have to admit that such a change in the basis of 
our theory, for that is what I believe the result may be, will indeed 
be arrived at only after a 'long, co-operative process, ' a process 
which has begun to gain momentum in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. 
It has been, therefore, a great encouragement to discover in the 
sermons of Edward Irving what may be described in Kuhnian terms as a 
$revolution' in theological perspective. It is a revolution in 
theoloEical knowledge, not in the sense that here we confront new 
hitherto undisclosed data, quite the reverse! Rather, what we 
confront in Irving is not a rejection of data, but a reappraisal of 
the same data from within a changed set of prejudices; from within a 
new paradigm. 
The method assumed in this thesis has been undertaken in order to 
highlight the way in which Irving understands the two fundamental 
components of his christology from within this new set of prejudices, 
this alternative paradigm. These I have identified as the being of 
God and human being, In so doing, not only have we, for the first 
time, an explicit presentation of Irving's understanding of the being 
of God and human being, but the means by which we are able to grasp, 
more clearly, his interpi-etation of incarnation from within this 
particular paradigm. In so doing, it is my hope to present Irving's 
christology as a means by which our context of christological 
possibilities is expanded; by which we may realise the place we give 
to the Spirit in incarnation and in his relation to both Father and 
Son, As a result, we may assist those who nervously feel the 
traditional form of christology has met its 'Judgement day, '4 that 'we 
have seen the best of our time. "- It is my belief that this, however 
does not necessarily need to be judgment day, but simply a new 
morning of theological enterprise. 
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2. FOOTNOTES. 
J. Macmurray: The Self as Agent. London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1957, p85. 
2. K. R. Popper: Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of 
Scientific Knoweidge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
3. T. S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 19701. 
4. E. Dickenson: Collected Poems, New York: Routledge, 1982, p112. 
5. King Lear, Scene 1 Act 2. 
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PART I: IRVING'S DOCTRINE OF DIVINE BEING. 
- 16- 
1. Introduction. 
What is it that we know so well and cannot speak? What is it 
that we want to say and cannot tell? What is it that keeps 
swelling in our hearts its grand and solemn music, that is aching 
in our throats, that is pulsing like a strange, wild grape, 
through all the conduits of our blood, that maddens us with its 
exultant and intolerable Joy and that leaves us tongueless, 
wordless, maddened by our fury to the end? We do not know. All 
that we know is that we lack a tongue that could reveal, a 
language that could perfectly express the wild Joy swelling to a 
music in our heart, the wild pain welling to a strong ache in our 
throat, the wild cry mounting to a madness in our brain, the 
thing, the word, the Joy we know so well, and cannot speak? ' 
Theology, like history, repeats itself: it has to, so few people pay heed to 
it. But Christian theology, unlike history, traditionally does so in the 
dialectic of historical and trans-historical inquiry. Herein lies its 
essential character, the belief that within human history, the infinite and 
transcendent are expressed in a particular manner, in the history of Jesus 
Christ. At this nexus we confront the being of God, being both in terms 
of essence and action. In the dialectic between the historic and the 
transcendent we confront the hermeneutical problem of theology: the 
trinitarian expression of God's being demands interpretation. However, at 
a time when it is no longer fashionable to celebrate Truth but rather the 
impersonal IT by which we create our own definition of being, the task 
befalls the theologian to re-present and re-construct the givenness of the 
Christian story in a manner that makes sense to the respective audience 
whilst at the same time respecting the content of the Gospel. 
The mystery of language, by which this task occurs, lies in its self- 
effacing character: "nihil de suo habens sed totum de illa scientla de qua 
nascitur, It has its being in its revealing. "2 However, it is hardly 
impotent: the object of revelation requires some sort of conceptuality in 
order to facilitate expression. The miracle of human language3 is 
expressed not only in this creative act, but in the fecundity and 
creativity to which these formulated ideas lend themselves. A word 
becomes the key to unlock a world of ideas; ideas, which in turn take root, 
develop and lend themselves to further creativity. If this human 
creativity manifests itself in the capacity to express and identify, then 
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its supreme illustration lies in its ability to give form to that which 
never before has been expressed, So ventured John; 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God ... And the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among Lis, 
full of grace 3nd tr-uth, 4 
Never before had such an object required expression: something hitherto 
unspoken broke through the established perimeters identifying God's being, 
demanding concept ualisat ion. What now does it mean to talk of a God 
whose Word is expressed in incarnation? Surely not that Jesus Christ 
introduces us for the first time to an understanding of God, but rather 
that "the history of Jesus becomes a route to rethink the doctrine of 
God ... Jesus Christ 'intersects' with those understandings of and questions 
about God which human beings already have, calling into question what is 
known and compelling a rethinking of received conceptions. "'- 
So the hermeneutical task of the Church is begun, involving a longer and 
more protracted history of linguistic and philosophical definition. The 
history of this latter development, however, did not develop in unison with 
the initial response of the first Christian communities, Rather, it 
assumed a twofold approach in its inquiry of the Divine being: the 
explication on the one hand of the essential unity of God (De Deo uno), and 
the triunity of God, (De Deo trino) on the other. Despite the human 
proclivity to stress either the unity or triunity of God, each at the 
expense of the other, the theologoumenon has become an interpretative 
principle by which God's being is explained, and thus a necessary element 
of Christian belief. We may express the relationship between the act of 
God in Christ and the theologoumenon in terms similar to that between 
object and language. The 'object' in question, God's incarnation, finds both 
expression through and meaning in language: the theologoumenon. Whilst 
faith is placed in the saving action of God in Jesus Christ, we understand 
this saving action in light of its theologoumenon. Consequently, the 
earliest experiences of the God of Jesus Christ necessitated a distinction 
to be made within the Divine being, as Father, Son and Spirit, in order to 
make sense of this saving action. On the basis of their experience in and 
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through Jesus Christ, the early Christian communities confessed faith in a 
God who is both the one and the many, 
When we turn to consider the theological basis of Edward Irving's doctrine 
of Christ, it is of interest to note that at a time when post-Kantian 
theological method dictated a distinct separation between the doctrines of 
God and Christ, the method of intimately associating the two reflects that 
assumed by Edward Irving, who sought to express a hermeneutic which 
united them in a manner more radical than had hitherto been presented 
within his tradition. 
1.2. Unity and Diversity. 
The manner by which he achieves this reflects his unity with and 
difference from his own theological tradition. His unity with that 
tradition is reflected in the priority Irving gives to the scriptural 
presentation of Jesus Christ: both as the Johannine incarnate Word, and as- 
the inspired man of the Synoptics. The one we come to know as Father, Son 
and Spirit is the God of Scripture. The practical task of identifying 
God's being distinguishes the Christian God from all others: he is the God 
of Scripture, Therefore, Irving seeks to identify the being of God in 
terms of this scriptural givenness. His is not the God of the 
philosophers: the identity of God remains firmly attached to t he biblical 
revelation, 
However, any given hermeneutic is moulded by the specific context within 
which the interpreter exists. For Irving, his context demanded a 
practical and scriptural end-, knowledge of God must be practical, It must 
arouse the hearer to service and devotion for God. It serves the needs of 
the believers. In this he follows his Calvinistic tradition. Like Calvin's, 
his doctrine of God is not a highly refined dogma, He has little to say 
on the nature of God in any abstract sense, and gives no systematic 
account of the existence, nature and attributes of God. 
Who is our God? He is the one we meet in Scripture - and in each present 
history. Although complete and essential knowledge of God is beyond human 
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comprehension, knowledge of the mysteriUM trinitatis is given through his 
gracious action primarily in the historical act of incarnation and the 
ongoing action of God in redemption from the Church out to the created 
order. Thus, Irving's theologla is dictated by his oikonomia in a manner 
similar to that of the Fathers, typified by Basil, who affirms that "the 
divine nature is too exalted to be perceived as objects of enquiry are to 
be perceived, " and thus, are we, of necessity "guided in the investigation 
of the divine nature by its operations, "'E' However, it is also of 
consequence that Irving's oikonomia, unlike many of the Fathers, is 
intimately moulded by his theoloEia. The specific implication of this 
point of method will become more explicit as our discussion of Irving's 
doctrines of God and human being develops. 
Like Calvin, Irving understands the doctrine of the Trinity to be a 
postulate of the believer's profoundest religious experience, given in the 
very act of salvation itself, -7 Nevertheless, he clearly differentiates 
between the 'order of being' and the 'order of knowing. ' Although the 
triune God is understood to be the source of all being, Irving seeks to 
present an epistemology which is built upon his understanding of the being 
of God, and which is the linch-pin to his understanding of salvation. 
Unlike the methods adopted by his contemporaries Schleiermacher and 
Coleridge, 19 the being of the triune God becomes the conceptual and 
theological key to Irving's entire thought, for he understands it to 
undergird the very credibility of his christology and therefore of any 
meaningful and adequate doctrine of salvation, 
If the doctrine of the Trinity be the foundation of all orthodox 
doctrine.. If the Trinity be the only eternally existing substance, 
from the operation of whom all things that are have been created 
out of nothing that is seen, but out of the invisible will, word, 
and Spirit of the Godhead; if all things that are, and everything 
that is, be but the shewing forth of the Divine Essence of the 
Triune God.. then I do say, that every act of the preacher of the 
gospel is incomplete, yea, is not an act of preaching Christ, 
which doth not contain the three offices of the Divine Persons, 
and display them. -3' 
It is not, however, the success or lack of success of Irving's hermeneutic 
vis-6-vis Calvin's which most interests us: at present, It is rather two 
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facts which his theological method raises with particular force. Firstly, 
Irving re-presents to the theological West a movement away from the 
"Augustinian emphasis upon the philosophical premis of divine unity" which 
tends to flatten the distinction between the persons of the Trinity. 10 
The inbreaking of the Divine presence in incarnation is that which 
determines the Christian experience of God: God's history has become our 
history. Arguing both empirically and analogically, Irving distinguishes 
between Divine and human being whilst holding to the belief that the 
Church's experience of God reveals something of the Divine Mystery. This 
is argued, however, not from any a priori philosophical concept of God, but 
rather from his scriptural and formularistic understanding, wherein is 
reflected the continuity with his theological inheritance, as well as the 
means by which his doctrine of God is safeguarded from any abstract 
speculation. " 
Conversely, in what way does Irving's differ from this tradition? Herein 
do we touch on the very kernel thrust of our thesis, for it our desire to 
show the relevant development Irving makes of that theological tradition 
which he inherited, and that he did so specifically by developing his 
understanding of God's being as Spirit both in incarnation and in Godhead. 
In Part I it is, our purpose, therefore, to present Irving's doctrine of God 
as well as to show how he establishes from it a means of facilitating a 
pneumatic dimension to his understanding of incarnation, 
2. The Grace of God. 
Irving's thoughts on the doctrine of God as Trinity were given shape and 
form in 1825 by means of a series of sermons on the Trinity, preached to 
his Hatton Garden congregation, Little attention was accorded them then 
nor in 1828 when they were first put into print. Subsequent biographers 
and scholars have continued this inattention to the creative expression 
Irving gives to his understanding of the being of God. Subsequently, the 
importance of these germinal sermons to Irving's theology has gone 
unnoticed, the only exception to this trend being Irving's early biographer 
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when commenting upon the early sermons on the Trinity first preached at 
his Hatton Garden church. 
These sermons, though of a very different character from those 
bursts of bold and splendid oratory by which the preacher had 
made his great reputation, are perhaps more remarkable than any 
of his other productions. ý 
However, this overall inattention is wholly in character with the events 
surrounding Irving's life, The heated examination within which his 
doctrine of the human nature of Christ was deliberated, itself, was 
divorced from its relation to God's being expounded in these early sermons, 
It is, however, uncertain whether a full appreciation of Irving's doctrine 
of God would have aided or abetted the final denunciation, for it reflected 
the same degree of individuality as that found in his later christological 
sermons. 1---4 
This streak of individuality manifests itself in the fact that whilst it is 
for the many to accede, only the few inquire. What is acceptable for the 
former, often remains unsatisfactory for the latter. Irving's theology 
identifies him as one of 'the few, ' for whilst the many are content to 
assent to credal belief in one God who is Father, Son and Spirit, Irving's 
interest lies both in ontological enquiry "concerned primarily with BeInE, " 
and with the ontical in its concern "primarily with entities and the facts 
about them. 1114 With particular respect to his doctrine of God, he seeks 
not so much to explain the existence of God as one and many, as to give 
theological expression to the creative activity of Father, Son and Spirit 
in incarnation and redemption. Therefore, his is not an explicit analysis 
of God's being, Rather, it is a theological means geared to a specifically 
soteriological end: the manner by which the grace of God comes with 
certainty to the object of this grace, human being in its separation from 
God. 
Yet his is also a concern to delineate the subject of grace, for if human 
beings are the objects of divine grace, from whence and from whom does 
this grace flow? Within what context may we identify this grace and by 
what means may we be certain that we are indeed beneficiaries of divine 
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grace? Irving's answer incorporates two distinct criteria. Firstly, that 
the quality of grace is contingent upon its source, that is, it is God's 
grace. Thus, Irving is at pains to establish the Son's divinity in order to 
contest the Arian, Socinian and Unitarian notions that the Son is an 
exalted creature, "- Secondly, that the identity of the source of grace may 
be extrapolated solely from the act of incarnation: God's saving action in 
Christ delineates the perimeters for our understanding of divine being. 
Both criteria are united in a series of sermons based upon Ephesians 1: 2, 
"Grace to you and peace from our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. " In 
these sermons, his focus is upon God's being as Father and Son, with 
specific stress upon the identity and status of the Son, 
Irving approaches the divine mystery in a twofold manner: when arguing for 
the divine unity and equality of Father, Son and Spirit, his apolpEia aims 
to establish the divinity of the Son, The divinity of the Spirit stands or 
falls with that of the Son. In addition, the theological rule, opera 
trinitatis ad extra SUnt indivis-a, enables Irving to clarify his basic 
premis. When establishing the plurality and individuality of the divine 
persons, he apportions each a specific activity within the overall 
indivisible divine economy, The unity of divine action ad extra highlights 
the distinction of divine being ad intra. God's being as Father, Son and 
Spirit, in unity and triunity, is reflected in the manner of divine 
operation. Conversely this unity of action distinguishes itself at the 
same time in a diversity of operation. Our knowledge of God's being 
corresponds to the way in which God makes himself known in and through 
Jesus Christ, This is a point of Irving's christology we shall return to 
in detail at a later point in our discussion of his doctrine of God. 
I 
In his sermons on Ephesians Irving focuses specifically upon the persons 
of Father and Son, for reasons both deductive and theological. 
Theologically, he wishes to affirm the self-effacing character of the 
Spirit, I '-- In practice, however, it would appear self-defeating to 
investigate that which is ultimately 'self-effacing. ' It is at this point 
that we confront a specific tension evident throughout Irving's work which 
results from three components: the personal, the metaphysical and the 
pneumatic. Firstly, Irving's inquiring mind is as concerned with the 
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dynamic by which his credo holds together as it is with its content, so, 
he seeks to give full expression to the reality of God's being- in-act ion, 
Secondly, he is concerned to harmonise God's- being- f or- us with an 
adequately assuring soteriology, The means by which he attempts to solve 
this involves highlighting, thirdly, the character and action of the self- 
effacing Spirit of God. Irving expresses well the tension he recognises in 
embarking upon such a method: 
And as it is a sign of infirmity and sickness to be talking about 
our health, and economising our powers of action, so it is a sign 
of weakness in the spirit to be talking about the Spirit and 
searching into His office, and f ee ling for His influence.. 
Nevertheless-it is also true that-the Holy Spirit bear(s) 
testimony of (h imself) whenever (his) divine personality is called 
into question. 
17 
Whether or not Irving is correct in this conclusion does not concern us 
here: what is of importance to note is the foundation he lays for future 
theological development. It is this foundational pneumatic component which 
subsequent commentators on Irving's christology have ignored, namely, the 
self-effacing role of the Spirit in any act of the Godhead. As a result, 
the significance of Irving's appreciation for the being and action of God 
the Spirit in creation, incarnation and redemption has been over-looked, 
with the more dramatic ecclesial and theologically naive aspects of his 
christology blurring the theological depth to his thinking. However, 
before this may be meaningfully expressed, we must turn our attention 
first to the means by which Irving establishes the identity and divinity of 
the Son. Such a task introduces us to the hermeneutical problem implicit 
in the Church's christological debate, whether, "the divine that has 
appeared on earth and reunited man with God" is "identical with the 
supreme divine, which rules heaven and earth, or is ... a demigod? """' 
When we turn to his Trinity sermons, we find Irving applies himself to 
this debate by means of the Son's relation to the Father. He f ocuses 
particularly upon Ephesians 1: 2 for therein he finds combined the notions 
of God's being ad intra alongside the grace made known to human beings in 
the divine economy. Moreover, the source of this grace, despite the 
plurality of persons, is unequivocally singular, If the grace itself is 
neither shared nor divided between the Father and Son, however, by what 
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means does it come into being? 
Seeing that it is not in the way of share or division that the 
grace and peace cometh from these two Divine fountains) it must 
be in the way of passage or transition from the one to the other 
.. from God our Father to our Lord 
Jesus Christ. `9 
For Irving, God the Father is the supreme subject of all divine action. 
But whilst God's being as Father is causa sul sufficiens, the sufficient 
cause of himself, he is neither individual nor independent. God as Father 
is related ontologically with God as Son. Thus the source of grace is 
neither divided nor independent: both the Father and the Son define the 
source of divine grace. Irving expresses the relation between Father and 
Son in a monarchical manner which becomes the hermeneutical key to unlock 
the problem of God's being as Trinity, setting in motion the dynamic and 
interpersonal identity of the one who identifies himself in this 
individuated unity, The Father is prior to yet equal with the Son. 
I lay it down as the first principle in all sound theology that 
the fulness of the Father is poured into the Son, and returneth 
back through the Holy Spirit unto the Father, all creatures being 
by the Holy Spirit brought forth of the Son, in order to ex press 
a part of the Father's will and ot His delight in His Son, which 
they do by union with the Son, promised through the Holy 
Ghost, 20 
It is this principle of causality which Irving uses to maintain the 
distinction he understands to exist between the Divine persons, His 
understanding of incarnation, wherein is revealed the filial obediance of 
the Son to the Father, enables Irving to interpret God's being as Father as 
the fulcrum by which we gain access to the mystery of divine being. Like 
Athanasius, 21 Irving affirms the divine identity and status of the Son 
from the affirmation of God as Father, It is this which is the major 
thrust of his apologia, with the secondary relationship between Son and 
Word threading itself throughout his argument. Both shall be examined 
separately for the sake of simplification and clarity. Our attention here 
focuses on the place Irving attributes to each in his analysis of God's 
being. However, this is not to suggest any attempt to explain away the 
mysterium trinitati-s: although the Trinity is above reason, ultimately, it 
is not against it. Rather, his method reflects the overall goal of his 
thinking: the means by which God's grace is given to fallen human beings. 
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Consequently, before he presents the means by which this grace is made 
available, he sets his mind to establish, deductively, the equality of being 
that exists between the Father and Son. 
2.1. The Son and the Word. 
The function of language, for Irving, lies not in making a word work 
'terribly hard' and rewarding it for so doing, but rather in the ease and 
precision by which a word expresses and illumines its predicate, Like 
Alice, he questions any extravagent claims attributed to particular 
words. 2-2 Rather, there is an intimate relation between language and 
thought, word and object, We see this most clearly in the way Irving 
stresses the intentional relation between theoloEia and oikonomia: what is 
the relevance of 'God-talk`ý The answer for Irving, is derived from 
incarnation, from the economy of salvation. Throughout his Trinity sermons 
he argues from his understanding of and implications involved in 
incarnation. Therefore, his understanding of the dynamic of incarnation 
underlies his entire argument, moulding the concepts which finally express 
his understanding of God's being. 
What, for instance, is the significance of God's being as 'Word' when 
applied to the second person of the Trinity? Because Irving derives the 
basis of his knowledge of God from God's gracious activity towards us in 
incarnation, he is adament in his answer: 
There could be no manifestation of the grace of God in the 
purpose of redemption from the simple knowledge of Christ as the 
Word. 2-3 
The being of God as Word fails to express the essential nature of the one 
who becomes known through Jesus Christ. It is unable to communicate the 
full import of what God does in Christ, and subsequently retards the 
soteriological implications Irving understands as implicit to any 
interpretation of divine being. Irving identifies two significant 
implications in holding to a purely Logos- christology, God's being as Word 
affords only the idea of ý? ijll and as such, bears no revelation of grace, 
which is the attribute of a person, not a mere will, Whilst Irving places 
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great stress on the notion of 'will, ' as we shall have reason to note 
throughout the entire thesis, he consistently holds to a distinction 
between 'person' and 'will'. Consequently, the identification of Christ as 
God's Word can express at best only his ability to participate in and 
reveal the Father's will, in a manner similar to the way in which human 
words express the thoughts of the subject. However, in the same way that 
a word is not essentially related to the one from whom it proceeds, so the 
Word of God is not essentially related to nor capable of expressing its 
subject, the one from whom it proceeds. 
How, therefore, can God's being as Son express that which his being as 
Word cannot? The answer lies in the place Irving accords to the notion of 
full and free love of one person to another. To identify Christ as Word 
is to identify him in a manner that is insufficient to express the 
relationality of God's being, not only ad intra, but also in his being-for- 
others. If the Word contains in itself the idea of one who shares in and 
expresses the Father's will it is only by means of all that is inherent in 
the notion of Sonship, that there is inferred the notion of love. 
The Word doth express His participation of all the Father's 
counsels, and His office in revealing them all- but the Son is 
that which expresseth His full possession of the Father's 
undivided affections, wrapping up in Himself all that love upon 
which the universe was to lean, as H- wrapped up in his name of 
the Word all that wisdom by which the universe was to subsist. 
If it be an essential part of the eternal purpose of the Godhead 
revealed by Christ, that it contains the fulness of the Father's 
love in surrendering, as well as of the Father's wisdom in 
manifesting Christ, then I say that He who was surrendered must 
have been in the full possession of all the Father's love, as well 
as a sharer of all the Father's wisdom; or that He must have 
been Son as well as Word from all eternity. There is the same 
connexion between His office of Prophet in time and His 
personality of Word from eternity, as there is between His office 
of Saviour in time and of Son from eternity, - the one 
expressing a portion of the incommunicable wisdom of God which 
He was fraught withal; the other expressing a portion of the 
incommunicable love of God, whereof the fulness was poured into 
His single bosom, which can alone contain the ocean of it 
fulness. 21 
What is of importance to note here is the priority Irving gives to the 
idea of relatedness, and the subsequent relations involved. The givenness 
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of God's being transcends the mere capacity to communicate. God's being is 
in his relating. In as much as God's being as Word communicates only an 
impersonal form of relatedness, an impersonal God is unable to effect the 
personal redemption Irving understands to be the consequence of God's 
grace. Rather, it is only as Son that Christ receives the Father's love, 
and is subsequently able to make this love, rather than a bare will, 
known,: 21- 
2.2. The Son and the Father. 
Irving has now established the first stage in his ontology: for the work 
of Christ to reveal anything more than the bare will of God, God's being- 
for-us must embrace both the creative capacity to communicate, as Word, as 
well as the capacity to love, as Son. This, however, is insufficient to 
establish the divine and equal status the Son shares with the Father. 
Consequently, Irving turns his attention to establishing the identity of 
the Son in his relation to the Father, In so doing, he seeks to highlight 
the intimate relationship the identity of the one has with the other. 
2.2.1. The Son as Creature. 
The problematic of God's being as Trinity implicates specific hermeneutical 
questions. lf God's being is made known to us through a Son, is this Son 
identical with the 'supreme divine' or is he a 'demigod"? One historical 
and repetitive solution has been given in the Arian, Socinian and Unitarian 
notion that the Son is a creature. 
The problem of God's creatureliness, for it is indeed a problem for those 
who confess an incarnated God, is addressed by Irving on soteriological 
grounds. If the Son is a creature, even the highest of all creatures, even 
that one through whom all others come into being, then Irving identifies 
three consequences. Firstly, any act of divine affection solely upon this 
one creature, which is not extended upon all creatures, rather than 
eliciting love and adoration, will excite "envy and disgust in all other 
creatures to behold God lavishing such excess fondness, and bestowing such 
amplitude of love upon one creature, and exalting him by such immeasurable 
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titles and unparalleled honours unto His own immediate presence and 
fellowship and blessedness ... This Socinianism 
is the destruction and death 
of all confidence of the creatures towards God, and must of necessity 
beget distance and reserve when they behold such ravishment and 
blandishment upon one above the rest. "2'-' 
Secondly, God 's- being- as- creature, even as created Logos, is incapable of 
reflecting, on its own, the perfect and complete image of the invisible 
God. Whereas the Word may reveal the will from which it proceeds, as 
creature it is yet incapable of a complete revelation of God's will or 
mind. It affords only a visible creation, and a creaturely manifestation 
and understanding of that will. Fundamental to Irving's christology is the 
belief that nothing specifically created can reveal fully the work of its 
creator, The upshot of this, . 
therefore, is that in ascribing mere 
creaturely existence to Christ, either as Word or as Son, the mu-sterlum 
tr, initatis of God's being continues to remain hidden. Thus Irving argues: 
How can there be complete trust or assured love towards one 
whom we have no complete revelation of, I cannot conceive. I do 
not mean that it is necessary to comprehend God, in order to 
love Him and trust Him. You know how often I have exposed the 
profanity of such a thought as that we can comprehend God, or 
that He should be comprehensible-But if He is a creature that 
hath been manifested, then it is at best a work of God we have 
been contemplating, not God himself, who is still as much behind 
the veil as ever; and revelation is no revelation; and, in truth, 
there is no revelation made of God himself, but only of a 
creature of God. 21 -7 
Thirdly, to claim that such a creature is commissioned by God for the 
purpose of revelation is of little consequence, for at best all that can be 
revealed is the creature's understanding of God: a comprehension that is 
finite, no matter how capacious the creature's abilities. Therefore, no 
matter how elevated is the status of the Son as creature, his ontic status 
remains creaturely. Consequently, Irving perceptively argues that if, "I am 
a piece of God's workmanship as well as he, (I) may teach him a lesson, as 
properly as he may teach me one. And the lesson I learn from him can in 
no wise obliterate the lesson I learn from myself, And if these disagree, 
then ... I will cleave 
to my own intimate acquaintance with my dear self, 
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rather than to any message brought to me from afar by another, who is but 
a creature like myself. ": 21 
The significance of this point is not to be understated, for it represents 
a defiant contemporary, theological stand. Whilst prevailing theological 
methods were moving towards an anthropic centre of theological 
interpretation, Irving radicalised the theocentric in an attempt to hold 
together that which his contemporaries were rendering apart, namely, the 
doctrines of Christ and God's triune being. We shall deal with in detail 
one example of this contemporaneous difference in method in Part III of 
our thesis. However, the modernity of Irving's thought is revealed in his 
stress on the manner of revelation, for it anticipates more modern 
interpretations of the Trinity, 23 Although we have not reached a full 
explication of Irving's argument, we are already introduced to the ideas of 
the one who is Revealed and the Revealer. We now turn our attention to 
the manner by which he establishes the full divine status of the one who 
is the object of revelation. 
2.2.2. The Son as Divine. 
Irving moves his argument to its final goal. God's being as Word, makes 
us privy solely to the bare will of God, It is only as God's being as Son 
that Christ establishes the full character of the being of God as Father. 
However, his argument, at this point, remains open to Arian, Socinian and 
Unitarian interpretations; that curious tautology which envisages the Son 
to be a 'divine creature. ' It is now in our interest to delineate how 
Irving affirms the ontological status of the Son with the Father, This he 
explicates by means of a twofold rejection, 
Firstly, he rejects the notion that, "Christ is a Divine person, the same in 
substance and equal in power and glory with the Father, but that he is not 
the Son from all eternity, but only from the day of his earthly generation, 
or from some higher date which is still in time, ": 3'0 He returns once again 
to his central premis: we gain no ontological description of God's being 
from such a concept. The relations- of Fatherhood and Sonship remain 
circumstantial and accidental. If the Son is dependent upon an origin in 
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time for the purposes both of redemption and revelation, wherein lies any 
essential knowledge of God? 
For when you say that Christ is not Son from eternity, you say 
that God is not a Father from eternity; and when you say that 
Christ is Son only with relation to the work of redemption, you 
say that God is Father only with relation to the same. -31 
Throughout his argument, Irving pushes his hermeneutic further in order to 
establish an ontological description of the persons of the Trinity which 
elucidates and accommodates the Christian Gospel. "If God be not known as 
Father, save to fallen men, nor Christ as Son, as what are they known? " 
Not as Will or Word, he continues, for although both are expressions of the 
Godhead, they reveal "no love or parental care, goodness, no grace, 
expressed by that mode of stating and apprehending the relation between 
the everlasting Persons. "*"2 
Fundamental to Irving's christology, therefore, is the belief that Jesus 
Christ is God's being as Son for us, However, Irving is not content to 
rest at this, His concern involves the grounds of sonship: how is he Son? 
By what manner does his Sonship consist? Having addressed the origin of 
the Son's existence within time, and found it insufficient to establish the 
idea of paternai love, Irving turns his attention to that notion he deems 
most subtle in its heterodoxy, namely that God's being as Son is derived 
"from the eternal purpose of God, in which He gave Himself as an offering 
for sin - in that it is not essential to Him as the eternal Word, but 
belongs to Him as party in the everlasting covenant and all inclusive 
purpose of God. "ýý3: 3 To the casual reader, this may appear to be 
theological hair-splitting! How can we talk of an eternal being who has a 
point of origin? Having thwarted the idea that the Son's origin is derived 
from a point in time, there still remains the need to clarify the exact 
manner of his eternal origination, as traditionally held by the Church 
catholic, 
When we consider that Irving's single goal is to establish the full 
divinity of the Son with the Father in a manner consistent with the nature 
of salvation offered in the Christian Gospel, we see that he wrestles, in 
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this particular instance, with the most subtle of intrusions as he nears 
the end of his critical analysis of those notions he considers less than 
adequate to establish his goal. Here, he confronts the notion that the 
identity of Christ as Son of God is derived from his being as Word rather 
than from his relation to the Father. The subtle interpretation of the 
primacy of the Word over the Son, the office of the Son being a cognate of 
the Divine will, establishes the ultimate ground of being as that of 'will', 
rather than 'person'. To identify the Son in this manner is to preclude 
any essential union between Father and Son, for he does not originate from 
the being of God as Father, but from the eternal covenant of God with his 
creation. As such, the Son is not eternal with the Father, but an exalted 
creature. 
Herein Irving opposes the arguments of his opponents, Only God's being as 
eternal and essential Son fulfils both the divine purpose of redemption 
and reveals to us the relation of love between Father and Son. Herein 
lies the significance in unlocking the mystery of divine being by the 
notion of 'grace: ' "the greatness of the grace is according to the 
greatness of the love which was set aside. "" Consequently, the status of 
Sonship must be essentially identical with that of Father. 
His pre-existence as the Son of God is essential; his pre- 
existence as the Word is not sufficient to constitute the purpose 
as I find it written in all the Scriptures. For this purpose is 
not a purpose of will only, but it is a purpose of goodness, and 
of grace, and of mercy, and of bounty, - in one word, it is a 
purpose of love, according to the good pleasure of His will.. Now 
the relation of Word-gives us no idea of love, but of will only; 
and without the revelation of Father and Son, we have not that 
idea, Wherefore it is absolutely necessary to the formation of a 
purpose which should contain the infinitude of all grace, that 
the Father should have known Christ as Son in the act of His 
origination, and loved Him with the fulness of the love of God, 
in order that, when He was surrendered in the purpose, we might 
be able to discern the fulness of the grace of God unto all 
creation,: 3'- 
Finally, we arrive at the object of Irving's diallage, from which he 
delineates his theological perspective on the issues most pressing. 
Christ's identity as Word is insufficient to support a consistent doctrine 
of salvation. For God to be known as loving Father, Christ must be 
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identified as eternal Son, and not merely as Word: the former has priority 
over the latter, Only an eternal and essential generation of the Son from 
the Father establishes a divine status and meaning to the source of grace, 
Having defended his understanding of God's being as Father and Son, Irving 
is now at liberty to transcend the critical element in his apoloEia, and 
move towards constructing his own theological solution to the particular 
issues that have been raised, However, in order to highlight the 
significance of Irving's own solution, we turn to the earlier solution 
developed by the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Caeserea, Gregory of Nyssa 
and Gregory of Nazianzus, which developed the Church's understanding of 
divine being in a manner that facilitated fuller appreciation of God's 
being as Spirit. 
3. A Point of Comparison. 
Since its origins the Christian faith has struggled to express adequately 
the very nature and character of divine being. Whilst editing and 
compiling the early oral traditions maintained by the first Christian 
communities, the Gospel writers felt no strain in presenting Jesus, the 
Christ, in terms of equality with the God he made known as Father. 
Neither did they shrink from suggesting, in less explicit terms, equal 
status to the o ne they knew and exper ienced as Spirit-, one who was 
distinct from bot h the Father and Jesus. With casual ease, they held in 
tension both the belief that in Jesus the man, we meet the Divine Son, and 
the confession of one God who is known in the Christ-event as Father, Son 
and Comforter, or Spirit. 
This casual synthesis of the 'one' and the 'many' continues in the Epistles, 
wherein there is reference in doxology, benediction, opening and closing 
pleasantry, to an accepted equality of divine persons, Yet at no time do 
these writers express any hint of presumption in declaring a monotheistic 
God of Persons. 31 It was, so to seem, the logical conclusion from the 
Church's experience of God. There was something about the Christian 
experience of God that circumlocuted this seeming paradox of combining the 
'one' with the 'many. ' The early Christian communities' experience of God 
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, is Father, Son and Spirit long preceded any interpretation and explanation 
of the object of their experience and worship. 
Such theological scrutiny was to become a major elem 
inheritance at the end of the apostolic era. 17 The 
involved in establishing an adequate concept ua lisat ion 
the faithful to affirm the unity and diversity of God's 
by the historic and geographical contexts within which 
found itself, both East and West, But it was in the 
refined form of the doctrine of God was to develop. 
ent of the Church's 
epistemic necessity 
which would enable 
being, was dictated 
the Church catholic 
East that the most 
If that which creates History can ultimately be attributed to the divine 
afflatus - for who can teach great genius? what theory produces leaders? 
- then the emergence of the Cappadocian Fathers is to be understood as 
one historic moment moulding future theological thinking. Thus, it is to 
the Eastern trinitarian conception of God that we turn in order to 
highlight that which we shall in turn delineate from Irving's Trinity 
sermons. This in itself is an important point of method, for it is too 
easy to caricature differing theological expressions and pit the one 
against the other. Because of the different and developing traditions, of 
new contexts wherein questions and solutions are reviewed, reconsidered 
and reconstructed in order to make sense of both the Christian kerygma and 
its interpretations, whether theological or christological, the task of the 
theologian is to develop in harmony rather than develop by division that 
which is inherited, This is perhaps no more the case than when we 
consider the theological expressions which have greatly moulded trinitarian 
doctrine, whose development is not to be found in homogenised unity but in 
mysterious diversity. Thus Surin argues: 
Within these developing contexts, the various trinitarian concepts 
were deployed heuristically, as dogmatic formulation advanced 
-into the unknown. Clarity was sometimes achieved-but clarity, 
with its accompanying philosophical desiderata, coherence and 
logical rigour, were very much ideals to be reached for, rather 
than imposed willy nilly in contexts thought to be inappropriate. 
Hence, if two irreconcilable propositions. each had something to 
warrant their acceptance, then both were likely to be retained as 
possible facets of some yet to be secured truth. We are left 
with the unbridgeable dichotomy between Eastern and Western 
trinitarianism. Now it cannot be gainsaid that there are times 
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when such historically- instituted theological dichotomies just 
have to be accepted by the contemporary theologian: our 
theological forebears, whether by design or inadvertance, shaped 
the theological agenda in thiss way rather than that, thereby 
constraining the present-day theological practitioner to operate 
with certain irreducible 'givens', This, however, is simply not 
the case where the possible dichotomy between Eastern and 
Western trinitarianism is concerned-It must be acknowledged that 
tradition has given us two possible approaches to the mystery of 
the Trinity, both of which are perfectly orthodox, but which 
reflect undeniably different attitudes to the mystery, ---3*9 
The Cappadocians were the inheritors of the Church's one truly ecumenical 
statement of faith, the Council of Nicea (325), and continued its empirical 
and inductive method. -: 3": O They argued from the Christian experience of God 
as Father and Son to formulate their doctrine of God, which was to be 
vindicated at the Council of Constant inople, (381), doing so both 
empirically and analogically; the latter affirming the distinction between 
the Divine and the human, the former the belief that the Church's 
experience of God reveals something of the Divine Mystery, 
The task fell to the Cappadocians to steer the Church through the Scylla 
of Jewish monotheism, and its Christian counterpart, Sabellianism, as well 
as the Charybdis of Greek polytheism, and its Christian counterpart, 
Arianism, 40 Their task was to avoid these two opposite theologies whilst 
expressing their own understanding in God's being as Trinity. In so doing, 
they were to finally arrive at a theology which was to prove "a bulwark 
both against Ar ian subordinationism and against Sabellian uni- 
persona liSM. 0141 
The task fell to Basil of Caeserea to establish an adequate metaphysic 
within which to talk rationally of God as both 'one' and 'three' without 
implying either of the above dangers, This, however, involved no mere 
logical strategy, but ontology: the very ground of being. The task 
demanded a philological development that would facilitate talk of the one 
God which adequately embraced three persons. 
In order to avoid Sabellianism, that the three persons are three roles of 
the one God, Basil sought for a way to speak of Father, Son and Spirit as 
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three full beings, rather than roles. However, 'person' or np6awnov, did 
not carry this meaning. Rather, it suggested 'role' or 'mask', lacking any 
ontological status. Consequently, Basil performed a major conceptual shift 
in order to establish an ontology that gave full being to the word 
$person. I This he did by developing the metaphysic inherited from 
Athanasius who identified hypostasis 0')TT6aTacTtq) with OUSi, 9 (obcTia), the 
implication being that a thing's concrete individuality (1_)Tr6CTT(XCr1q) means 
simply that it is, (i. e,, its obaicx). Basil sought to re-interpret 'person, 
and upgrade its significance, This he did by re-defining hypostasis. In 
so doing, firstly, he re-interpreted Athanasius and the current use of the 
word by aligning it with 'person. ' Thus hypostasis took on a personal 
meaning gained from 'person, ' and 'pet-son' was up-graded in status by 
virtue of the ontological connotation hypostasis derived from Ousia. 
Secondly, Basil laid to rest, by means of this common nature, the 
Origenistic notion of a mediatorial Logos, so that the Son could now be 
attributed an equal status with the Father. 42 
Christian orthodoxy was at last equipped with a linguistic framework which 
enabled it to embrace the notion of 'one' and 'many. ' Sabellianism found 
its defeat in this process of re-definition, Subsequently, that which 
unites the Godhead is the common ousla; that w hich distinguishes the three 
persons are the individual hypostases. 1: 3 Thus Basil states, both: 
That of the proper nature no difference can be conceived as 
existing between one and the other, the peculiar characteristics 
shining, in community of essence, upon each. 44 
And: 
If you ask me to state shortly my own view, I shall state that 
the ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has 
to the particuiar, Every one of' us both shares in existence by 
the common term of essence Wusia) and by his own properties is 
such an one and such an one. In the same manner ... the term ousla 
is common, like goodness or Godhead, or any similar attribute; 
while hypostasis is contemplated in the special property of 
Fatherhood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify,, 4ý- 
Thus, states Kelly, the Cappadocians "analysed the conception of hypostasis 
more thoroughy than Athanasius ... They were emphatic that the three 
IIA6 hypostases share one and the same nature. In countering Sabellianism, 
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they asserted that ontological priority does not reside with a 'God' who 
revedis himself in three separate roles, but to one who is Father, Son and 
Spirit, each of whom equally shares in the Divine nature in concrete, 
particular modes of being; Fatherhood, Sonship and Sanctification, or 
Father, Son and Spirit. " What unites them, both theologically and 
olkonomically is the commonly shared ousia and the unity of divine action 
respectively. It is to the latter that attention must now be paid in order 
to appreciate the Cappadocian polemic against both the Arian accusation of 
tritheism and the assertion that the Son is a creature. 
In his Theological Orations, Gregory of Nazianzus argues for a very 
specific form of Monarchianism, Dismissing the ideas of Anarchia and 
Polyarchia as chaotic and disorderly, he states: 
Monarchy is that which we hold in honour. It is, however, a 
Monarchy that is not limited to one Person-Unity having from all 
eternity arrived by motion at Duality, found rest in Trinity. 
This is what we mean by Father and Son and Holy Ghost, The 
Father is the begetter and the Emitter: without passion-and 
without reference to time, and not in a corporal manner. The Son 
is the Begotten, and the Holy Ghost the Emission-let us confine 
ourselves within our limits, and speak of the Unbegotten and the 
4S Begotten and that which proceeds from the Father, 
For the Cappadocians, the particularising characteristics of each person of 
This the Trinity is his "manner of coming to be, "4'ý' (Tp6TrOq Týq UTI&PkEwq), 
they explained in terms of Monarchia, wherein lay the distinctions between 
each of the persons; the particular characteristic of the Father being that 
he is both unbegotten and the 'cause' (b(pXý) of both the Son and Spirit, 
the particular characteristic of the Son being begotten of the Father, 
whilst that of the Spirit being his procession from the Father, Due to the 
fact that these names represented the idiomata or hypostas-es, and not the 
ousia, the Cappadocians were able to ascribe the idea of a monarchia, a 
causality to the Trinity without implying ontological subordinationism. 
Thus, they could accord the idea of begottenness to the Son without 
implying creatureliness. 
This idea of causality was grounded in the Christian experience of God; 
our knowledge of the unity of God is derived Oikonomlcallv, from the unity 
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of divine action -a sinEle co-operating activity of the entire Trinity 
derived from a unity of Divine will. 
We do not learn that the Father does something on his own, in 
which the Son does not co-operate. Or again, that the Son acts 
on his own without the Spirit. Rather does every operation which 
extends from God to creation and is designated according to our 
differing conceptions of it have its origin in the Father, proceed 
through the Son, and reach its completion in the Holy Spirit. It 
is for this reason that the word for the operation is not divided 
among the persons involved. For the action of each in any 
matter is not separate and individualized. But what ever occurs, 
whether in reference to God's providence for us or to the 
government and constitution of the universe, occurs through the 
three Persons, and is not three separate things. -cl 
3.1. The Cappadocians and the SpLrit. 
Arianism challenged the fourth-century church to clarify its teaching on 
the Spirit. Whilst the threat from Sab ellianism was met in asserting that 
the Spirit has his own Tp6noq Un6pkEWq, the Church's new task was to define 
both the status and particularity of the Spirit against the Arian Trinity 
of "three infinitely dissimilar essences (oucyiai avo4o%oi En 
Basil attributed equal worship to the Father, Son and Spirit. From the 
unity of operation, he argued for the "'invariability of nature. "-2 
However, he never claimed the Spirit was God or consubstantial with the 
Father. '--3 This was to be developed by the two Gregories. Gregory of 
Nyssa asserted the particularity of the Spirit, the Spirit receives his 
identity from the Father who is, hypostatically, the cause (T6 C(Nutov) of 
both the Son and the Spirit. The Spirit, consequently, receives his 
identity from the Father, through the Son. -4 Whilst Gregory does call the 
Spirit 866q, he never describes the Spirit as oyioouuiov -uy Raupý. It wa--- 
Gregory of Nazianzus who openly declared the consubstantiality of the 
Spirit with the Father, asserting the full divinity of the Spirit. 
What then? Is the Spirit God? Most certainly. Well then, is He 
Consubstantial? Yes, if He is God. Lý-s 
The doctrine of God as Trinity now reached its zenith in this fullest of 
conceptual presentations. In true systematic form, Gregory explained the 
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late arrival onto the theological scene of the Spirit's divinity thus, 
The Old Testament proclaimed the Father openly, and the Son more 
obscurely. The New manifested the Son, and suggested the Deity 
of the Spirit. Now the Spirit Himself dwells among us and 
supplies us with a clearer demonstration of Himself. For it was 
not safe, when the Godhead of the Father was not yet 
acknowledged, plainly to proclaim the Son; nor when that of the 
Son was not yet received to burden us further-with the Holy 
Ghost. '-' 
3.2. A Prozression in Thought. 
Like a mobile which moves only in relation to the wind blowing against it, 
so is the ongoing task of 'trinitarian' theology: its content, like the 
mobile, remains constant moving only insofar as is required to answer the 
questions thrown up by each subsequent Zeit8-eist. -7 By means of the 
highly refined conceptual tools of ousia and hypostasis, the Cappadocians 
facilitated a theological construction which expressed belief in a God who 
is both one and many. The historical context within which their 
problematic arose, however, is far removed from that of Irving's, Although 
the problematic which both addressed was similar, (for theolpEy, like 
history, does indeed repeat itself), the manner by which each addressed 
their data highlights and in turn facilitates the ultimate expression they 
give to the identity of God as Trinity. 
God's being as Father is identified in terms of monarchy and causality 
within the Godhead. He is the fc)n-,:; trinltatl_ý_-, the 'source' and 'cause' 
from which the Son and the Spirit proceed, The unity of God's being is 
safeguarded by the fact that the Father is the only one of the Trinity who 
is 'self -originated. ' His identity as Father is the "fundamental principle 
of the Trinity-His single prerogative, His precedency in being, though not 
in time. "'-e He derives his identity from the fact that he has no origin. 
He alone is self -originated. Conversely, the common attribute of self- 
existency shared by Father-, Son and Spirit, safeguards the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
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However, for Irving, the Father is also identified as the 'abysmal Will, ' the 
'primary founder' out of whom "all things are and by whom we are, `-, -:, We 
noted that throughout his argument, Irving has been at pains to safeguard 
against the notion that the grounds of being consists of an impersonal and 
unidentified Will: the history of humanity is identified with God's history 
- the practical expression, not of brute will, but of a loving, paternal 
will. In a later sermon, 'The TheolpEy of the Natural Man, ' he argues 
against the Romantic notion of an intelligent Creator or Superior Being 
derived from scientific observations of creation. This 'primary founder' 
which Irving talks of is not to be identified with the idea of God as 
power or sovereignty, for such talk is insufficient to the notion of a 
personal God. No provision is made in his theology for the notion of a 
vestigium trinitatis. 
Now, supposing them to have made this step from the visible 
creation to an intelligent Creator, and that they did habitually, 
upon beholding nature, connect her forms and changes with a 
superior Being, they are still remote from any apprehension of 
the Christian's God, and incapable of those affection which we 
feel towards the God who is revealed in the Holy Scriptures. 
They have evidences of immeasurable power; but power doth not 
beget love.. Whoever fastens upon God' attribute of sovereignty or 
power, and placeth that chiefly before his eyes, becomes a 
timorous devotee, a superstitious, feeble slave, (-c' 
God's being as Father leads us to consider the particular identity Irving 
ascribes the Son, and in particular, the ontical identification he ascribes 
to the Son, The Cappadocians identified the particular Tp6noq un#ýEwq of 
the Son in terms of his being begotten of the Father. Irving, however, 
seeks to delineate the implications involved in talking of an eternal 
relationship between Father and Son. This he extrapolates from the New 
Testament notion that the Son is the express image of the Father. 
Concerning the mystery of the eternal generation of the Son in 
the bosom of the Father, God forbid that I should speculate, or 
even venture to think that I can comprehend it, or that I would 
liken it to anything in the heaven above or in the earth below, 
While I reverently contemplate it, and meditate upon it as as 
mystery of the Divine Being hid within Himself, and receive it 
implicitly as a matter of divine f aith, revealed for our 
knowledge of God, and comfort and delight in Him, all that I 
would attempt in discoursing thereof would be to shew unto His 
Church the streams of consolation and grace which flow from this 
most secret and mysterious fountain-The knowledge that the first 
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act of the Godhead was to generate a Son in His own image and 
likeness, who should contain the fulness of Himself, and dwell 
within Himself the object of all His delight, is such a proof 
of fellowship and communion and divine affection, as should 
fill every creature with trust and confidence, and assure our 
hearts before Him. -' 
It is not in our purpose to extrapolate from this the various implications 
of Irving's thought. Rather, what is of importance to note is the manner 
in which he remains consistent with his own Scottish, theological 
tradition, which Barth identifies as the balance between the Majesty of God 
and the Per-son of God. -ý The Majesty of God remains an ultimate mystery; 
the human mind lacks capacity to fully comprehend the incomprehensible and 
infinite. However, Irving differs from the Eastern fathers in that he 
resists any philosophical speculation in order to establish the identity of 
God's being. Secondly, and following on from this, is Irving's insistence 
that the Father chooses to reflect, or image, himself in and through his 
Son. The eternal generation of the Son, subsequently, becomes identified 
not with a bare, omnipotent will, but, rather with the loving will of the 
Father. The Son's generation consists 'in His being, then, the object of 
all affection, and delight, unto the Father before the world was. r-4 
Hitherto in his apologetic, Irving's use of both the Fatherhood of God and 
the Son's eternal generation from the Father reflects his dependence upon 
the theological tradition within which he trained, Only once does he 
suggest an element of independence which could be deemed specifically 
innovative. This we have highlighted in the place he attributes to the 
Trinity in his thought. Whereas the Cappadocians arrived at the divine 
status of the Son by means of linguistic conceptuality in distinguishing 
between ousia and hypostasis, Irving pursues the same goal without such 
linguistic dexterity. 
Irving extrapolates the divine status of the Son both in paternal and 
soteriological terms. The one who comes to us in saving grace is also the 
bearer of the Father's grace, Therefore, there is an intimate relation 
between what Irving identifies as the filial and soteriological identity of 
Christ. If the Cappadocian apoloEia was abstracted from any explicit 
soteriological implications, then Irving's is a complete reversal in 
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theological method, as we have noted above, The Cappadocians, despite 
their remonstrations to the contrary, treated data about God as primary 
data which could be treated as an object of investigation over against 
oneself . Irving, however, consistently treats such 
data as secondary data 
contingent upon the context within which human beings find themselves: 164 
God's trinitarian being is intimately associated with his saving action. 
Consequently, as we turn to consider the manner by which Irving delineates 
his understanding of God's being as Spirit in relation to that of Father 
and Son, we confront an innovation that moves away from the conceptual 
method for expressing divine being of the Cappadocians, to one that draws 
more heavily upon the specific relation of the Spirit. 
4. Irving and the 5piEit. 
However much we may agree in sentiment with Mackey's remark that 
"trinitarlan theology stands or falls with the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit, "'-'- we must add that the degree to which it stands or falls is 
contingent upon the specific identity given to the Spirit, The doctrine of 
the Spirit remains the Achilles' heel of trinitarian thought, With Gregory 
Nazianzus' triumph in systematising most fully Cappadocian thought, the 
Spirit's role in the divine economy came to be interpreted via fourth 
century theistic presuppositions, r-r> Consequently, we take leave of our 
Cappadocian comparison, and turn our attention to the first of Irving's 
major innovations within his own western tradition, 
What does it mean to affirm God's, being as Spirit? In what way does his 
being Spirit increase our knowledge of the transcendent and divine 
mystery? Herein lies the hermeneutical problem of trinitarian theology. 
The God who identifies himself as Father and Son, is further differentiated 
as Spirit, But whiist we are able to comprehend the analagous relations 
of Father and Son, that of Spirit is more evasive in that it is less self- 
explanatory. Ecclesial and dogmatic history repeats itself in consistently 
succumbing to the danger of treating God's being as Spirit both 
independent from and consequentiai to that of Father and Son. To various 
degrees, the Spirit becomes an appendage to any trinitarian 'God-talk. ' 
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Irving's solution to the trinitarian problematic does not remove God's 
being from the existential and practical needs of the Church. Rather, he 
contests that our knowledge of God's being cannot be divorced from the 
Christian experience of God in Christ and in the Church, Therefore the 
identity of the Spirit is not abstracted from what we perceive in Christ 
both in incarnation and in salvation, and experience in Christian worship. 
However, this is not to infer an identification of the economic Trinity 
with the Immanent Trinity, God's being ultimately remains a mysteriLIM 
trinitatis. This is not to affirm, however, that the Godhead is mysterious, 
Our knowledge of God as Father, Son and Spirit is derived from God's 
gracious activity towards fallen humanity. To this degree, God's being is 
in God's becoming - he makes himself known in his action towards U S. r- -7 
For Irving, the triune being of God is in harmony with the Christian 
experience of God. 
What is of interest when we analyse Irving's understanding of God's-being- 
for-himself, is his uninterest in any philosophical expression of the unity 
of God. His monotheistic trinitarianism is obviously founded upon a notion 
of the oneness of God's being. Although he alludes to the notion of a 
common divine 'substance' in fact it is always in the background of his 
thinking. Irving's concern is at all times with the personal relations 
between Father, Son and Spirit in incarnation and redemption. As a result, 
his doctrine of God as Trinity is less abstract than the Cappadocians, for 
he elucidates his understanding of the Trinity from his perception of the 
biblical data, His soteriological concerns press him to consider the 
threefold relations of the Godhead in incarnation. As as result, he refers 
very little to 'substantial' language, preferring to pursue what is an 
explicitly relational unity, The ultimate grounds of being is not def ined 
by any substantial category, Deu-s est ens super en-q only as Father, Son 
and Spirit, 
The Cappadocians attempted to solve the trinitarian problematic regarding 
the unity of divine being by mean--- of the aforementioned distinction 
between ousia and hypostasis. The result was to present the unity of God 
in a manner distinct from the bibiicai presentation of Father, Son and 
Spirit, The unity of God's being came to be expressed in mainly 
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substantial terms. Irving, however, is at pains to show that God's being 
is in God's relating: not merely in his subsisting, but in his self- 
relating. Not only so, but that the manner of relating is specifically 
pneumatic. The God who differentiates himself as Father and Son does so 
specifically through his being as Spirit. Herein lies Irving's solution to 
the trinitarian problematic, The hermeneutical problem of trinltarlan 'God- 
talk' is given a relational and, in particular, pneumatoloSical solution, 
Although we find in Irving's vocabulary the notion of 'substance, ' it 
assumes a quite different meaning from its traditional use: it denotes the 
common characteristics shared by Father, Son and Spirit - grace, love, 
justice, mercy, omnipotence. Indeed, Irving's understanding of the term 
confounds any parallel identification with Cappadocian usage, His use of 
'substance' parallels that of the Cappadocian lhypostasiss. ' 
If any one ask a Christian what is the name of his God, he doth 
not answer well unless he say, "The Father, and the Son, and the 
Holy Ghost, " And when in blessing we do say ... "The grace of our 
Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God the Father, and t he communion 
of the Holy Ghost be with you all, " we use that word God in 
connexion with the Father, not to signify that He only is God, 
but to signify His Divine substance; Just as for the same reason 
we use the title Lord Jesus Christ unto Jesus, and the title the 
Holy unto the Spirit. Ga 
It is not our purpose to determine whether or not this divergence came 
about through ignorance of the historical distinction between the 
substance and persons of the Godhead. Of greater importance is whether 
Irving's mind is suf f iciently capacious to state concisely and 
straightforwardly a theological perspective which, once having re- 
orientated the traditional means by which the Church has maintained its 
belief in the unity of Father, Son and Spirit, is able to achieve the same 
goal. 
Irving's answer turns specifically on the belief that God's being is in his 
relating, which Irving delineates in terms of Father and Son whose relation 
establishes and facilitates the notion of love. In so doing, he moves away 
from his western tradition which appropriates the title of 'Love' to the 
Spirit, Whilst Augustine suggested that if any of the Trinity "be 
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specif I ically called love, what more fitting than that this should be the 
Holy Spirit-The Holy Spirit is specifically called love, "r-9 it was Richard 
of St, Victor who developed with great insight God's being as Spirit as 
that which represents the overflow of the love between the Father and the 
Son, The Spirit is realised as the one whose existence it is within the 
70 Trinity to perfect the divine love, It is interesting to note that here 
again, we meet a philosophically deduced interpretation of God's being as 
Spirit, for although Richard is at pains to develop a biblical perception of 
divine being as Love, the manner by which he attributes this to the Spirit 
reflects more his deductive rather than scriptural presuppositions. 
When we turn to consider Irving's perception of God's being as Love, we 
discover that he applies the notion of love within the divine relations not 
to the Spirit but to the Father and Son, and in particular to the Son as 
the one who is the image of the Father's loving will. Thus he rejects the 
idea of identifying the Spirit as Love, on the grounds that "we have no 
such expression as the Father loving the Holy Spirit, or the Son loving the 
Holy Spirit - the love being always from the Father to the Son, and 
terminating in the Son, "-71 
How, therefore, does he identify God's being as Spirit? More importantly 
within a trinitarian aplogetic, if he misunderstands, or deliberately 
rejects, the notion of a unifying, divine substance, wherein lies that which 
safeguards his doctrine of God from the charge of tritheism? It is at 
this point that we are introduced to the corner-stone of his entire 
ontology, He continues the western stress in identifying the Spirit in 
terms of procession, whilst also seeking to identify the implications 
involved in this assertion, Like generation, procession implies both "the 
idea of the originating will of another, and self-existence (not creature- 
existence) in that which is originated, " Irving has used the idea of 
generation to imply "the most perfect love in him who begetteth, and the 
most perfect likeness in him who is begotten, " However, in relation to 
that which Irving believed to be implicit to the Christian Gospel, such an 
expression falls short 0 t, the Christian experience of God, both in 
scriptural and personal attestation, Herein we meet the complementbry and 
necessary role the Spirit plays within the divine community. God's being 
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as Spirit, as the one who proceeds, "implies a full and fixed purpose in 
him from whom the procession is, and an active obedience and complete 
power of fulfillment in him who proceedeth, 1172 As such, the Spirit is 
differentiated from the Father, who is self -originated, and from the Son, 
who is generated and images the Father's love, The Spirit, as we have 
noted earlier, is further distinguished from the Son in that it is only in 
the filial and paternal divine relations that we are introduced to God's 
love. 
Inasmuch as God's being as Spirit is distinguished in the act of 
procession, we continue to 'see in a glass dimly. ' There is no immediate 
analogy by which we can interpret this particularising identity. Herein 
lies the 'self-effacing' nature of the Spirit: an implicit resistance to any 
thoroughly explicit identity. He is God's being in his 'other-self -being': 
both God's being as relating for the Other and God's being relating to the 
Other. For Irving, God's being ad extr-a, in his creatureliness throughout 
the Christ-event, is the criterion by which we identify his being ad intra, 
If the purpose of creation and redemption "revealeth the activity and the 
power of the Holy Ghost to shew forth and outwardly realise-those 
correlative affections which existed in the Father and the Son, or, in 
Scripture language, to testify of the Father and the Son, " then "this 
procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and love to 
manifest their being, must have been in existence before the purpose to 
reveal the same could be formed. 11-7-: 3 
Thus far Irving has not generated any significant development within his 
theological tradition, This he develops in the manner by which he 
attributes to the Spirit a unifying relation within the divine community. 
We have already noted that Irving accords personal, though not ontological, 
priority to the Father. Traditionally this monar-chia has been accomodated 
alongside the equality of essence shared by each of the divine persons. 
Consequently, God's being is both substantial and relational. In the 
history of dogmatic expression, however, the former has emerged as the 
more dominant tool in expressing divine unity. Irving, however, moves away 
from this substantial priority to develop a more personal and relational 
understanding of divine unity. 
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In the sublime exordium of the Gospel by John, it is said of the 
Word that He was with God, and that He was God, and that He came 
forth from the bosom of God: and in- Colossians, it is said that 
it pleased the Father that in Him all fulness should dwell: 
expressions these which convey in the strongest terms the 
diversity of persons in the Godhead, the subordination of place 
in the unity of substance, between these two, the Father and the 
Son. But this unity of substance between two divers persons can 
only be maintained, even in idea, by the existence of a third 
person, who shall be the bond of that union. If the Father in 
His own personality were to speak or to do anything to the Son 
to the end of His coming into the bounds of the Christ, or if He 
were to express or shew forth any affection to Him, in that 
subsistence, then doth the Father himself come within the limits 
therof, and unlimitable infinite Godhead ceases to be the 
inalienable property of the Father. 74 
In this we confront the means by which he developes his theological 
inheritance in order to relate to the issues he saw as being most 
pressing. The very unity of divine being implicates more than two persons, 
In this sense, Irving parallels the logic of Richard St. Victor, but differs 
in that whilst the latter argued for the Spirit's existence in order to 
substantiate the quality of divine love, the former does so in order to 
substantiate the grounds of divine self-relating. If God's being is his 
self-relating, then it is a self-relating that operates in a specifically 
pneumatolo, gical manner. 
As the Father doth, in the primeval and one only complete act of 
His will, generate the Son, in whom are included, and through 
whom are operated, all the various particular acts thereof; so 
f rom the Father and the Son, in their harmonious union, 
proceedeth the Holy Ghost; through whom, before creation, in the 
depths of eternity, the Son expresseth unto the Father the 
perfect unity of His being, notwithstanding that distinctness of 
personality which He had bestowed upon Him, The self-existence 
of the Son, and the self-existence of the Father would constitute 
them twain in existence, as well as in personality, were it not 
for the procession of the Holy &host from both in whose self- 
existing intercommunion they behold, and are satisfied, with their 
oneness-The Spirit being originated both from the Father and the 
Son, must in His self-existent being represent the unity and 
harmony of these two self-existent Beings. -7s 
The unity of God' s trinitarian being is communicated neither in any 
abstracted manner, nor in the relation between primary and secondary 
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substance, of ousia and hYPOStasis, nor in any psychological analogies 
derived from self -reflection, The unity of God's- being- f or-himself is 
radicalised by the paradoxical triune character of God Is- being- f or-himse If, 
The Achilles' heel of trinitarian theology becomes the very corner-stone to 
Irving's entire ontology, It is (a personal and thoroughly Pneumatic union. 
The primacy of the Father's will in generating the Son is not that which 
causes the Spirit's procession. The Spirit proceeds from both the Father 
and the Son, In order to so establish his point, as one implicit to his 
ontology, Irving returns to the key principle within his hermeneutic at 
this point, and one similar to that of Barth; "the reality of God which 
encounters us in His revelation is His reality in all the depths of 
eternity. "71- Irving takes the Filloque most seriously because of its 
givenness within the Christian story. That which we know of God's being 
as Spirit is that which we 'encounter' in the divine revelation, The 
ontological identity of the Spirit is harmonious with his functional 
identity given to us through the written and incarnate Word. 
By going forth to set on foot any mighty work, and creating the 
elemental life of it, He doth thereby, in working his own 
personal and distinct work, so far forth express their unity and 
oneness of substance; while by staying at a certain point, and 
confessing His inability to proceed further, He doth give hon our 
to the superior place, and room for the independent self- 
sufficiency of the Son: who now cometh forth, whether as Word, or 
as the only-begotten Son, (for He is both from all eternity in 
His very substance, ) to give forms, and functions, and laws of 
being: yet all the while declaring that He can work nothing by 
Himself, nor put will into anything, being Himself but the great 
offspring of the Father's will, for the decree of which every 
work waiteth, and without which no work of the Godhead is 
complete. And the work being complete doth acknowledge the 
origination of its life to the Spirit, the excellent form and 
peculiar blessedness of its life to the Son, the end and 
continual support of its life to the Father's will. 77 
Who is God- in- his- being- f or-himself ? He is the one who reveals himself 
through his being- f or-others. Irving maintains an essential harmony in 
the manner by which the economic Trinity reveals to us the immanent 
Trinity, The economic Filioque "expresses recognition of the communion 
between the Father and the Son. It -7 8 However, unlike Barth, this communion 
is not one of love. (This, Irving has attributed previously to the 
relationship between the Father and Son: the latter specifically identified 
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as Love within the Trinity), The economic Filioque reveals the immanent 
Filloque. It expresses that which was attributed, in the tradition of 
dogmatics, to the notion of the commonly shared divine substance, It is 
not by the latter that we come to recognise the divine unity, Rather, the 
unity of God's being- f or-himself is derived from the immanent relation the 
Spirit has with both the Father and the Son, He is both ex Patre and 
Filloquo in such a manner that the ultimate grounds of being is understood 
not merely as multi-per-sonal, but much more significantly, as unl-perssýonal: 
God's being is in his personal self-relating, Thus the essential union 
between Father, Son and Spirit categorises the meaning of 'person. ' It is 
a meaning derived from the economic Trinity revealed in incarnation. 
Consequent ly, the t rin it arian and christological meaning of 'person, I 
reveals the significance of our own human personhood, not vi ce-versa: the 
term 'person' owes its meaning to christology in its 'metaphysical 
f oundat ion'. 73 
This is, indeed, an innovative development of dormant theological threads 
within his own trinitarian tradition, However, this should not be isolated 
merely to Irving's western context, We turn again to our Cappadocian 
comparison in order to highlight the ongoing and creative, theological 
development in the East with regards that which was initiated by Basil and 
the two Gregories. 
Basil maintained that the Spirit is not a creation of the Father nor of a 
different nature from the Father. Anastos points out the Basil insisted 
that "the Holy Spirit has a kinship (o 
) 
-Lxcýcocr-rv) with the Father and Son.. 
that the Spirit is holy, good, a bestower of special spiritual gifts (such 
as sonship of God and the immortality of the body), and one which shares 
in divinity. " However, Basil "was reluctant to go beyond recognizing that 
the Holy Spirit was 06ýov or making the tortuous argument that, since 
baptism is performed in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, and is a seal of faith, faith-is a recognition of the divinity [of 
each of them, ]"" Thus, Basil himself states that the Council of Nicea 
deferred comment because "at the time of the Council, no question was 
mooted, and the opinion of this subject in the hearts of the faithful was 
exposed no attack. "' it was the threat from Arianism that brought this 
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to the foreground, However, Basil remains silent on the overall identity 
of the divine Spirit. 
Whilst Gregory of Nazianzus defends Basil's silence in terms of his desire 
not to alienate him from the wavering, 1ý12 as well as on technical grounds, 
affirmimg that Basil's terminlogy is not to be considered as "the utmost 
limit of truth, "I-: 3 more modern scholars vary in their testimony to Basil. 
A, Meredith argues negatively that Basil's caution in ascribing equal 
honour to the 'Spirit is not an "eirenic gesture" nor an example of his 
"economy, " but due to his "imperfect (or barely existent) awareness of the 
role played by the Holy Spirit in the work of creation. "e4 
Those who defend him, argue that Basil was unwilling to disrupt an already 
fragile Church, therefore, he withstood the pressure to affirm any explicit 
statements about the Spirit's divinity, although the substance of his 
writings suggests the Spirit to be God. *"'- According to J. D. Zizioulas, 
Basil is following the Cappadocian line of argument: substance language 
was only used when comparing God and the world- God is one substance, the 
world another, It is used in the Father-Son debate to indicate that the 
Son is not a creature, but God. Thus, he argues: "when substantialist 
language is taken out of the created-uncreated dialectic and is turned 
into a ground of divine metaphysics, it is taken away from its original 
context. 111111c- However, Gregory of Nazianzus' affirmation of the Spirit's 
consubstantiality with the Father appears to make little reference to the 
Creator-created debate, thus seriously weakening Zizioulas' argument. 
In Being as Communion, J. D. Zizioulas argues for a particular interpretation 
of Cappadocian ontology. He argues that Basil, in re-defining "person, " 
introduces a new philosophical concept; a fact the history of philosophy 
has not noted. No longer is 'substance' the ultimate principle of being- 
this ultimacy is now accorded to 'person, ' For the Cappadocians, the 
ultimate ontological principle becomes 'person' and specifically, the Person 
of the Father who causes, by a free act of his being, both the Son and the 
Spirit. Consequently, the Trinity is derived not from a substance, but a 
person, the Father - "what therefore is important in trinitarian theology 
is that God "exists" on account of a person, the Father, and not on account 
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of a substance, OIG7 From this person, by a free and personal act, are 
caused the Son and the Spirit, The Father, for Zizioulas, becomes the 
cause of the Persons of the Trinity, and as such, the being of God resides 
in communion with the Father, not the Divine substance: "Communion arises 
from the person of the Father, not the substance of God. It is the Father 
as divine person, and not the divine nature that is ecstatic. 111519 
Zizioulas' interpretation is both illuminating and refreshing, and possibly 
permissible within an Orthodox hermeneutic, wherein he is interpreted as 
expanding upon the tradition he inherits. However, does he present what 
the Cappadocians themselves argue? It would appear not, for the 
Cappadocians held in tension both the substantial and the personal, doing 
so in order to confound both Sabellianism and Arianism, as well as it--- 
extreme form, Eunomianism which identified the substance of God with the 
Father, attributing a lower form of existence to the Son, To reject the 
efficacy of substantial language in their own method of argument is to 
undermine a bulwark established by them to defend rational talk of God as 
a Trinity of Persons against these misrepresentations of the Christian 
doctrine of God. The substance of God is a fundamental category within 
their ontology, 
Secondly, all three Cappadocians argue quite unequivocally for a communion 
of divine substance, not persons, as Zizioulas argues. This, Gregory of 
Nazianzus states a most succinct and representative manner when he states 
that "the Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action ... But 
it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and 
the Son to the Father. "e9 
Thirdly, Gregory of Nyssa argues for a distinction in person and nature 
vis-A-vis causality. "Although we acknowledge the nature is 
undifferentiated, we do not deny a distinction with respect to causality. 
That is the only way by which we distinguish one Person from the other, by 
believing ... that one is the cause and the other depends on the cause ... When 
we speak of a cause and that which depends on it, we do not, by these 
words refer to nature, For no one would hold that cause and nature are 
identical. `ý'O It is because all three modes of existence, Father, Son and 
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Spirit, fully possess the one, full divine nature, that the Cappadocians can 
safely talk of a monarchia and causality from the Father without inferring 
any ontological subordination. 
When we compare this, the hitherto greatest theological expression of the 
divine identity given by the Cappadocians with that of Irving we find both 
similarities and differences. On the one hand, Irving's interest in and 
stress on the divine relations parallels that which we see in Cappadocian 
theology, and whilst it can hardly be said that such a stress in missing in 
western theology, for we have noted it in Richard of St. Victor, Irving's 
emphasis appears to be much more at home within the theological tradlItion 
expressed both by Cappadocian thought and its progression in Zizioulas. 
However, on the other hand, Irving's doctrine of God differs significantly 
and specifically from the Cappadocians by virtue of its pneumatic 
dimension, The Cappadocians' philological development established the 
specific identity of the Spirit: the Spirit is Divine; not so much in hi-s 
relational being- in-event, but in terms of his substantial being-in- 
divinity. Herein lies the significance of Irving's contribution to the 
trinitarlan problematic: he refuses to acknowledge a radical distinction 
between the reality of God's being- f or-himself and that reality which owes 
its existence to God 's- being- in- action, The Cappadocians maintained a clear 
distinction between the two by means of the apophatic character of God's 
being. Irving argues conversely. God's being is understood from the 
perspective of e ven t, incarnation, wherein is highlighted the Spirit's, 
relation to the Father and Son, It is therefore, from the event of 
incarnation that Irving delineates his understanding of the divine 
relations. Whilst God's- being- f or-himself is finally a mystery 'hid within 
Himself, ' the act of God's self-revelation through the Christ-event 
illuminates the my-sterium trinitatis. The relations between Father, Son 
and Spirit ad extra adequately signify those hidden ad intra. "God reveals 
himself as Father, Son and Spirit because he is God asr Father, Son and 
Spirit. "91 On this basis, Irving identifies the _`ýpirlt as the vinculLim 
Linitati-q- the uniting link within the Trinity. Our comprehension of Father, 
Son and Spirit as God's being- f or-himself, (as God's self-relating, is 
intrinsic to the Spirit's specific relation within the divine community. As 
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the Father is dependent upon the Son for his own being, and vice-versa, 
both are incomprehensible in their trinitarian being apart from the Spirit, 
who, in turn, is understood only in his specific relation with Father and 
Son. 
Nevertheless, God is no object of theoretical speculation: theological talk 
about God remains ic-onic, or, what Polanyi calls 'inar-ticulate' knowledge. " 
Although knowledge of divine being is derived from the perspective of 
incarnation, this knowledge is a given. Our knowledge of God's being for 
himself and for others, comes to us in an act of grace: that which he has 
done in and through Jesus Christ. Consequently, although Irving proceeds 
with caution, this does not imply we are left to grope in the dark in a 
confused and meaningless manner. He insists upon a clear distinction 
between the subJect of revelation and the means of revelation. Thus, our 
articulation of any knowledge about God's being is derived not from any 
state of self-consciousness, but from the transcendent moment in human, 
finite history when the infinite and divine became enfleshed within time. 
But the derivation of such knowledge, in turn, has no anthropic source: it 
is thoroughly pneumatological. Thus the believing community of the 
faithful invoke: "Per te sciamus da PATREM noscamus atque FILIUM: Te 
UTRIUSQUE SPIRITUM credamus omni tempore. Grant that we may know the 
Father and the Son through thee: and that we may believe Thee, the Spirit 
of both at all times, " 




und unvorstellbarer Gott! 
Andere gibt es nur im Menschen, 
nur in der Vorstellung, 
In ihr hat der Allgegenwärtige nicht 
Raum. 
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Ist er niemals zu sehn? 
Ist er ewig unsichtbar? 
Wie? Dein allmächtiger Gott 
Kann sich uns nicht sichtbar machen? 33 
The question of God's being, his existence and identity, is surely as 
problematic now, as it was for Schwnberg's Moses. If God is "indefinable 
because invisible, and unobservable, and unbounded, and eternal, and all 
pervading, `ý" then is not all 'God-talk' merely the Cheshire cat of 
ingenious theology? Are we not forced to halt at the final words 
attributed, by SchcBnberg, to Moses? 
So war alles Wahnsinn, 
was ich gedacht habe, 
und kann und darf nicht gesagt 
werden! 
0 Wort, du Wort, das mir fehlt! " 
There has been no more succinct Christian reply than that given by St. 
John in his prologue: this Word became flesh, the filial expression of God's 
innermost being as Father. It is he who expresses the unspoken Word. 
This is no Deus ab-sconditus, herein lies the Deus revelatus. "No one has 
ever seen God: the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has 
made him known. "'I>- The silence is shattered by divine Flat: the Johannine 
Son diffuses the darkness with dawning light. The indefinable, 
unobservable, unbounded and eternal becomes visible in the Son. By no 
other means do we comprehend the infinite and eternal attributed to God. 
This fundamental element of Johannine theology becomes the foundation for 
Irving's entire ontology. Undergirding his entire doctrine of God is the 
belief that, "through Christ, and Christ only, who is the Godhead in a body, 
could the Godhead out of a body, the infinite and invi sible Godhead, ever 
have been known-God is known by His acts ... We come by the knowledge of the 
invisible Godhead of the Father, through the visible Godhead of the Son. 
111317 
However, Irving has argued already that God's creative action reveals no 
personal attribute of his being. Otherwise, the unity of God's being would 
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be deduced in a manner similar to that which Irving opposed in the 
Unitarians and Deists, Consequently, although there has been little doubt 
with regards the unity of God's being within and outwith the Church, Irving 
maintains a very clear distinction between the unity held by the Church 
and that propounded by his secular contemporaries, Theirs is a false God: 
'a certain idea of perfect being and infinite power which they have from 
their own brain, an abstraction of certain properties of man, a 
generalisation of certain principles of matter, "a great first cause least 
understood, " an all-pervading power, and everything or anything but the 
true, self-existing, personal God, '191ý1 
Nevertheless, the pressing problem of the moment lies not in the question 
of monotheism per, se, but in the criterion by which we maintain trinitarlan 
monotheism. There is no doubt in Irving's mind that outwith the New 
Testament, there is no 'knowledge of a trinity of persons in the Divine 
substance. ' There is no question of a vestiEium trinitatis. We are privy 
to absolutely no knowledge of a trinitarian Deity outwith the divine 
revelation in Christ, Herein we confront the christocentric nature of 
Irving's entire thought - knowledge of God's being as Father, Son and 
Spirit, is derived solely from the history and person of Jesus Christ. 
Irving's is a supremely christocentric hermeneutic, Who is God in his 
being-for-himself? He is Father, Son and Spirit. And by what means does 
he become being- f or-others? - solely through his visible and historic 
being- f or-others as Son. 
It was not until the Son came into manifestation as a man, until 
the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, became our Saviour, 
the long-expected Messiah on earth, the long-looked for Christ 
and Lord in heaven, for whom all things were created, that the 
truth of the glorious Trinity became a grand and manifest truth 
f or ever. Because so soon as the Son became manifest He made 
-he eternal known the Father, to whom He always inferred back as t 
Father of the Son, and in Him the great originator of all things, 
and principal party to the eternal purpose which the Son came 
forth to reveal. "No one has ever seen God: the only Son, who is 
in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known. " By the same 
act also did the Spirit become manifest; for- Christ's becoming 
outward and visible was the act of the Spirit, 91'3 
However, it is in his searing criticism of his opponents that Irving 
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reveals the full import he accords the Incarnation in its revelatory nature 
in making known to us the character of the triune God, It is when he 
turns upon his Unitarian and Socinian opponents that we are most privy to 
the magisterial christological position within his entire ontology. 
Ye may be able to state out the redemption, without a Trinity of 
persons in the Godhead: I lay claim to no such ability, Your 
Trinity is an idle letter in your creed; but it is the soul, the 
life of mine. Your Christ is a suffering God; I know it well: my 
Christ is a gracious condescending God, but a suffering man. In 
your Christ, you see but one person in a body: in my Christ I see 
the fulness of the Godhead in a body. My Christ is the Trinity 
manifested: not merely the Trinity told of, but the Trinity 
manifested, I have the Father manifested in everything which He 
doth; for He did not His own will, but the will of His Father. I 
have the Son manifested, in uniting His Divinity to a humanity 
prepared for Him by the Father; and in making the two most 
contrary things to meet and kiss each other, in all the actings 
of his widest, most comprehensive being. I have the Holy Ghost 
manifested in subduing, restraining, conquering, the evil 
propensities of the fallen manhood, and making it an apt organ 
for expressing the will of the Father, a fit and holy substance 
to enter into personal union with the untempted and untemptable 
Godhead, 100 
Although this immediately introduces us to Irving's doctrine of Christ, and 
specifically, those elements in his thought that were to be the object of 
his excommunication, it is not in our present purpose here to explicate his 
understanding of the Incarnation. Rather, we turn our attention to the 
manner by which Irving derives and identifies the divine names of Father 
and Son from the act of incarnation, and in so doing complete our survey 
of Irving's apoloEieq, Whilst this method may seem to take us away from 
the role Irving apportions the Spirit in his understanding of Divine being, 
it is, neverthelss, in harmony with his own theological method, for it is 
always from the Father and Son that Irving derives his understanding of 
the Spirit. Therefore, it is only through the explicit relation that Irving 
attributes the Son with the Father, that we gain insight into his doctrine 
of God as Spirit. 
Irving's deductive explication of the Son's divine status, as delineated 
above, shapes his major polemic 
against which he so resolutely 
against the tide of unitarian thought 
stood. His primary thrust of argument 
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incorporates the eternal status of Sonship vis-6-vis Fatherhood, However, 
although this identifies the Son with the Word, it has yet to unite the 
divine with the human: the Son with Jesus Christ, and to a lesser degree, 
the identity of 'God' with Father. 
Firstly, then, Irving wishes to identify the Father with the name 'God., 
Before the act of incarnation when in his procession from the Father the 
Son 'took unto Himself flesh of the Virgin Mary'1101 the name 'God' denoted 
only "the supreme unity and majesty of the Godhead, without any reference 
simply to the specialities of His revelations, "' 02 It was only "when the 
time came to open the mystery of the Trinity" that "this name of God 
received a special and particular application to the Father. "10--: 1 Knowledge 
of God's being as Father is derived solely from the Incarnation. Any 
mention of the name 'God' before this event is to be attributed to the 
'Godhead in its unity; ' it represents the 'substance of the Godhead without 
any respect to the personalities thereof. '10-4 The word "God" belongs to 
the first person of the Trinity, designating "His essential Godhead and His 
self -origination, as distinguished from the Son and the Holy Ghost, whose 
prerogative it is only to be self -existent, " "01- 
Secondly, the means by which Irving establishes the union between the 
eternal Son and Jesus Christ is more protracted, and is approached from a 
dual perspective, The first he deals with at the start of his Trinity 
sermons, If the Greek form, 'God' is distinct from the Hebrew, 'LORD, ' and 
the identity of the former remains unknown until the event of incarnation, 
then who is made known to us in the Old Testament? If the Father at all 
times remains invisible, being known only through the visible manifestation 
of the Son, then who is the subject of divine revelation in the history of 
Israel? For Irving, the incarnation is not a totally unique event of 
Heil -ý,:; Eeschlch te because he identifies the second person of the Trinity with 
the Old Testament appellations, 'Lord' and 'Jehovah. ' The Old Testament 
title 'Lord' is identified with that of 'Lord' in the New Testament by means 
of Acts 2: 36, "Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that 
God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and 
Christ, " the last two t it les being interpreted as 'Jehovah' and the 
'Anointed One. ' Consequently, "this title of 'The Lord' is ... appropriate to 
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Christ: - it belongs to the second person of the Trinity by special 
inheritance, and not to the Godhead in its revealed and undivided essence, 
for which the proper name is God, 11106- 
Thirdly, having established a union between these names, Irving turns his 
attention to the specific manner by which Jesus Christ may be identified, 
within a scriptural hermeneutic, alongside God's being as Son, In order 
to do so, he sets his mind to explain the name 'Jesus, ' which he identifies 
as Tehoshua. 'Jah' signifies a contraction of the divine appellation, 
'Jehovah, ' found in Psalm 118: 4 where in this singular term it denotes the 
full force of the name. Elsewhere, 'Jah' denotes the eternal signature 
revealed to Moses in Exodus 3: 14 -I AM THAT I AM - teaching us "that 
self-existent, underived, unchangeable, self-sufficient being is that which 
is contained under the name Jehovah. "' 0-7 Finally, the name, Jehovah, or its 
compound Jah, has been compounded into Jesus, who, in Revelation 1: 8 
identifies himself in similar terms: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning 
and the end ... which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty, " 
In addition, Irving extrapolates the significance of 'Hoshea' as signifying 
'Saviour' or 'salvation. ' 'Hoshea', Saviour, amplifies, the identity of the 
former, Jehovah, Under the old Covenant, Jehovah is known only as Judge: 
"it is manifest from God's revealing Himself as Jesus, or the Saviour, that 
the creatures are in a state of condemnation- otherwise what meaning were 
there in revealing Himself as their Saviour? "10'3 Conversely, by means of 
his appellation, 'Hoshea, ' he who formerly is identified as Judge, by 
becoming the incarnate one and assuming the name Jesus, identifies himself 
as Saviour. 
Inasmuch as God's being is revealed through his personal actions, Irving 
reaches the point wherein he identifies God's being as Son with the 
history and person of Jesus. 
That word Jah, incorporated with Hoshea in the name of our 
blessed Lord, is to me a pledge that all things which arc, written 
in the law and th, -- prophets the Son of man hath come not to 
destroy but to fulfil. And accordingly we do find that Jesus 
hath applied to Him the essential meaning of Jehovah, which is 
independence on all outward causes, and unalterable by time-Unto 
this much have we attained, therefore, that all the might and 
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holiness, all the magnif icence of power and splendour of 
operation, all the faithfulness and immovableness of purpose, 
together with all words whatsoever written of Jehovah and the 
old dispensation, are the property of Him who hath revealed 
Himself under the new as a man of sorrows and acquainted with 
grief, the meek, the humble, and the lowly Jesus. 109 
In this manner, Irving identifies the inner trinitarian locus of God's being 
with the subject of the incarnation, His apologla, however, is not entirely 
complete. Irving has introduced us to the premis that the Divine is- 
revealed in personal event. And there is purpose to such activity: its 
underlying reason is neither capricious nor indiscriminate, God's being- 
for-others reveals an essential order of relatedness which not only 
pervades the entire event of incarnation, but can be traced back to the 
very ground of being itself: the Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit. 
God's being, for Irving, is in his relating, The essential character of God 
cannot be understood but in an e-ssentially trinitarian fashion. 1110 We 
should not underestimate, therefore, the importance Irving accords his 
doctrine of God in the fight against current unitarian biases. God's being 
is in his self-relating as Father, Son and Spirit. Therefore, the doctrine 
of God is at best, a harmonisation of and a balancing between the 
differing relations and functions of each. In turn, every subsequent 
doctrine implicitly revolves around a trinal premis Irving brings to every 
theological discussion. 'Every point of divine truth' is pitted against 
three criteria: "as it is in the eternal being and purpose of God; as it is 
manifested to us in the revelation of God; ... as it is applied to and 
appropriated by us for our promotion in the favour of God, " namely, in 
light of the being and existence of Father, Son and Spirit. "' To focus 
solely upon the first, he goes on to elucidate, leads only to fatalism and 
quietism, wherein we either 'are blinded by the darkness of too much light, 
or lost in the insignificancy of our own being, "112 Alternatively, to 
focus simply upon the divine revelation in Christ outwith the purpose it 
has in the Father's will, can only lead to ignorance about the human will, 
namely that we "either forget that man hath a will, or believe that the 
will is determined by the conviction of the mind on the affections of the 
heart. " IIa Lastly, if our attention is given only to the experiential, then 
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"it very speedily introduceth an ignorant, coarse, and homely way of 
religion, which never elevates the soul from its natural grovelling. "' 11 
In each, we gain insight to the respective dangers of Calvinism, 
Arminianism and Evangelicalism and Methodism. 
5.1 The Means of Grace and Personal Will. 
God's being is in his relating: he is personal event; he is being in 
relating. This is the great mystery revealed in his activity, God in his 
being- f or- others is being in action: "not a thought, nor a word, " but being 
in action. III 
The nexus of Irving's ontology continues in the consistent manner wherein 
God's being- f or-himself is revealed as his being- f or-others: in event, in 
act, in work. As it is in the Christ-event, so "the Divinity f ollows out 
its eternal and necessary law of being in the secret recesses of its own 
harmonious purpose, with which no creature intermeddleth, and of which no 
creature is competent to discourse, further than to say, Thus it is, 
because it is revealed that there is a trinity of persons in the 
Godhead. "I r-ý 
If that which we are privy to in Christ reveals the essential character of 
the divine being, by what means do we come to understand the Divine? 
What does the Christ-event reveal about the mysterium tr-emenduni? it 
reveals to us a Father who at all time remains hidden; a Son who chooses 
to make the Father known; and a Spirit who both unites Father and Son, and 
brings to fruition the act of the Son's revelation, At this point, we are 
now able, to explicate the fulcrum by which Irving's ontic analysis of the 
Incarnation opens up for us, more fully, the character of the trinitarian 
being. 
The mysterium tremendum of trinitarian theology, however, presents only 
one facet of the doctrine of God. With it alone, we drift aimlessly in our 
theologising. Rather, for Irving, the divine mystery opens up in the event 
of incarnation. At this point, we are able to understand more fully the 
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import he accords to Christ as incarnate Word. There is no dislocation 
between Christ 's identity as Word and as Son. As Word, he reveals that 
which has been spoken 'before the beginning of the world, ' and by doing so, 
proves that 'a revelation by word is older than the fount ain head of time, 
even old as the purpose of the Ancient of days. " 'I It is only because 
Christ is the Father's Word, that the Son who dwells in the bosom of the 
Father is able to reveal the Father whom he alone knows. Consequently, 
The word is not uttered by the invisible Father, who speaketh 
nothing but by the Son; nor is it spoken by the Holy Ghost, who 
speaketh nothing which He hath not heard of the Son; but is 
spoken by the Son, who speaketh nothing of Himself, but what He 
heareth from the Father. Neither by the Son is it spoken in His 
infinite Godhead, but in His predestined creature form. 1"3 
It is, however, a focusing upon the ontical with which Irving concerns 
himself, By what means does the enfleshed Word communicate the purpose 
of the Father? How is this so? Herein lies the import Irving accords the 
Spirit: he is vinculum unitatis, as we have noted above. But he is also 
understood in the light of the doctrine of the orthodox fathers as 
'vinculum Trinitati-s, the circle of communication between the Father and 
Son, "I ý-; O 
The independence of Irving's thought is highlighted in this most central of 
ideas, As we have noted, traditionally, the Spirit's specific role within 
the divine relations has been presented in aEapeic terms: he is the one by 
whom the love of the Fattier for the Son and that of the Son for the 
Father is fulfilled. Irving's ontology, conversely, prohibits any pneumatic 
ascription of love. His pneumatology turns on the notion of E-výpy6ia. the 
Spirit, includes within himself every possible activity of God, Of course 
this is not to suggest any divorce between divine being and divine action. 
Indeed, to do so would be to annul any meaningful talk of revelation. For 
Irving, there is no ontological difference between the divine essence and 
divine energy, only an epistemological one on the basis of our created 
finitude. "'O This concern parallels that of his mentor, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, who expresses an equal interest in ontology in his remark that 
"the question of the nature of the real was not simply a pragmatic one 
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about its operation: the real had to be seen in its connection to its 
f oundat ion. 111 21 
Therefore, when Irving attests that the incarnate Word reveals the Father's 
purpose, his will, and it is brought to completion by energising event 
through the Spirit, we are not to interpret this in any other manner than 
that the divine event of incarnation and redemption is not only consistent 
with, but reveals to us the very character ot divine being. 
In this we confront the primary thrust of Irving's thought: the incarnation 
is God's event. It is not creatinE event. Rather is it incernatinE event, 
and as such reveals to us God's- being- in -action, for it involves divine 
being itself. Herein lies the ontical nature of Irving's inquiry: 
incarnation is trinitarian event. 
Undergirding his entire thought is the absolute primacy he attributec-ý to 
will, The purpose of the incarnation is, ipsszo facto, to reveal God's will, 
It is the great purpose of the Divine will which God was minded 
from all eternity to make known unto this creatures, for their 
greater information, delight and blessedness, to make known-to 
all His intelligent creatures the grace and mercy, the 
forgiveness and love which he beareth towards those who love the 
honour of His Son, and believe in the word of His testimony. 12ý 
This per-sonal will is reaffirmed in the act of incarnation, wherein the 
Father reveals 'that more tender aspect of His being called Erace - that 
part of the Divine substance which could not otherwise have been made 
known. '1 2-: 3 But how does Christ reveal to us this grace? He does so by 
revealing the Father, by 'setting forth every word as proceeding from the 
Father's will, and every act as the demonstration of His power. ' And what 
is the Father's will? It is both pu,, -po-qe, the manifestation of the Son, 
and operation, the work of the Spirit-': 21 Herein lies the import Irving 
accords the Spirit: he is vinculum unitatis, as we have noted above, as 
well as being understood in the light of the doctrine of the orthodox 
fathers as 'vi=llum Trinitatis, the circle of communication between the 
Father and '---; on, through whom the will of the Father expresseth itself to 
the Son, and the obedience of the Son expresseth itself back again to the 
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Father. " -'I- But the pneumatic dimension expresses itself in a thoroughly 
innovative manner, 
Particularly noteworthy here is the intimacy Irving establishes between 
Father, Son and Spirit. Although the Father is ultimate Will, he chooses 
to work through his Son, whose role it is 'to word what the Father hath 
willed. 21- In turn, both unity and e-vtp-f6ia are established through the 
Spirit, If the Son performs what the Father wills, if the divine purpose 
is expressed in filial covenant, it is only the Spirit who brings into 
existence the fruit of co-operation between Father and Son. Herein lies 
the consistent import Irving accords the Spirit in any act of the Trinity: 
he is the one who unites Father and Son. We have, of course, moved in 
consideration from the divine Being to divine activity. Nevertheless, this 
is consistent with Irving's method, wherein a distinction is made at all 
times between the two. The point to be stressed, however, and that 
omitted by subsequent commentators since Irving's time, is the role he 
accords the Spirit. If God 's- being- f or-himself, as Father, Son and Spirit, 
is understood by means of his economic activity, then our supreme insight 
is derived from the event of incarnation, wherein 'cometh the knowledge of 
the three subsistencies in the Godhead, and of their common substance, 
what its purpose is, what its, word is, and what its act is, ' namely, Father, 
Son and Spirit. 12-7 Furthermore, it is from this revelation that we 
comprehend, in turn, the Godhead in terms of Per--sonal Will, residing in the 
Father, being revealed to us by the Son, but at all times accomplished 
through the Spirit, who brings the Father's will and the Son's word into 
existence. 219 This is no addendum, no appendage to a primarily binitarian 
framework. It is the explication of a thoroughgoing order of relatedness 
in which the place accorded the Spirit is intrinsic and organic to the 
divine relations. It is an ontical delineation of the very ground of being, 
in which only the presence and relatedness of all three divine persons 
consititutes both the meaningfulness and reaiity of Father, Son and Spirit. 
What does Irving mean, however, when he talks of God's- being- f or-himself 
in terms of Personal Will'? Is lie not the reduction of divine being to 
such a concept actually impersonaI? In order to address the priority of 
will in his thought, it is necessary to consider the manner by which 
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Samuel Taylor Coleridge's own deduction that the grounds of being is to be 
understood in terms of Absolute Will, which can be derived from gobbets of 
thought upon the Trinity are scattered throughout his writings and 
marginalia, and most clearly in his Academy address 'On the Prometheus of 
ks chyl u sc' ''' Whilst the theological methods of Irving and Coleridge differ 
greatly, we turn to Coleridge in order to establish a possible foundation 
upon which Irving builds his own understanding of Divine being and 
consequently human being in light of incarnation. 
In his analysis of the Prometheus of kschylus, Coleridge most formidably 
presents his case, delineating his understanding of Divine being by means 
of a basic formula. Both Theist and Pantheist agree that W (material 
universe) minus G (Deity) equals 0 (nothing). However, whereas the 
Pantheist argues that G-W=0, the Theist substitutes G-W=G, 1: 30 
Coleridge's concern is to delineate the means by which the latter 
substantiates the real. This he achieves by an analysis of three differing 
views of reality: the Phc6nician, the Semitic and the Greek. Each is 
subjected to Coleridge's peculiar tetradic formula - Prothesis, Thesis, 
Antithesis and Synthesis: essential identity, being, act and ability, 
respectively, 
The PhcBnician is dismissed on the grounds that it confuses the ground of 
being by reducing it to two notions: a 'self -organizing chaos' and an 
'omniform nature as the result. "" Consequently, "with the Phcenician 
sages the cosmogony is their theogony, and vice- ver-sa. "1 1ý2ý The Greek, 
secondly, fails for it attributes an impersonal identity to the ground of 
being, Its cosmogony consists of three elements; 1. the hyle, which 
parallels chaos; 2. T& a6ýicxTa - the heaven and earth; 3. the Saturnian - oý 
xp6voi UnEpXn6via - the self -polarising power. '-3: 3 The impersonal nature 
of being for them resides in the plurality of law and being, rather than 
personal unity, because the divine is not the cause of reality, but its 
substance, 1: 3,4 It is only in the tetradic Semitic formula that Coleridge 
identifies an ultimately personal ground of being: 1. Unbeginning creator; 
2. Antecedent night or chaos (gravity); 3. the chaos; 4. the created 
material world. '--31 Herein lies a cosmogony which remains distinct from 
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the theogony, and vice-versa, It is, however, a theogony which comes to 
fullest expression in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, 
In order to understand how Coleridge reaches this conclusion, we must turn 
to his other formularistic notions whereby he identifies the Trinity in 
terms of the tertr-actys- Liýtitý (that which is essentially causative of 
all possible true being, the absolute subjectivity, the Good, ), Ipseity (I Am 
in that I Am, Father), Alterity (supreme being, o '6vcwq bv, Jehovah, Son, 
Word) Community (Spirit - of Holiness, to the Father, - of Truth, to the 
Son). 1 36 
The immediate question raised, however, in such an assertioii, involves the 
means by which Coleridge identifies a tetractys with the notion ot 
threefoldness. As Hardy points out, each of the four elements of the 
tet. ractys is not intended to represent a person. 1-: 37 Coleridge simplifies 
this in a manner which parallels the orthodox distinction between oussia 
and hypostasis, 
In the Trinity there is, 1. Ipseity. 2. Alterity. 3. Community. 
You may express the formula thus: 
God, the Absolute Will or Identity 
Prothesis. 
The Father = Thesis, The Son = Antithesis. The Spirit 
Synthesis. 1: 3e 
Thus, "The Trinity is, 1. The Will; 2, The Reason or Word; 3. The Love, or 
Lif e. As we distinguish these 3, so we must unite them in 1 God. The 
union must be as transcendent as the distinction. ""33 Hardy points out 
that with the early Coleridge, there remained the "tendency to spatialize 
considerations of being. ""') God's being, however, transcends the notion 
of space and time, and for this reason, Hardy argues that Coleridge sought 
to conceptualise God's being in non-spatial terms, by attributing the 
priority of Will to God, It is "an absolute Will, which... is essentially 
causative of reality and therefore in oriEine causative of it own reality, 
the essential causativeness, however, abiding undiminished and 
undiminishable, "' 41 This notion of Will is advanced most fully in his Opus 
Maximum, where Coleridge seeks to 'build upon the idea of personeity in 
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the Absolute Will, "" upon a thoroughgoing ontology of Will, where 'the 
Triune God is, above all, Absolute Will. "' 4: 3 
The priority given by Coleridge, then, in identifying God as Absolute and 
Personal Will both parallels and differs from that which we have 
delineated in Irving, Whilst Coleridge tocuses upon the philosophic- 
substantial character of Absolute will, the more overtly personal- 
individual is highlighted by Irving, It is, however, of interest to outline 
the significant parallels and dissimilarities each has with the other. 
First ly, we can trace Irving's specif ic identity of paternal 'Self- 
origination' back to Coleridge, If, as has been mentioned already, Will is 
understood as the cause of God's own, and subsequently all other reality, 
then per-soneity establishes the 'other-directedness' of God's essential 
being; necessitating an 'Other Self' who differs from the 'Primary Self. ' 
However, the Self "in both is self -subsist ient, but which yet is not the 
same because the one only is self -originated. "' -4-4 It is because the 
'absolute mind' is 'from all eternity personal' that 'from all eternity' it 
is 'Father Almighty, ' The thought or expression, the Word, of this mind is 
the personal, only begotten Son of God. ' 41 
A supreme, self-originated being hath communicated himself 
without withholding, and for this act, no recipient being 
conceived previously thereto, the nearest analogy, and at all 
events the least inappropriate term and conception that human 
knowledge and human language contain, is that of beEetti nE, and 
the most expressive relation that of Father and Son, 1-41ý_, 
Secondly, and of significance, is the subsequent identity Coleridge 
apportions the Spirit, Firstly, he identifies the Spirit as "the act, in 
which the Father and the Son are One. ""4-7 In a manner which Irving later 
re-echoes in his idea of the vinculum Trinitatis, Coleridge delineates the 
"perfect Idea", the Spirit, as 
that which proceedeth from the Father to the Son, and that which 
is returned from the Son to the Father, and which in this 
c ir cu la t ion consititutes the eternal unity in the eternal 
altritity and distinction, the life of Deity in actu purissimu. 
This is truly the Breath of life indeed, the perpetual action of 
the act, the perfect intellection aiike of the Inteilectus and of 
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the Intelligible and the perpetual being and existing of that 
which saith "I Am". 14t3 
However, Coleridge perceives the Spirit as Act, as event, in purely aEapeic 
terms. This union is a union of Love- Love is the Spirit of God, Herein 
is to be found the Achilles' heel: whereas Coleridge identifies the Spirit 
as love, and in so doing, perpetuates his tradition, Irving radicalises the 
notions received from Coleridge. That Irving applies himself more fully to 
the scriptural than the philosophic (and in Coleridge's case, specifically 
Kantian philosophy), may explain this pneumatic difference. However, it is 
also fair to suggest that Irving's soteriological goal dictated his 
pneumatology. 
What is of considerable note here, however, is the fact that Irving expands 
the early Coleridge, who presents the fourth element of this tetractYs as 
ACT, Furthermore, Irving may be understood as developing that which he 
receives from Coleridge by purifying and systematising it. The notion of 
Absolute Will demands the complementary idea of Ev6pýEia in order to bring 
about its purpose, That purpose, Irving identifies as Love and Grace. But 
it is a purpose that is impotent without the power to accomplish that 
which it wills, Furthermore, in light of the Divine as made known to us in 
incarnation, we see that the Father's enfleshed Word, his filial expression, 
comes to purpose through the Spirit, Thus =-k1though from Coleridge Irving 
may have received the ideas which facilitated an explication of incarnation 
in terms of Personal and Absolute Will, he has moulded these ideas to 
incorporate the Spirit not in any addended or synthetic addition, but in a 
manner wherein God's-being-as Spirit is fundamental to any 
concept ua lisat ion of him in terms of his- being- as- Father or Son. In turn, 
by incorporating the idea of Will into his very ontology, Irving 
establishes the means by which he may unite the event of incarnation, 
wherein touch the divine and human, the infinite and finite, the 
transcendent and the immanent with God's creatureliness. 
On the basis of this ontology of Personal Will Irving is able to establish 
a christology which facilitates a central place to the work and being of 
God the Spirit. In that the Father's will is communicated to the Son, and 
m 
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the Son's obedience to the Father by means of the Spirit, we shall 
therefore expect to find in Irving's christology this notion of the opera 
trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa whereby an essential place given over to 
the Spirit. However, before we are able to do so, we must first turn our 
attention to another relatively unexplored dimension of Irving's 
christology, which, like his doctrine of God as Trinity, is foundational to 
any adequate perception of his christology, namely, his doctrine of human 
being. Whilst our attention in Part I has been to present Irving's 
understanding of the trinitarian character of God, and in particular the 
relation of God's- being- as- Spirit with that of the Father and Son, our 
attention in Part II will focus not only on Irving's understanding of human 
being, but also the manner by which he is able to talk meaningfully not 
only of incarnation, but of the Spirit's place in incarnation, 
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PART II-. IRVING'S DOCTRINE OF HUMAN BEING. 
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1. Introduction. 
Why talk of a heavenly flesh, when you have no grounds to offer 
us for your celestial theory? Why deny it to be earthy, when 
you have the best reasons for knowing it to be earthy? He 
hungered under the devil's temptation; He thirsted with the woman 
of Samaria; He wept over Lazarus; He trembles at death (for "the 
flesh, " as He says, "is weak"); At last He pours out blood, These, 
I suppose, are celestial marks? "" 
Inherent to the Judeo-Christian belief of an incarnated God is the legacy 
of docetism by virtue of the Graeco-Roman context within which 
Christianity grew. Matter and spirit are perceived to be logical 
opposites. How then can that which is pure Spirit both assume a human 
form, and be seen to suffer? Herein are raised fundamental questions 
concerning the kind of humanity assumed in incarnation. What is the 
nature of humanity assumed by the Son within a spirit - matter dualism? 
And what are the criteria for such an understanding? This legacy of 
various docetic biases provides a constant and creative tension in which 
incarnational theology h-as sought to express itself. The notion of two 
distinct worlds, the noumenal or spiritual, and the material, permeating 
thought from Parmeneides through Plato to Kant into present materialist 
ideologies, has influenced the conceptuality of subsequent incarnational 
christologies. It expresses itself in the ancient flight from the material 
through to its modern reverse, a flight from the spiritual. In dialogue 
with, as well as in bondage to, both forms of thought, the Christian faith 
has sought to assert in meaningful form the belief that both 'worlds' have 
met in the person and history of Jesus Christ. "That which was from the 
beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we 
have looked upon and touched with our hands ... we proclaim to you. 117 In 
effect, 'very' God becomes 'very' man, 
However, the expression this endeavour assumes has been multiform, in 
which, for the most part, Tertullian's argument above fits unsquarely. 
Indeed, he is seen to represent that which establishes the very boundaries 
of christological anthropology: the building bricks for future theological 
development. Yet Tertullian's assertion became lost in the more relevant 
and pressing issues of debate. The confession that the worlds of the 
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Divine and the purely created have come together in the event of 
incarnation; that the Creator has assume(i the created, the Infinite the 
f inite, the Transcendent expressed in a materialised immanent form, 
strangely mutated into its very anti-thesis: the Kantian separation of the 
noumenal from the material, with its ultimate expression in pure 
materialism. The noumenal becomes that which is beyond reason, completely 
'other, ' to the exclusion of any point of contact with the mundane. Thus 
we break from the initial patristic roots of an incarnated God, and face 
the apparently insurmountable modern problem of addressing Jesus Christ as 
a revelation of the Divine. -3 It is the historical conclusion to a problem 
of 'opposites' which lacks an adequate conceptual framework within which a 
solution may be found, So, christology is vacated of any transcendent 
dimension and becomes reductionist in its thinking, with theological 
assertions being reduced to merely anthropological statements. 
This 'Copernican' shift highlights the debate to which Irving addresses 
himself - The reaction of modern thinking to a highly other-worldly 
interpretation of the Ghristian gospel, in which the humanity and 
materiality of human existence and that of Jesus Christ is undermined, 
lends itself to this increasingly reductionist interpretation of the Christ- 
event, This is the age of humanity. The divine is too wholly other: an 
unknown and unverifiable commodity. Human being has come of age. No 
longer is it necessary to present one's cosmology through the rigid and 
other worldy framework of Christian tradition, The anthropocentric rapidly 
replaces the theocentric. 
To this extent, Irving can be interpreted as perceiving this development as 
a healthy reaction against too transcendent an interpretation of the 
Christ-event. Its solution, however, he understands as less healthy, for it 
entails a flight from the divine, rather than an adequate reappraisal of 
the relationship between the divine and the human as presented in the 
incarnat ion. I suggested in the previous chapter that had Irving's 
opponents more fully understood his doctrine of God, they would have 
gained a more adequate insight into his reasoning with regard to the 
dynamics of the incarnation. Yet, his doctrine of God is so precocious 
that had they done so, there would have been added only more fuel to the 
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f ire. Similarly, had they understood his doctrine of human being, they 
would have comprehended the reasoning behind his stress on the type of 
human nature assumed in Christ and seen it as an attempt to address the 
soteriological implications he intuited in the present ZeitEelst, However, 
in so doing, they would have been confronted by a theological anthropology 
as distinct as his doctrine of God. 
For Irving the reappraisal of and solution to the modern problem entails, 
to some extent, a pneumatological perceptual shift: an addressing of the 
Spirit's role in the incarnation and inner- tr init arian life of the Godhead. 
This Irving outlines within a trinitarian principle of revelation as 
discussed in the previous chapter: the incarnate Son reveals to us the 
nature and character of' the Godhead. In and through Christ there is 
revealed the Triune God; Father, Son and Spirit. But at the same time, the 
Christ who reveals to us the being of God, reveals also what it means to 
be human. Thus, the "other- wor idly" dimension of Irving's hermeneutic is 
rooted in this present dimension of created time, in the very 'stuff' of 
human being. Nevertheless, although somewhat unconventional, Irving's is 
far from an unorthodox anthropology. He stands firmly in line with 
Reformed thinking, echoing the opening comments of Calvin's Institute--s 
"Without knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God. Nearly all the 
wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two 
parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves, "4 
However, whereas Calvin suggests a lack of clarity regarding the 
relationship between the human and divine, Irving extends Calvin's maxim 
by making more explicit the role of Christ. It is of significance to note 
here how Irving's revelational hermeneutic, wherein Christ reveals both 
the divine and the human, also takes precedence over Barth's comment on 
Calvin's opening statement in the 1hstitutes: that "we cannot accept the 
theses of Calvin unless we transplant then from the empty and rather 
speculative sphere in which they stand in his thinking, and root them once 
more in the firm ground of the knowledge of Jesus Christ in which they 
really grew even in Calvin. "' 
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For Calvin, Irving and Barth, the incarnation prohibits an explication of 
the relationship between God and his world in terms of logical 
complements. The revelation by Jesus Christ of both the divine and the 
human must be understood to be different from this. However, any 
revelational theology, either in terms of analogia fides or analo'gia enti-s, 
demands an inquiry into the relationship between the divine and the human. 
Otherwise, the modern reaction, against which any such revelational 
theology is itself reacting, remains unaddressed. 
Thus, in what way is it possible for us to talk rationally about the 
meeting of these two apparently logical opposites: the spiritual and the 
material, the human and the divine? Irving's response to this problem 
involves an explication of his doctrine of human being in light of the 
revelation of God in and by Jesus Christ. At the heart of the matter is 
the problem of being and how it is perceived. If God and humanity are 
comprehended as logical opposites, the problem remains insurmountableý the 
modern reaction to traditional Christian theology is justifiable both in 
form and content. Any presentation of divine and human being as logical 
opposites results in a faulty perception of being per se, which directly 
impinges upon the soteriological significance of the Christ-event. 
In what way, therefore, does Irving perceive his inherited metaphysic to be 
inadequate? I have hinted, in Part I, that Irving understood this to be a 
pneumatological inadequacy. But it would be an inadequate representation 
of his thought to arrest the debate at this point: at the heart of the 
matter Irving understood the problem to involve an inadequate perception 
of the grounds of being itself. The inadequate perception of the Spirit's 
being and role within the divine relations and economy has led to an 
erosion of the true humanity of Christ, and subsequently of the Christian 
doctrine of human being. He addresses this problem in his doctrine of God 
which facilitates a more consistently trinitarian ontology- God's being is 
in his relating as Father, Son and Spirit. In turn, Irving applies this 
derivation from revelation to the source of revelation itself, the person 
and humanity of Christ. Thus he completes his hermeneutical circle, 
However, to return to the initial problem, the relation between the human 
and the divine has not been addressed, The purpose of Part II is to 
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delineate the manner by which Irving establishes a way of relating the 
human with the divine in incarnation, and one which makes sense of the 
presence of the person and work of God the Spirit in incarnation, 
In order to do so, we must turn to Irving's doctrine of human being, the 
most neglected area of his entire theology. To this date, there has been 
no direct examination of Irving's, supposedly unorthodox, '- christology in 
light of his anthropology, let alone any explication of Irving's 
anthropology, either in the literature of his opponents or in recent Irving 
research, That this is so is a somewhat ironic statement upon theological 
critical procedure. It was on the very basis of his anthropological 
concepts that Irving faced the full vehemence of his mother church. By 
means of them, he sought to present a christology which both addressed 
and grappled with traditional hamartiological and soteriological questions. 
We can summarize these in Kelsey's words- 
1. What is it about human beings that makes it possible for them 
in their finitude to know the infinite God? 
2. What is it about human beings that makes fallenness possible 
in such a radical way as to require the kind of redemption to 
which Christianity witnesses? 7 
It is to this neglected element of Irving's thought and his answer to 
these questions that attention is turned, not as a point of mere interest, 
but as the hermeneutical key that unlocks his entire thought. An 
understanding of his doctrine of human being is, therefore, of fundamental 
importance to his christology, and one which has to be analysed in detail 
before the purpose of his soteriological emphasis may be more fully 
understood, 
1.2 . StranKe News from Another 
Star-' 
The rabbinic tradition of Israel recounts a tale about the 
creation of the world. Having completed creating everything in 
five days, the Creator asked one the attending angels whether 
anything were still missing. The angel answered that everything 
was, of course, perfect, as one might expect of God's own 
handiwork. "Yet perhaps, " the angel ventured, "perhaps one thing 
could make this already perfect work more perfect: speech, to 
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praise its perfection, " God thereupon approved the angel's words 
and created the human creature. s' 
It is through this speaking creature that the Word became f lesh and dwelt 
among us. The speaking God, Deus loquens, creates through his own Word, 
the speaking creature. In history, the speaking creature is assumed by the 
Word: the Word became f lesh and dwelt among us, In this very act of 
incarnation the speaking God takes on human language in the speaking 
creature, The speaking creature, in turn, takes on the divine language of 
the Word, In this way, knowledge of human being can be understood to 
facilitate true knowledge of the Divine, 
Epistemologically, this suggests that the anthropological dimension to any 
given christology is of major importance. And so it is. What is more 
problematic, however, is the relationship between the human and divine in 
the context of Hell-,; 87eschichte. From what direction do we approach our 
doctrine of human being? Christian cosmogonies and cosmologies (theories 
about the origin of the universe, and treatises on the structure of 
creation), by and large, have explicated knowledge of the human in terms of 
the conf lict between either an archaeological or a teleological 
interpretation of creation. On the whole, the dominant interpretation has 
been the former. The fall from an originally perfect state necessitates a 
return to the primordial state of perfection in which the first human 
beings were created. Hells8-eschichte is then interpreted in light of a 
return to this primordial state of perfection, Human being is interpreted 
in terms of its lapXý, its beginning., its utXoq is determined, consequently, 
by its ()XpXý. Unfortunately, this facilitates a static and Aristotelian 
interpretation of human being, a qualitative commodity that, having lost 
its original identity, necessitates a restoration to the intial proto-type. 
But in light of our increasing knowledge of the human condition, such a 
'proto-type' and any subsequent return to paradise lost comes, indeed, as 
estrange news from another star. ' 
The teleological, on the other hand, may be understood as representing a 
more developmental and progressive interpretation of human history. Human 
being is interpreted in terms of its Tt/\oq, its end-, the &pXý in light of 
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the subsequent TAoq. Consequently, human being is liberated from the 
determinism of its past, of its ('*Xý, to be conceived in dynamic and 
relational terms, It is from this direction Irving perceives the human 
story: the ixpXý by the cd>, oq, 
I believe God hath ordained nature in its present form, and 
established it according to its present laws, for the single and 
express purpose of shadowing forth that future perfect condition 
into which it is to be brought: so that from man down to the 
lowest creation ... everything containeth the presentiment of its 
own future perfection. " 
This alone, however, is insufficient for Irving, In turn, he subordinates 
this teleological interpretation of the human story to a more primary 
interpretative principle that prevents any diminuation of the human 
predicament. His cosmogony is determined by revelation. So he writes: 
We must receive our f irst principles of cosmogony from 
revelation, and adopt them as the card by whi ch we steer our 
course of action, before ever our intercourse with the visible 
world, or human life, will lea ve behind it any soil upon which 
the seed o f the word will take root and flourish. " 
Irving's cosmogony is derived, subsequently, from a prior act of the 
Godhead: all things are created in and through Christ, and, as we shall see 
in Part III, this he interprets as a creation in and through the 
preincarnate form assumed by the Son. In the very act of creating, the 
Son chooses to do so not in the blazing glory of infinite Godhead, but, as 
it were, through the reduced and fracted beam of created being, his future 
assumed form of being. Consequently, his cosmogony and cosmology are 
safeguarded from the threat of anthropocentrism for creation has its being 
and meaning in and through the Son. Consequently, history has personal 
meaning: it takes its direction in and through, because and from, the 
history of God in Christ. And this is not merely by virtue of the -saving 
work of Christ, but more significantly, from the creating work of the Son. 
To this extent, Irving presents us with a theology in which the Creator 
and the Saviour are inextricably united in the act of creation, not merely 
salvation. Creation has an appointed end by virtue of the humanity of the 
incarnated Son. We confront not only a western doctrine of man which 
relocates the direction of human being in terms of its TgXoq, but one 
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which also finds its form and meaning in and through the human history of 
the incarnated Son. For this reason, the T6Xoq of the history of human 
being is inextricably linked to the humanity of Jesus Christ. 
Consequently, it is only as we delineate the anthropological dimension of 
Irving's thought that the full meaning of this TtXoq may be perceived. 
2. Master - Story 91,. Paradise Gained. 
Men look on the starry heavens with reverence; monkeys do not.. 
When we are frightened by the greatness of the universe, we are 
(almost literally) frightened by our own shadows: for these light 
years and billions of centuries are mere arithmetic until the 
shadow of man, the poet, the maker of myth, falls upon them. I 
do not say we are wrong to tremble at his shadow; it is a shadow 
of an image of God. But if ever the vastness of matter 
threatens to overcross our spirits, one must remember that it is 
matter spiritualized which does so. To puny man, the great 
nebula in Andromeda owes in a sense its greatness. 12 
According to Judeo-Christian cosmogonies, the arrival of human being onto 
the platform of history announces the highest form of being in the created 
world. It is the culmination of the creator God's activity, after which is 
sabbath, For Irving, however, the creation of human being is not to be 
considered as complete nor as an end in itself. Rather, it finds its 
ultimate meaning in the Creator's purpose for creation. This purpose 
Irving considers heterogenously, each dimension of consideration acting as 
a particular facet to his theological prism, and without each, his 
understanding of incarnation would be misrepresented. Firstly, from a 
theolo8, lcal perspective, the creature is created in order that God may 
"find the justification of his holiness, and the upholding of it forever. "' 
The creature exists "to bring the invisible mind of God to light" in order 
that God "may be seen and known in his working over creation. " 14 Human 
being, therefore, is created with the express purpose of revealing "unto 
all the creatures the invisible and infinite substance of the Godhead, " 
to "body forth God completely in all the features and powers of his 
invisible Godhead. "I Secondly, creation has a christolpElcal function: the 
great end of creation consists for the "manifestation of the Son of God in 
the creature form ot the risen God-man, in which to abide and act the will 
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of God the Father for ever, 1117 thus enabling the creature "to represent, to 
enact, and to enjoy a part of his fulness (Col. i. 15-20). 11119 Thirdly, there 
is an anthropic dimension: by virtue of the Creator's act of creation ex 
n1hilo, the human being is being- in- dependence, It so by virtue of the 
humble origins of human existence, for "as He was to make it out of 
nothing, He would have it remember its nothingness in itself-to this 
single end of bringing the creature to apprehend the nothingness of its 
substance, and the absoluteness of its dependence upon the Divine will, 
which is the very truth. '"`-' 
Throughout Part II we shall be considering each of these dimensions in 
detail, However, Irving gathers all these different but interrelated 
criteria are subsumed under the ultimate purpose of God in creating human 
being, which Irving understands in the following manner: 
The purpose of God in creating man, was the manifestation and 
communication of His own glory unto the creatures which He had 
made, or which He was about to make; and to bring the creature 
wholly dependent upon Him, and to worship Him. 20 
Consequently, the T6Xoq of creation finds its ultimate meaning not in human 
being itself but in its contingent dependence upon the divine will which 
brings finite being into existence. It is being- in-relat ion: the creature 
dependent upon the Creator who is the very source of its existence and 
being. 
We have, at this point, set the scene against which we may delineate 
Irving's answer to the initial questions set by Kelsey at the beginning of 
this chapter. Human being is created with the express purpose of 
revealing the glory of God. Essential to this purpose is the notion that 
human being is being- in-relat ion. But what does Irving understand to be 
the dynamics of this 'being- in-relat ion? ' And in what way does Irving 
conceive the inter-relation between the human and the divine as a 
possibility in the light of our opening questions? 
Irving answers both issues by means of two anthropic symbols derived from 
the creation-deciaration in Genesis 1: 27-28, wherein "God created man in 
- 89- 
his own image, in the lma8-e of God he created him; male and female he 
created them. And God blessed them, and God said to them, "Be fruitful 
and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the 
fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing 
that moves upon the earth. " The divine mandate to be both image bearer 
and lord of creation becomes the 'charter and the law, the frame, of human 
being. Both expressions declare something about the divine purpose behind 
creating humanity, namely that God may have 'His own invisible and 
incomprehensible essence, and to give to this likeness of Himself the 
primacy and lordship of all creation. ' It is of fundamental importance to 
Irving's anthropology that whatever history the created being assumes, it 
cannot thwart an anterior principle to that of creating, the will of the 
Creator that the 'fiat of God for human kind is that which still abideth 
unalterable. 1121 
Irving's entire theology may be interpreted as an explication of his 
understanding of the tensive symbolism22 contained in the term imaEo Del. 
The original charter of that, the first and most noble of creation, male 
and female, consists in the command to be 'Godlike, an image and likeness 
of God in the law and form of (its) being. '2--3 In Part I, we have seen how 
Irving explicates the divine identity in terms of the Son as the image of 
the Father. This, in turn, becomes the exegetical principle by which he 
interprets human being as ima8-o Del. When the Creator proclaims and 
brings about the high end of creation, he does so not in generic terms, of 
conformity to a bare essence, but as that which bears witness to his Son, 
as the imaging forth of the Son. The human creature is an image of God 
after the likeness of the Son. So Irving states, 
Within Himself from all eternity there was an image of Himself 
in the person of the Eternal Son: out of Himself that image is 
found in man; first in the person of Christ, and then in every 
one who is renewed after the image of God in righteousness and 
true holiness. 21 
From this we are able to address two aspects of his thought. First ly, 
Irving maintains an inherent tension between an archaeological and a 
I teleological interpretation of the imaEo Dei. Christ is both the apXý and 
the TgXoc, of human being; that which is imaged and that which perfectly 
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images. As such, in imaging the Son who is the express image of the 
Father, human being is seen to derive its being entirely from its relation 
to God the Son. At this point in our inquiry, attention will be focused on 
the archaeological interpretation of human being. 
What does it mean, though, to talk of a christocentric interpretation of 
the imaEo Del in terms of its &pXý? It means that human being as imaEo 
Dei is derived from that which it mirrors, Irving can be seen as standing 
in a wholly Reformed interpretation of the ima8, o Del at this point. He 
does so primarily in terms of reflection, and secondarily, as conformity. 
Human being reflects the image of the Son and does so by 'conformity of an 
intelligent will to the will and Word of God. '2- Both aspects are united 
in our second point of clarification, the notion of being- in-relat ion. 
Part I has highlighted how Irving understands the Son to be the image of 
the invisible Father. In this sense, the concept of 'image' essentially 
entails the notion of reflection: the Son is the image and likeness of the 
invisible Father. This notion of imaging is inextricably linked to the idea 
of obedience on the part of the Son. However, Irving delineates this 
obedience in terms of the Son's dependence upon the Spirit. Thus, it is a 
ref lect ion- in- dependence. If, in turn, we apply this notion of reflection 
to that which is the most noble of creation, we may extend to the human 
creature as ima&o Dei the same notion of reflection. As such, human being 
lacks an essential ability to perform its given created end, not merely by 
virtue of its finitude, but more importantly by virtue of, its essential 
being as a finite reflection of the Son. As the Son reveals the Father in 
dependence with the Spirit, so the human creature has been created to 
refelct this being- in- dependence and attains its full humanity only in 
dependence upon the Spirit. Thus human being is created to exist in some 
way by means of a pneumatic being , in-dependence, Herein, Irving echoes 
Torrance's reflection on Calvin, that 'the imaEo dei, spiritually considered, 
has no momentum or security of its own, but depends entirely upon the 
grace of God and is maintained only in relation to that grace, "21- Irving 
would add that this grace is to be understood not merely in terms of 
salvation, but in the very act of creation itself. 
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Imago Dei: the divine Dart among the earthly. 
What is it that makes possible a link between the Saviour and the 
creature? Irving f inds the point of contact in the idea of human being as 
being- in-ref lect ion. as lma8, o Dei. Throughout his writings, from the 
earliest sermons to the later apologetical writings, Irving is consistent 
in his insistence that human being is created as the image of God in order 
'to act the divine part among earthly scenes. 127 But how does Irving 
delineate the dynamics of such an enactment? It is at this point we are 
able to explicate in detail what he means by presenting his understanding 
of man and woman as the bearers of the image of God. 
'Man, ' he adumbrates most concisely in the Morning Watch, 'was created for 
two ends: the first, "to be an image and likeness of God; " the second, "to 
have dominion over the creatures. "' It is upon the former that we focus 
our attention, which is, he continues, 'descriptive of his reasonable 
soul... fashioned on very purpose to be an image of God, who is Spirit; 
endowed with his affections of love and goodness, of truth and Justice, of 
wisdom and understanding:.. so that God without any accommodations should 
be able to speak his mind to man, and man without any conjecture should be 
able to understand it. 'ýe Herewith, we return to the notion of DeUS 
loquens and the mystery wherein the Creator speaks to and communicates 
with, the speaking and comprehending creature. 
However, we may pause at this point to question how consistent Irving is 
in his description of the image: hitherto, it has been extrapolated solely 
in terms of the Son. It may be argued that Irving is introducing merely 
an alternative facet to the Son's being, namely, that the Son is not 
matter, but spirit. This is indeed an aspect of Irving's argument, as we 
shall note below, but it can hardly be the case here, for he goes on to 
st ate, 
In virtue of this conformity of human reason to the infinite 
Spirit of God, in virtue of man's soul being an image and 
likeness of God, God was able to converse with Adam in the 
garden of Eden, as afterwards he did with Abraham and Moses, and 
doth with us all in his word. For the word of God is not an 
accommodation but a real utterance of God's mind to man's mind, 
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created for the very purpose of understanding and responding to 
God. "'9 
In the conformity of human reason to infinite Spirit there is disclosed the 
Deus loquens. The image, therefore, does not consist of a moral 
propensity, nor even in the mutuality of human sexual differentiation. " 
Rather, Irving continues with his radical ontology of will by locating the 
capacity for image-bearing in the human will. It is this notion of the 
will that becomes the leitmotiv for Irving's doctrine of human being, 
Intimately linked to the notion of human will as the means by which the 
divine and the human meet, is the notion of freedom. Human being is the 
image of one who is unconstrained. Consequently, the image itself cannot 
be constrained. " It is because 'God is free and uncaused, being the cause 
of himself, ' that 'man must have, and hath, such a part in his will, which 
within the creature-bound is caused by nothing, but is of itself the 
cause. la2 Thus Irving maintains the notion of human being as image bearer 
of the creator God in terms of the creature's will and its original 
freedom. The very consititution of human being resides in the will, 
whereby the human creature 'is a figure of God; the will answering to the 
Father, in that it is a cause unto itself, not caused by things without or 
motives within, but free in its proper constitution to originate all 
thought and action. '-: 3--9 
This divine freedom from causality is revealed in God's ability both to be 
what he wills himself to be and to remain so. This freedom from 
determinism, in turn, constitutes the &pXý ot human existence, As God is 
perfectly free from any form ot causation, so 'it is required that there 
should be in man, his image, a wiil which should be uncaused, the cause of 
itself; not overmastered by God, but left to act in its own liberty. 1: 3,4 
Freedom of will in the human creature reflects the very character of God, 
who is himself perfectly free and uncaused. 
But why this element of uncausality? Firstly, as noted above, human 
being is constituted according to the Creator's design, whose desire it is 
that the human creature should be like him, and do so by its own 
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volitional will, determined neither by the divine nor the human. 36 
Secondly, and of more significance, is the derivation of the above from a 
purely christocentric ontology. As we have noted above, human being is 
being created in the image of the Son who, himself, is the image of the 
invisible Father. This the Son performs freely in the economy of salvation 
as the Christ in dependence upon the Spirit. As a consequence of being 
created the image bearer of this God, the human creature is created to 
reflect God in its willingness to serve him freely. Thirdly, freedom of 
will provides the means by which human being is able to establish its 
relation to the created order, either positively or negatively. 
At this point we are able to address the means by which Irving 
understands this imaging by will to come a bout, What exactly does he 
understand this ontology of will to be? In order to clarify Irving's 
position, we can approach it from two different but complementary 
perspectives, Firstly, there is the relation of the divine to the human. 
It is created with the 'very purpose to bring the invisible mind of God to 
light, to be his likeness, through which he may be seen and known in his 
working over the creation. '-: 315 The former, as image of the latter, is 
understood a derivative of the latter: it is being- in-relat ion. 
Consequently, it operates in conjunction with the being of that to which it 
is dependent. But what is the character of that which is imaged in the 
human creature? Irving begins to delineate and establish the perimeters 
withJn which he furnishes his ontology with content. 
Now God, being a Spirit, carrieth on his communication only 
through the Spirit or word, and not other wise. There his 
operation as God beginneth and endeth. He leaves the will of 
man to do the rest. " 
It is because God is 'spirit and not flesh, invisible and not visible, 
insensible and not sensible, operating as God doth operate, by power of a 
word, not by physical contact, "' that the divine action with the human is 
an operation in the human spirit, the will. We have arrived at that which 
determines Irving's entire doctrine human being. Human being is contingent 
being; dependent upon an Other, whose operation with the material is 
solely by means of the spiritual, At first glance, Irving appears to be 
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advocating yet another bifurcated metaphysic within which the material and 
the spiritual are pitted one against the other. However, on closer 
inspection, it is an attempt to accomplish the very opposite, Rather, it is 
a serious attempt to give meaning to the existence of human being in light 
of the New Testament proclamation, wherein is maintained the affirmation 
of two worlds, two Adams, two states of being. Irving may be understood 
as exegeting this biblical tension by means of a thoroughgoing 
christocentric hermeneutic. He attempts to explicate the relationship 
between the divine and the human in a manner which gives new direction 
to too obfuscated an expression of human being that pits the one against 
the other. Irving's entire soteriology and his understanding of the 
incarnation may be interpreted in light of his constant affirmation that 
the materialised embodiment of human being is 8, ood As an alternative to 
the notion that the human and the divine represent polarised forms of 
existence, Irving advocates an interpretation of human being that resists 
the temptation to construe salvation in terms of a flight from the 
material into the purely spiritual, Irving's is a high anthropology: the 
material is Eood. He perceives any repudiation of the materiality of 
human existence to be a lese-humanity, an offence against the high dignity 
of human being. This he does to good effect in a sermon in which he 
denounces those who oppose the notion of eating in the life to come, he 
responds by asserting, 
I know what a body-despising Puritan (falsely called spiritual) 
generation I am speaking to; men who, not understanding the 
question of materialism at all, nor seeing the glory of God in it, 
have an ignorant prejudice against the whole subject, and a 
pitiful fear of it, as holding of the materialist school. Poor 
wits! what are you afraid of? Has not God made me with a 
body? and is He not to raise me again with a body? and is 
there not to be a new earth as well as a new heaven? What 
makes you so much outcry about, ye disciples of the shadowy 
elysium of the heathens? I would you had more reverence for 
God's material creation, and for man's body, creation's lord. 39 
In what way, however, does Irving understand the physical dimension of 
human existence to be consistent with such an apparently non-material view 
of human being? In order to answer this we turn to the manner by which 
Irving relates the spiritual and the material dimension of human existence 
in its primordial state, 
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2.2. Human Being: the vinculum creationi& 
The ultimate primacy of human being over the 
Irving, is to be found in its unique status. 
lmaEo Del. As ima8, o Del, human being 
Consequently, it has the God-given capacity 
discussed above, the imaEo Del consists in the 
be the obedient creature amidst the purely mat 
is accorded a specific destiny: to image God, 
destiny in and through the will, 
created order, according to 
It is both lma8-o mundl and 
is 'being-with' (Mitsein). 
to transcend itself. As 
human creature's ability to 
erial. As such, human being 
In turn, it performs this 
But human being is significant not not solely in being imago Dei. It is 
also imago MUndi, It is the one that is both able to transcend and to be 
immanent. Its being takes meaning only in light of the full polarity 
between the two: one has meaning only in light of the other. As imago 
mundi human being reflects an order of being we may describe as 'being-in' 
by virtue of its purely immanent situatedness. Whilst homo sapiens is the 
one with raised arm and upward gaze as an expression of that beyond 
itself, it is so as the one rooted inextricably in the immanent world of 
creation. Thus, human being is imago mundi by virtue of 'being-in, ' for it 
shares in the immanence of all that is created. 
Human being is both 'being-in' and 'being-with: ' both immanent and 
transcendent. As such, it is the vinculum creationis. Herein lies the 
original design of human being: it was at f irst "a body of dust, and a 
spirit from God; by the one holding of the creature, by the other of the 
Creator; and so in himself forming a link between the creature and the 
Creator, "40 Having delineated the form, an ontology of will, by which 
Irving explicates the unique position of the human creature, we are now 
able to outline the dynamics by which this vinculum is animated and 
personalised. Human being performs its destiny in and through its proper 
and willing response to the Creator's will. The latter in turn is an 
operation of the Divine purely in the realm of will. This is not merely a 
qualification of being, but one much more of grace, for, "he would have the 
will of man to be recognised as the lord of all visible things. "" Thus, 
Irving outlines the Godward identity of the human creature by use of the 
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tensive symbol, imago Del, in order to present 'spiritual life' as 'the life 
of the spirit ... the constant presence of a will to live so- 
0142 In so doing, 
he presents not only human spirituality in terms of obedient will, but 
human, 'perfection in terms of one whose will, word and work is in unison 
with God 
16.41 
Yet, whilst the human will is the meeting place between the Creator and 
the created, the Divine and the human, it is the purely material aspect of 
human existence that is, for Irving, the conditio sine qu. 9 non by which 
this occurs due to the fact that 'the body is the organ by which the 
spirit within a man doth manifest itself to the world, '44 
It is this embodied reality that for Irving manifests how the creation of 
the Adam surpasses the primary angelic order as the one f it to be the 
immanent lmaEo Dei, for incorporeal being before the creation of Adam has 
no need of a material body in order to perfect its being: it is pure 
spirit, perfect in its kind. But not so with Adam, who as the nexus 
between the spiritual and material introduces not only an altogether new 
form of existence, but one that is superior to all other forms of created 
existence, Consequently: 
The creation of Adam hath this advancement, above the creation 
of angels, that it includeth another kind of existence, any one 
substance, and any one exponent of the Divine Mind and purpose, 
which is the visible, as distinguished from the invisible; the 
corporeal, as distinguished from the incorporeal; matter, as 
distinguished from spirit. Hitherto there had only been invisible 
and incorporeal substance, which as is the soul of man; but now 
there is to be joined therewith a body which shall possess all 
material and visible things as its habitation. 4r- 
When he turns his attention to the materiality of human existence, Irving 
makes use of an alternative conceptuality in order to express both the 
self-relation and the extra-human relation of embodied human being. This 
he does by the complementary notion of 'dominion. ' By means of the dual 
use of 'dominion' that Irving establishes the high dignity of human being 
within the immanent world of creation. On the one hand, as imag-o Dei, 
human being is be ing- under- dom in ion: it owes and finds its existence in an 
Other, the Creator God. Yet, on the other hand, it mirrors its drchetype 
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by virtue of existing itseif as a being- irr-dominion, It is this being-in- 
dominion thaL sets the agenda for delineating the place of the human 
within its createdness, At all times, however, this being- in-relat ion is 
itself subsumed under an all embracing ontology of relatedness, Thus 
Irving asserts: 
God, when He had finished His work, gave it into the charge and 
responsibility of man: it was man's house, for man's government; 
always in obedience and subservience to God - which is a 
condition, the absolute condition, of a creature. 41- 
Irving moves from the purely transcendent to both the purely material and 
the vinculum between the two, human being. In so doing, he . 
begins to 
outline a metaphysic with which he can better embrace the full scope of 
human being, whose being- in-relat ion has three distinct foci: God, self and 
the extra-human. 47 These foci, however, are not to be divided between the 
conceptual tools Irving uses, namely human being as 'ima8-o DeP and as 
having 'dominion. ' They are, rather, inter-reiated in Irving's anthropology, 
albeit in a very definite manner, wherein the human creature is created: 
first and noblest of all, to be His own image and like-ness; but 
next, and only second to this, to be the heir, possessor, and lord 
of all His created works, to have dominion, to rule for God, to 
possess and to enjoy the works of His hands: this is an integrant 
part of man's creation; - to inherit the earth, the habitable 
earth; to have dominion over the beasts of the earth, the fish of 
the sea, and the fowls of the heaven; this, I say, upon God's own 
constituting Word, is as much of man's essential being as it is 
to be holy as God is holy, and pure as He is pure; and who is, 
the man that dare gainsay it? 413 
Irving does not interpret 'dominion, ' significantly, as merely a functional 
attribute of human being but as an es-sential quality to being human. In 
Adam, the archetype, human being 'stood as the head of the creation, sun, 
moon, and stars, and earth; the world animate and inanimate; creation's 
lord, who sealed up the sum full of wisdom and perfect in beauty, whom God 
also pronounced good. "9 The created order is not given over as a mere 
habitation nor as a 'diversion' f or Adam and his Eve. Rather, the 
appointment of the human creature to be creation's sovereign, carries with 
it immeasurable responsibility: human being has the capacity for changing 
creation, by means of its freedom to choose the good. Irving delineates 
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this ontic quality of dominion by his christocentric hermeneutic. Firstly, 
the idea of 'dominion' is interpreted in purely human terms. From the 
biblical notion of the oneness of being and substance in a plurality of 
persons, 1-0 he prepares the foundation for his Adamic typology. Thus he 
writes: 
These instances of the oneness of being and substance in a 
plurality of persons shew out the proper mystery of manhood, as 
distinct from the angelic nature; whose numbers were never thus 
recapitulated into one person, as mankind were heretofore into 
Adam, and the saints are hereafter to be into Christ. " 
However, what is of greater importance here is the use Irving makes of 
this creation mandate to outline the relationship between Adam and that 
over which he is appointed to be sovereign. As sovereign of creation he 
determines the destiny of that which he tends, or, as Irving puts it, the 
created order 'sinks or swims ... falls or rises`"ý, derives the quality of its 
being, from its human sovereign. This denotes much more an ontic rather 
than merely functional relation of the first human pair to that which has 
been given them to tend and over which they are to have dominion. It is 
an affirmation of human being in its relation to the created: human being 
in an essential relation to that which the Creator proclaims good 
Consequently, the function of 'dominion' is placed in the realm of being, as 
an ontological category which is prescriptive of human being. 
Consequently, 'being-with-God' is not a flight from the materiality of 
human existence, Rather, it is a saying 'Yes' to the material: an 
affirmation of the divinely appointed relatedness between the Creator and 
his creation. The truly human, Vere Homo, is humanity in the image of God 
as rooted and grounded in its created situatedness. 
This original intention of the Creator for his image bearer is revealed 
two dimensionally, in the human spirit to be God's likeness, and in the 
body to 'express every disposition of God in the government of the 
creatures. ' This notion of the relatedness between the human and the 
extra-human creature helps unpack, in turn, Irving's interpretation of the 
ima8-o Dei. It is an ontology of responsibility: 'man is the responsible 
creature; he only is the responsible one: all the rest are subject to him, 
and look up to him; not to God directly, but to man directly, and through 
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him their offering is to be presented to God. `-: 3 The one who is 'God- 
breathed, ' the ImaEo Dei, mirrors the Divine only in its context as the one 
who is 'dust-formed, ' the ima8, o mundi, The former may distinguish the 
image bearer from the extra-human, but the latter underpins the context 
within which this imaging assumes. It is a righteousness that manifests 
itself not only In the material, but also by virtue of the material, 
Consequently, the material and spiritual dimensions of human existence are 
not polar opposites, but complementary elements of the one being, As such, 
Irving's doctrine of human being is a clear affirmation of the goodness of 
human being, " and is at all times the background out of which his 
explicit doctrine concerning the human nature of Christ is formed. 
Thus far we have delineated Irving's anthropology in terms of its relation 
both to the one it images, as imago Del, and to that over which it has 
dominion, the extra-human, the Imago mundl. In so doing, we have 
investigated both the object imaged and the context within which this 
imaging occurs, What remains to be evinced is the relation of the subject 
to itself within this ontology of relatedness. It is to the dynamics of 
this operation that this discussion turns, namely, the self-relation of the 
image bearer. 
What therefore is the inner dynamic by which this creature can be vinculum 
between both the created and Creator? On the one hand, Irving understands 
the link with the transcendent in light of the human creature's affinity 
with the Divine by means of its reason, or spirit. As r-easonable being, 
the human creature is open to the Divine Reason of God's Word and Spirit. 
On the other, he posits the human link with creation by virtue of the 
former's own material existence. Thus, the Creator and created touch in 
the human creature who becomes the vinculum creationis. In so doing, the 
mind of the invisible God becomes imaged in the soul of man, s- and given a 
visible, finite and material expression. For Irving, the human creature as 
God's image and King is an embodied creature. 'Man is an embodied 
spirit, "-'- This apparent dualism is explained, by Irving, in terms of a 
cultural analogy: 
The Jew and the Christian can be as little separated as the body 
and spirit of a living man; and, like these two constituents- of a 
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living man, neither can they be confused or mixed up with one 
another, but must be treated of as distinct, though co-essential 
to life-,, " 
However, in order to understand more fully this tension between the 
material and spiritual of human existence, we may turn to Irving's use of 
a trinal analogy with the Trinity. Firstly, as noted above, Irving 
understands the very consititution of human being to reside in the will, 
This he parallels with the Father as supreme will: by virtue of its having 
a will free from causality, Adam and his descendants are invested with the 
capacity to image the divine. The Father's will, in turn, seeks eternally 
to manifest itself in reason, which Irving makes analogous with the Son. 
The full significance of this will be discussed below when attention is 
turned to Irving's notion of the 'person, ' Lastly, this reason must express 
itself through bodily form. This, Irving parallels to the Spirit's operaton 
in 'going forth from the Father and the Word, in order to express their 
will and their mind in outward action, "50 Irving applies his hermeneutical 
principle, that our cosmogony is to be derived from revelation, to his 
doctrine of human being. From the revelation of the trinitarian God in and 
through the incarnate Son, Irving extrapolates the original balance between 
the spiritual and material in the ima8-o Del. It is an imaging in terms of 
will, reason and expression. This, in turn, becomes the key to conceiving 
the human creature as lma8-o Del. Consequently, 'man in his consitution as 
a creature, is a type of the constitution of the Creator, three 
subsistencies in one substance, each complete and perfect in itself, yet 
inseparable and indivisible from one another. "-'9 
How, therefore, does Irving understand the self -relatedness of the first 
human creature? At this point we may refer again to Coleridge's influence 
upon Irving. Both desire to present human being not as anthropology pure 
and simple, but as an anthropology- in-relat ion, In order to so do, both 
hold to an ontology of will which understands being in terms of 'Absolute 
Will. ' Both understand human being as a dynamic relation in the order of 
being. '-cl But Irving goes on to transcend his Coleridgean influence. His 
soteriological interests free him from any Coleridgean confusions and 
abstractions. As his context demanded both a re- interpret at ion and re- 
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orientation of the doctrine of God's being as Trinity, so, in a similar 
manner, his anthropology takes on a specifically 'Irving, hue as it is 
expounded within the context of his christOlogical and soteriological 
concerns, Irving shares the concern of his contemporaries in establishing 
a foundation for talking about both the human and divine activity in the 
Christ-event. '-' However, his aim is to do so whilst preserving a 
trinitarian dynamic- of Divine and infinite Reason or Will corresponding 
with human and finite reason or will. Consequently, it is an moral 
interpretation of creation, and one which describes the dynamics of human 
morality in a manner that attempts to facilitate an adequate answer to how 
the 'infinite can be focused in the finite ... and unconditioned ideal be 
instantiated in a historic individual. It is an attempt to answer such 
questions without falling into the anthropocentric interpretations of human 
being of Kant and Schleiermacher. 
Irving begins by defining the circumference of human being: the flesh. 
'Flesh' is the boundary of humanity. It is 'the bound and compass which 
God hath fixed for the definition of His creature man; ' not simply the 
body, nor merely the soul, but the body and soul, or spirit, in unison. It 
denotes the visible and invisible elements of humanity existing in union 
with one another. '=-: 3 The soulish element, whilst evidently non-material, 
has its being by virtue of the material, The flesh, or 'flesh and blood' 
for Irving, delineates 'the region of the will and power of man. `-4 Human 
being is, therefore, enfleshed being, fleshly being, Yet it is at the same 
time supremely ensouled being, or embodied spirit. This non-material 
dimension to human being is the realm of the will, of reason, of 
conscience- the volitional, the rational, the moral. As such, Irving can 
talk of the soul in terms of the seat of righteousness: it has a purely 
moral capacity. r-r- The human soul and its reasoning faculty, is also 
expressed in terms of conscience-, it is the conscience or reason that the 
Tempter seeks to 'lull asleep. "'-, Alternatively, he describes Adam in 
purely rational terms, 'not reason, neither... flesh; but-a person endowed 
with reason, and responsibie to God for the right use of the same, Reason 
and flesh, or in Scriptural language, a living soul, "-7 
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Yet however interchangeable may be Irving's use of the terms 'soul,, 
'reason' and 'conscience, ' he makes a clear distinction between them and his 
use of 'will. ' Whilst he may use 'soul' and 'spirit' interchangeably when 
referring to the non-material dimension of human existence, he 
distinguishes between the two in their relation to reason, Irving posits 
$soul' as the locus in which human being occurs, but 'will' he understands 
as the HvaýLiq by which all human volition, rationality and morality occur. 
Thus he asserts, that as the 'will is the substance of a spirit, of an 
intelligent being, ' so 'reason, without a will, is like a visible world 
without a sensible creature to possess it. ' Therefore, 'the will is before 
reason, as the sense is before the sensible world, "-O Immediately we 
confront the manner in which Irving expresses the relation between the 
material and spiritual dimensions of human being: a reasonable. will In the 
soul which moves and controls the purely material form of human existence. 
It is human understanding, natural feeling and bodily sense operated upon 
by the spiritual, the will. '-'9 Thus Irving asserts- 
The body of man is a noble creature of God, made to rule and 
command the whole of this visible world ... These senses were made 
to possess all material things, and to be possessed by none: the 
creatures were but the furniture for the entertainment of man's 
body, and the whole earth was but as the house for it to dwell 
in; and as the master of the house is more noble than the house, 
so is the body of man more noble than this earthly tabernacle 
which it was destined to inherit. 70 
The purely material dimension to human being, as we have delineated above, 
thus conforms to the will. It is within this subordinated structure of 
human being that Irving attributes dignity to the purely material form of 
human existence, It is the harmony of body and soul: the imago mundi in 
conformity with the imago Dei; the earthly with the heavenly, It is an 
affirmation of the material dimension of human existence, and that which 
lies behind Irving's soteriological concerns, In its purely practical 
application, Irving is to be seen no more at his best than when he defends, 
in an early essay, his philosophy of education within the increasingly 
mechanised society, Here he argues for an all-embracing pedagogics which 
continues to cultivate the 'common and catholic, ' against that which is 
increasingly specialised. His is a polemic against an increasingly 
materialistic anthropology wherein human nature is considered to consist 
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'only of five senses, four lusty limbs, and a voracious body. ' It is an 
apologia for 'the old notion' that there is 'a spirit in man, and that the 
breath of the Almighty hath given him life, that there is a world of faith 
beyond the world of sight, 171 
If Irving conceives of human being as consisting of 'a reasonable will In 
the soul which moves and controls the purely material form of human 
existence, ' then in what way is this personal being? Although this is a 
question he admits to having not directed his thought whilst writing his 
ma8-num opus on the Incarnation, nor in his earliest tracts in the flurry of 
opening debate, " he does address this imbalance in his preface to The 
Orthodox And Catholic Doctrine of Our Lord's Human Nature by 1830, Here 
he distinguishes between that which is common and that which is particular 
to the human creature. The difference between the two is described in 
terms of derivation: 
Our personality is not given to us by Adam, but by God; and, 
therefore, we are responsible to God for all the actings of our 
personal will. But our substance is derived from Adam; we are of 
one substance with him, though different persons. 7 ---I' " 
The latter is that 'what man was created. ' It is the community of the 
human 'compound nature, body and soul, flesh and reason, 474 The f ormer, 
that which particularises each human being, is the 'individuality or 
personality, that which we denominate -T myself-, and which 
God regards as 
responsible. ` Irving derives this particularising attribution to the 
human person from his understanding of the Incarnation in that the Son did 
not assume a human person /personality715. 
It is of interest to note the theological implications of Irving's 
interpreLation of human being in terms of the common and particular. 
Although he does not expressly say so, this interpretation of human nature 
parallels his previous explication of the Divine identity: that which is 
both common and particular to Father, Son and Spirit in their community 
and individuality. The nearest Irving comes at expressing an explicit 
correlation between the Divine and the human in terms of 'person, is in the 
aforementioned article in the Morning Watch -77 where he interprets human 
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being as a dynamic relation in the order of being, after the order of the 
Trinity. What is of importance here is the manner in which Irving 
attributes the notion of' 'person' specifically to the Son: 
The originating fountain of the will doth ever seek to pour 
itself our into the various forms of reason, which all uniting 
together in the personality of a man, constitute what we call I 
myself. This is the mystery, of the absolute Godhead expressing 
itself in the unity of Word, or Logos, who is also a person, and 
properly the Per-son, in whom the invisible and incomprehensible 
substance of the Godhead doth body itself into form, for the 
purposes and end of creation, 77 
The distinctly human person is understood to be separate from the human 
nature which is passed on by natural procreation. The human person, 
Irving asserts, is derived from God: it is 'looked on as holden from God 
our Creator, and ever responible to Him. '7e Throughout his discourse on 
the incarnation, Irving is at pains to establish the mono-personal identity 
of Jesus Christ: there is no distinctly human person assumed by the Son. 
What he assumes is a human nature. 
What, therefore, does Irving define as the 'human person? ' In what way 
can his be understood as a modern anthropology, in which the purely 
subjective agency of human being is integrated fully within his 
overall anthropology? It is at this point that Irving is seen both to 
grapple and interact with his own Zeitgeist. His ontology of will 
necessitates an interpretation of personal human being in terms of 
responsible agency. This Irving asserts by virtue of the priority he 
attributes to the role of the human will. The will is the realm of 
the personal: the personality standeth in the will, 1 73 Yet this 
construction of human being in terms of responsible agency suggests an 
Other to whom the human bears responsibility, Consequently, although 
in its self-relation, human individuality expresses itself in the 
will, this will must do so in accordance to its own nature: as will- 
in-relation, obedient to the Creator. " What we arrive at is a 
construction of human personhood in terms of its relation to its 
Creator by means of willing and responsible agency. 81 Irving's 
anthropology, as such, bears greater affinity to the biblical picture 
where the imaEo Del is located in the will, and interpreted in terms 
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of obedience. '92 It is an anthropology of obedience and responsibility 
to the God who covenants himself from Adam through Noah to Abraham, 
Israel and to Christ himself. Consequently, Irving constructs the 
essential nature of human personhood in relational concepts which 
reflect this underlying subordination to, yet diginity with, the 
Creator. These he derives from his understanding of the Christ-event: 
the human person stands behind all its actions, evident and living, in 
a manner that reflects the way in which the Father himself stands 
behind the actions of the Son in the economy of salvation, 
In summary conclusion to his analysis of 'Paradise Gained, ' therefore, 
Irving is seen to present an anthropology determined by the use of the 
two symbols, imago Dei and the exercise of 'dominion. ' Human being is 
being-with-God, imago Dei, It is also being-in-the-world, imago 
mundi, expressed in dominion and lordship. Both are pursued through 
an ontology of will. Through his obedient will the first Adam is 
image bearer. As embodied will, Adam is the vinculurA the meeting 
point between the Divine and the created, Human being as imago Dei, 
therefore, is not primarily a stat6ment about the creature, but an 
expression about its uniqueness within the context of the act of 
creation. In the words of Westermann: 
It is not a declaration about man, but about the creation of man. 
The meaning can only be understood from what has preceded the 
creative act. The text is making a statement about an action of 
God who decides to create man in his image. The meaning must 
come from the Creation event. What God has decided to create 
must stand in a relationship to him. The creation of man in 
God's image is directed to something happening between God and 
man. The creator created a creature that corresponds to him, to 
whom he can speak, and who can hear him, It must be noted that 
man in the Creation narrative is a collective. Creation in the 
image of God is not concerned with an individual, but with 
mankind, the species, man, The meaning is that mankind is 
created so that something can happen between God and man. 
Mankind is created to stand before God. IE31: 3 
2.3 Human Being is in its BecominR: 51. 
And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, 
are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to 
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another; for this comes fron the Lord who is the Spirit. II Cor, 
3: 18. 
Irving's ontology of will emphasizes his western, Augustinian heritage. 
Human being is distinguished from all other being by virtue of being lmag-o 
Del. As such, it belongs to the same order of being as God. The iapXý of 
human being consists in partaking of divine reality by virtue of intellect 
and reason, '84 Yet, his is not a noetic anthropology: the human spirit is 
not identified strictly in terms of the rational. Nor is it guilty of the 
self-analysis and introspection inherent in Augustine's integration of 
trinitarian theology with human psychology. The human self (mens) is not 
an end in itself Rather, it finds its meaning in relation to an Other, 
Consequently, for Irving, the human will designates a hermeneutical rather 
than purely anthropological concept: it finds its meaning in the imago Dei 
which is itself derivative of that which it images, 
This element in Irving's thought is not, however, the only aspect in which 
he appears to transcend his western heritage. Our earlier discussion 
focused on the teleological nature of Irving's anthropology. It is within 
this teleological interpretation of human being that Irving attempts to 
overcome the inherent hamartiological difficulties of a purely 
archaeological interpretation of human being. This he does by neither 
rejecting one for, nor pitting one against the other, Rather, he balances 
the two by means of a dialectic which focuses on that which each specifies 
about the order ot creation. Firstly, in harmony with both loci, he 
maintains the belief that God creates all things perfect. Within this 
essentially archaeological and primordial state of perfection, there is 
assimilated the twofold destiny of human being in its intrinsic relatedness 
with the Creator: 
It is of the nature of God to create all things perfect and 
blessed in their kind; and we certainly know that man was so 
created, and the dominion over which he ruled, There was no 
breach of peace amongst all the creatures over whom he held the 
mastery, nor between his wife and him, nor between God and his 
living soul, nor among the elements of creation, nor anywhere 
within all the bounds of his habitation. e-6 
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However, as we noted above, 065 creation is also a teleological act, Its 
being is derived from its intended becoming. The sole purpose for all 
that is created is that it may express a future perfection under the 
sovereignty of God. Human being is perfect both in its &pXý and its T9X0q. 
But each state of perfection has meaning, however, only in its subsumation 
within the Christ-event. It is both as Imago Dei and imago mundi that we 
may understand this dialectical use of perfection, On the one hand Adam 
is the perfect being as first of his human kind, as the &pXý of human 
being within the locus of creation. Alternatively, Adam is the one who is 
becoming perfect as one who stands in relation to the TdXoq of human 
being, which, for Irving, is Christ. Therefore, the rgXoq of human being is 
subsumed within the locus of christology. Irving's christology dictates 
his doctrine of human being, Human being is in its becoming as a type of 
the incarnate Son, the Christ- through him are all things created, from him 
does humanity derive its identity, for him it is created, of him it is the 
image, Its creation, fall and subsequent redemption are located in the 
person of the incarnate Son, The full expression of human being, 
therefore, is not that which is presented in Adam. Rather, it is that 
which is revealed in the proto-type, Christ. 
It is this emphasis upon the christological dimension of Irving's 
anthropology that, prima facie, suggests an interesting divergence from his 
western roots. A teleological interpretation of human being implies a 
movement away from the West. This is certainly the case if 'western' is a 
synonymn for 'Augustinian. ' For example, he may be understood as 
continuing the Athanasian argument that the Creator's purpose for his 
creation is not thwarted by human infidelity: it is a preparation for the 
revelation of the Word incarnate who reveals to the creature the hidden 
mind of the Father. '97 Without this revelation, Athanasius argues, the 
creature would be ignorant of its Creator. "lle This dependence upon the 
revealing Word of God permeates Irving's entire thinking. It is that which 
specifies the entire Christ-event. The enfleshed Son reveals not only the 
character of God, but also that of the human. Thus, Irving stands firmly 
within an Athanasian orthodoxy in his stress upon the revelatory function 
of the incarnate Word, 
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But on closer inspection, there is evidence to show that although he 
adheres to a developmental anthropology, Irving reflects a historically 
sound western anthropology, Irving may be understood as both taking that 
which lies partly developed within his own tradition, and applying it to 
the debate into which he addressed himself. 
In what way, therefore, does Irving extend his own tradition? This I 
believe he does by expanding elements he finds within the anthropologies 
of Irenaeus and Luther. Firstly, he parallels Irenaeus' insistence that man 
should be created, receive growth, be strenghthened, abound, fall, recover, 
be glorified, and ultimately see God, *"ýý Both also insist that to taste of 
sin is to bring about a greater state of human being- the experience of 
knowing then shunning evil, produces a true human character. 10 
However, there are specific implications in identifying the nature of human 
being within a teleological anthropology: what exactly do we mean by 
'human being? ' If it cannot be identified in terms of' a platonic ideal, or 
primordial proto-type, wherein lies the criterion for assessing being 
'human? ' 
This Irving derives from his obvious knowledge of Luther's interpretation 
of the Genesis story. It is a derivation that can be understood as 
extending that which is first presented in Irenaeus then re-emerges in 
Luther, and given 'flesh' by Irving, Thus, when he expands his adamic 
anthropology, Irving can be seen as standing alongside and expanding that 
of Luther, as presented in his commentary on Genesis. Here, in 1: 20ff, he 
argues for a distinction between Adam's initial createdness and that which 
he is to become. Whilst the first Adam lives a physical life, he is 
created in order to 'till the ground, not as if he were doing some irksome 
task and exhausting his body by toil but with supreme pleasure; not as a 
pastime but in obedience to God and submission to His will. "' It is 
indeed a paradisal garden. For Luther, however, this is not the end of 
creation: 'after the physical life was to come a spiritual life. "92 This 
clear distinction between the physical and spiritual in terms of a 
continuum leads us to the connection between Luther and Irving. Both 
temper and mould their respective anthropologies in the light of I Cor. 
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15: 45,46: "'The first man Adam became a living being"; the last Adam became 
a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the 
physical, and then the spiritual. ' Luther interprets this passage as 
f ollows: 
The first man was made a "living soul; " that is, he lived an 
animal life, which needs food, drink, sleep, etc. But "the second 
man will be renewed into the life-giving spirit"; that is he will 
be a spiritual man when he reverts to the image 
, 
of God. He will 
be similar to God in life, righteousness, holiness, wisdom, etc, '3ý3 
It is this antithesis between the first man as living soul, the physical 
life, and the last Adam as quickening spirit, that is of importance to 
Irving's argument. Even so, he develops it differently from that of Luther, 
Luther distinguishes the first Adam from the second on the basis of his 
purely animal-like existence, Thus, even had Adam not sinned, 'he would 
still have lived a physical life in need of food, drink, rest. He would 
have grown, procreated, etc., until he would have been translated by God to 
the spiritual life in which he would have lived without any animal 
qualities. 113 4 
It is a christological distinction, however, by which Irving distinguishes 
the two. At this point we are able to comment fully on Irving's doctrine 
of human being as imqEo Del. Within his ontology of will he asserts that 
human and divine existences are of the same order of being. Yet, this is 
not to suggest that human being is the same essential being as the 
Godhead, Rather, it expresses the quality of analogy. The boundary of 
this analogy is clearly set within a trinitarian setting-, although 'man was 
created in the image of God, he was not so in the same sense in which 
Christ is called "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express 
image of His person. ""' This differentiation is then given full 
expression in Irving's exegesis of the above Pauline passage, After having 
given a lengthy citation of verses forty-four through forty-nine, Irving 
then gives his exegesis and interpretation of the 'natural man. "91- Whilst 
Luther denotes the adamic language generically, Irving does so 
specifically: 
In this passage we are taught that Adam was not a spiritual 
creature in the sense in which we are spiritual, who are born 
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again of the Spirit by the quickening power of the Lord Jesus 
Christ: nor was he a creature in the dignity into which we are 
adopted by faith- Whatever distinction there is between a soul 
and spirit, - and such a distinction is continually preserved in 
Scripture, - that same distinction there is between the 
generation of Adam and the regeneration of Christ . 437 
The soteriological implications of Irving's exegesis do not concern us at 
this point. What is of importance to note is that he derives his 
a understanding about the 
I PXý of human being from his christology. The 
first Adam he identifies in terms of 'soul,, Herein lies the primary 
criterion for Irving's developmental anthropology. 'In that f orm of being 
called the soul, after which Adam was created, ' Irving argues there is 'a 
natural incapacity for receiving or knowing the things which the Spirit 
teacheth ... that this is a form of being preparatory for a higher and more 
perfect one, which God might have perhaps have given to our first parents 
if they had stood faithful unto Him who created them. They were perfect 
in that kind in which they were created ... but that kind was not of the 
perfectest, which yet awaited them, and to which they perhaps would have 
been translated if they had not fallen. "-'00 In this form of existence Adam 
had little knowledge of God beyond that of Creator. Herein lies the 
interpretation of human being within a thoroughly trinitarain hermeneutic. 
In the light of both the revelation of the trinitarian God in and through 
Christ, and thib developmental interpretation of human being, he asserts 
that: 
Of God's spiritual being I am in great doubt whether he could 
have any distinct apprehension or knowledge; because Paul 
expressly saith, that the natural man, or the man of the soul, of 
which Adam was the perfect form, knoweth not the things of the 
Spirit of God. he could not know the Father, who is known only by 
the Son, who was not yet come forth from the bosom of the 
Father; and not knowing the Son he could not know the Spirit 
whose procession succeedeth that of the Son. More than the 
knowledge of a Creator he could not have. His being was only, if 
I may so speak, preparatory to a spiritual being. " 
In this manner human being is presented as a dynamic and developing link 
between all forms of spiritual existence, from that of the purely immanent 
and created world, through the transcendent created realm of finite spirit, 
to that of transcendent trinitarian Being-, Father, Son and Spirit. Human 
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being is the vinculum between all these f orms of existence, not 
essentially, but derivatively, On the one hand, the human creature makes 
visible the invisible functions of pure spirit: both possess understanding, 
righteousness and love. But only through the former are these expressed 
within the comprehension of space and the possession of matter. 
Consequently, Irving understands the creation of pure spirit (angelic life) 
to be a type of the embodied spirit, human being, But lest we think 
anthropocentrically, Irving describes human being as but a type of 'that 
Divine form of being which Christ was to be, "00 Consequently, the first 
Adam is a type of the second. 101 Herein lies the dual dignity Irving 
ascribes to human being: it has both a horizontal and vertical dimension, 
Horizontally, it is the fullest creative expression of God: all things point 
to the arrival of man onto the platform of history. They are but a type 
of the one who is image bearer, In this being meet the hitherto unrelated 
dimensions of spirit and. matter. But to stop at this high and optimj, ý5ý 
picture of man is not merely to misrepresent reality as it now stands, but 
to belittle the true source and measure of human dignity. This Irving 
posits within the vertical realm: it is in and through the rel-a-t-io--n--of 
human being to the incarnate Son that he identifies the true worth of 
human being, 
I have discussed above the primary criterion by which Irving etablishes 
the value and worth of the human creature. This he locates within the 
dual appointment to be imaEo Dei and lord of creation. By means of this 
ontological framework Irving constructs his answer to the kind of question 
posed by Kelsey at the start of this chapter, Human beings are able, in 
their finitude, to know the infinite God by virtue of being both imag'o Del 
and the form in which the full revelation of the trinitarian God would be 
manifested, the incarnate Son. Irving constructs his anthropology within 
an ontology of will and responsibility. It is an ontology of relations: 
human being stands in a certain relation to the Creator; it is both finite 
image and lord. But what are the creature's benefits in this relation with 
its Creator? They are expressed in the very life given to the creature. 
The quality of Adam's life is a contingent not essential to being human. 
It is contingent upon being righteous. The will and the power to be so, 
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to live according to God's law, are gifts, lo; 2 Even the life itself is one 
derived from the Life-giver, This, of course, is hardly a novel assertion- 
it stands at the very heart of the Adamic story; Adam and Eve were 
banished from Eden before they could eat of the tree of life. Rather, it 
is a life that receives sustenance. from the Garden into which it was 
placed: 'not a life which could have died, not yet a life which could be 
pronounced immortal. " 10-'-11 It is a life complete according to its kind, but 
not an embodiment of life in its perfect state. It is incapable of having 
eternal life. "' What is of importance here is the manner in which Irving 
marries this Genesis declaration about the quality of Adam's existence with 
a teleological interpretation of human being. The latter neutralises the 
inherent problem of any archaeological interpretation; namely, how to 
account for any subsequent inversion of the intended human vocation, How 
does Irving account for any such possibility? We are now at the point to 
give his answer to the second of Kelsey's questions: what is it about 
human beings that makes fallenness possible in such a radical way as to 
require the kind of redemption to which Christianity witnesses? 
3. Master - Story §2: Paradise Lost. 
The Word that gives expression to that which 'we cannot speak, ""- which 
speaks and addresses, which does reveal, which does perfectly express, is 
the living Word that speaks into the deafening silence of exiled humanity 
from its primal Garden, It is the Deus loquens as he participates in the 
disrupted reality of his perfect and developing creation. Yet this reality, 
as experienced by each subsequent manswarm of human history, stands 
starkly juxtaposed to the intended apxý as expressed in western 
archaeological anthropologies, Both the human apXý and its relation to any 
subsequent dis-ease sounds indeed, 'strange news from another star. ' 
It is within this context and against this tension that the anthropological 
significance of Irving's theology assumes its nascent meaning. How are we 
to interpret the human predicament? From what perspective is one to 
approach it? If one's diagnosis of humanity's malaise is expressed in that 
which is central to christology, then the full significance of Irving's 
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christological solution will be grasped only in its relation to his- 
diagnosis of the human predicament. 
3.1 Human Being is in its Becoming:. §2. 
It is of pivotal importance to contextualise both Irving's doctrine of 
human being and that of sin, Out of context, they appear crude and naive. 
At face value the role of sin appears to be over- emphasized, But Irving 
is interacting with a very real opponent; the Socinian notion that, our 
present existence equals that of the Adamic original. Here he reacts 
against the logical conclusion to an archaeological anthropology which 
takes lightly the eruption of sin into human history, Irving's apologia 
consists in establishing an anthropology which combats the Socinian by 
accounting for the fall and the need for salvation in terms that 
necessitate divine action. Hence his emphasis upon a developmental 
anthropology, 
Irving's teleological anthropology presents Adam as perfect, but incomplete, 
Creation cannot have been created perfect, he attests, in light both of its 
subsequent demise and the appearance of Christ. For he argues, 'if the 
creation had been perfect and sufficient while yet the Christ was 
unconstituted, then why should there be a Christ at all? There cannot be 
two perfections, there cannot be two unchangeables, otherwise there were 
two gods. "01- Adam is merely the type of Christ- creation in the unfallen 
state existing only to make way for creation in its fallen state, If Adam 
is the apex of creation, there can be no divine remedy for a fall, 
redemption seen to be a mere after thought, and no guarantee offered in 
the redeemed state against a further fall. 
Eden, therefore, is created in order to show the incompleteness of human 
being. It is preparatory for an even higher state of finite existence, 
Here, Irving stands apart from the traditional Augustinian emphasis upon a 
'static' cosmology. Rather, Adam' s self -sit ua t edness manifests that 'the 
creation, all good though it was, is not the accomplishment but only the 
beginning of God's purpose, "" The TtXoq is delineated in light of ilý, e 
divine command to refrain from eating the fruit of the tree of the 
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knowledge of good and evil. Although Adam is created with the capacity to 
know such knowledge, it is not to be necessarily by willful disobedience. 
Irving argues for two consequences of such an epistemic state. Firstly, 
the teleological: it is a state higher than that of Adam's original 
createdness. Why? Because it is a knowledge not merely of good, but of 
good and evil, Secondly, the ontological: it is a state possessed of the 
Godhead itself. As such, it can hardly be an evil state. Thus, it must be 
a state capable of being attained by other means than that pursued by the 
f irst couple. 1 0'0 Consequently, Irving preceives the cdXoq of human being 
to be not only epistemic but existential: the ability not only to 
distinguish between good and evil, but to choose the good, to be im, 98-o Del, 
In what manner, therefore, does Irving unite his notion of the TgXoq of 
creation with a developmental metaphysic? He achieves this by the way in 
which he perceives God to unite himself with his creation. This notion of 
union is one that surfaces in Irving's thought in two pivotal areas: the 
cosmological and the ontological. The original creation was one wholly 
separate from its Creator, with little or no knowledge of spiritual life or 
Fatherly love, In its primal state, the creation does not reflect its 
intended t9xoq, Rather, as interpreted through Irving's thoroughly 
christocentric hermeneutic, 
a creation out of God was not the ultimate end of the purpose, 
but a creation united to God, and yet not mixed with him, through 
the union of a creature redeemed with the manhood taken into the 
person of the Son. 101 
We return to his central concern: creation and human being have meaning 
solely in and through the incarnate Son, Despite its archaeological 
perfection - the trees of life and knowledge of good and evil; the 
sufficiency of all desires; the completeness of all power; perfect love, and 
harmony of companionship; the presence and manifestation of God (and 
Satan) - 'the trees of his planting, the woman of his creating, and Satan 
of his permitting, "10 - the perfection of creation rests not in the 
greatest expression of divine fiat, human being, but in the incarnation of 
the Son. The issuing forth of the Son by the Father through the Spirit, 
Irving asserts, is intimately associated with the development of human 
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being in its becoming that which the Creator intends, But it is a 
'becoming' not by a return to any primal pertection. This would infer 
regressive and static historical consequences, for such an interpretation 
of the human story makes dubious the Creator's ability to maintain his 
creation. 
Therefore, in what way and by what means does the Creator bring about 
this u9Xoq? To answer this we must explore the h3martiolpElcal dynamics 
within Irving's other interpretation of God's uniting action with his 
creation. This he links to the divine permission of a fall from grace, 
3,1.1. The Agt. 
Irving is now able to move into the second stage of human- being- in- it s- 
becoming. He moves his anthropology from the primary created state, that 
of simple goodness communicated directly by the hand of God, to the 
second, the Fall, the state of the knowledge of good and evil, fallen into 
by disobedienc-e. 
It was necessary that Adam should pass into a fallen state, to 
shadow forth Christ in the fallen state, and to this very end was 
paradise created with all its ordinances. "' 
It is within this second state of creation that the uniting action of God 
is seen in an alternative mode of action, for it is a divine motivation 
towards an alienated creation. It is the action of the trinitarian Creator, 
and especially of the Father necessitated by love for his creation, 
pursuing it into its 'far country' in order not only to reconcile it to 
himself, but, according to Irving's anthropology, to bring it into its 
fullest and most perfect expression through the incarnated Son. 
It is solely by means of both the context within which he develops his 
anthropology, as he contends (against the Socinians, 112 and this 
developmental anthropology itself that Irving gives sense to the eruption 
of human sin. His hamartiology is delineated from the viewpoint of human 
being in its becoming that which the Creator intends, The fall of Adam 
does not take God by surprise, Neither does it hinder that which God 
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intends for his creation. Rather, it is an act of human 'disobedience both 
known and foreseen, and permitted by God. "'3 Indeed, the introduction of 
human dis--obedience into the scene of history is necessary 'as a part of 
the great scheme. " 14 It is this somewhat nervous theodicean tension 
between the necessity of sin on the one hand with the preclusion of divine 
culpability on the other that Irving grasps and makes as explicit to his 
doctrine of human being in its becoming in his apologia against the 
Socinians. This necessity, far from embarrassing the Godhead, is the means 
by which the full grace and love of God will be revealed, 
Yet how can sin be necessary, whilst God have no responsibility for it? 
This is a question Irving does not address directly. , Yet he appears to 
jeopardise his theodicy by the manner in which he stresses the necessity 
of sin. This I believe to be a fair representation of Irving unless one 
considers the two different but complementary perspectives by which he 
approaches the fall, Theologically, he defends the Godhead from any 
culpability on the grounds that the primal freedom of uncaused human will, 
and the exalted position of human being as vinculum between the immanent 
and the Transcendent, safeguard his theodicy. Teleologically, although God 
cannot be responsible for the fall, he permits it in order to fulfill his 
plan for creation. The appearance of the incarnate Son into the arena of 
human history as the TtXoq of human being affirms that the fall is 
permitted in order to bring about this TgXoc,. However, if this latter, 
christocentric element to his theodicy is addressed outwith its relation to 
the former anthroplogical. responsibility, Irving is not only misrepresented, 
but interpreted as making sin an end in itself. This is not the case. 
Rather, from his very earliest writings on he states the context within 
which any hamartiological talk should be made: 
The Fall is not an origin - creation is before it: and the 
purpose of God in Christ is before creation, and is the true 
origin of all being, the true end of all revelation, "' 
The fall of human being is approached from two different but 
complementary perspectives, Firstly, the cosmological, (and the purely 
negative), The fall is permitted in order to distinguish the Creator from 
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the creature, as well as affirm the order of relatedness that exists 
between humanity and its Creator, 
In order ... to preserve distinctness between the invisible and 
absolute God and the visible limited creature, it was necessary 
that the creature should fall: and, by falling, should know the 
end and inferiority that is in itself; and that the goodness 
which it had originally, is a goodness derived from another 
source than itself, seeing there hath not been, in itself, the 
power of retaining it. "- 
But Irving is at pains to show that sin is not the creation of God: it 
comes about by the uncaused will of the creature, 1 17 It is that for which 
only an initially free will may be held responsible, It is 'a condition of 
the creatures' and one that reveals how inferior the creature is to the 
Creator. "' 
In addition, Irving approaches the fall from a more positive perspective, 
the ontological. Firstly, the fall is permitted in order to bring about a 
higher form of existence. As we have noted above, it brings the creature 
into a knowledge of good and evil. But it also initiates the human 
creature to be the bearer of God's wrath against sin. Although the (inner) 
lma8-o Dei is deformed and the body, (the outer form), destined to death, 
human being remains accountable for its capacity as image bearer, for 
human being is not immediately consumed as a result of the fall. If this 
were so, human being would be a 'monument of wrath consumed' rather than 
a 'free-will actor of God's wrath, " "51 It is the God-given human capacity 
to overcome sin and in so doing declare God's sentence upon it that 
affirms the dignity of human being even in its fallen state, 12c' 
Secondly, Irving understands the fall of Adam as preparatory to the arrival 
of the 'God-man' onto the scene of human history-121 If there were no 
fall, there could be no knowledge available to the creature Of the eternal 
Son, neither in his offices as prophet, priest and king, nor in his names 
as Jesus, Christ and Lord. Consequently, within Irving's ontology, 'the fall 
is as essential for giving the God-man His dignity over and above the 
creatures, as it is for teaching the creature its distinctness from the 
invisible and incomprehensible Godhead. "22 
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But in response to whether God's purposes could have been achieved without 
a fall, Irving is hesitant to state, except to say that 'this was the best 
way of accomplishing it. '12`3 Thus he states that, 'while I assert the 
necessity of sin as a part of the great scheme, I wholly disallow that any 
creature was made for sin, but every creature for Christ. 1124 The salient 
point here is that Irving approaches the problem of sin and its eruption 
into previously perfect environs not in the light of sin but of Christ, for 
'the end of creation was the Christ. ' But Irving implies an inherent 
necessity to sin, for he goes on to say, 'this is the great end and purpose 
of sin in the creation of God, which, if you consider it well, is as 
essential to the fulness of the scheme, as is creation itself. '1ý2r- This 
necessity Irving subsumes within his doctrine of election, both universal 
and particular. This is not central to our discussion here, but highlight 
the fact that Irving does not deal with sin as an end in itself but always 
in its relation to the Divine intention of the incarnation. Whilst his 
stress upon the necessity of sin may appear to be of somewhat pessimistic, 
it stems from the stress he places on the appearance of Christ, as well as 
the importance he places upon the relatedness between the creature to 
Creator. It is within this context, therefore, that he resolves the 
'nervous tension' between his disparate and seemingly incompatible 
hamartiological approaches in the concluding remarks to his article on 
God's method and order of revealing himself, in Morning Watch. 
What we behold is not a creation destroyed, an idea of God 
marred or defeated; but it is a creation growing into that stable 
form in which it existed from the beginning in the Divine idea, 
Sin hath disclosed to man the guilt of a sinner, and taught him 
the dependence of a creature, and declared the mercy and grace 
of God; but it hath not interfered with God's original design of 
bringing a creature which should come to its glory through the 
way of death, as Christ cometh to his glory through the same. 
He would have done, and could have done it without sin and 
suffering to man by the ordinance of the forbidden tree, which 
was in effect the same prostration of the creature; but man 
would have the other way, of knowing good and evil, and he hath 
got it: but the end is plain, and the course of God is the same, 
and every defalcation in his creature only revealeth new funds of 
Divine excellency in the Creator; and so we shall see it to be 
unto the end. "' 
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3.1.2. The DiaRmosis. 
Adam's act of disobedience, historicised in the Genesis account of the Fall, 
brings about a disclocation in human being. He is no longer the image of 
the Deus loquens. No longer is he the creature who speaks on behalf of 
the One imaged, Nor does he embody the truth, giving it created being 
above mere word. Rather, in the primal act of disobedience, the truth is 
exchanged for a lie and humanity becomes untrue to itself. Adam, created 
to be holy and righteous, denudes himself of his inheritance as lord of 
creation. His suffering and death become a lie against an intended order. 
Adam's entire being becomes a lie for, in essence, he lies 'upon God, '121 
betraying that for which he is created, believing a lie against the truth. 
As a result, he is no longer God's image nor his vice-regent. 
Adam's 'untruth' or 'lie, ' however, does not create any 'thing' or 'creature. ' 
On the one hand, the lie of human being is illuminated only by the light 
of true being, the incarnate Light. On the other, since God alone is 
Creator and Absolute, the 'lie' cannot be a created thing, otherwise God 
would be responsible for it. The 'lie' has no life of its own, but is 
rather the parasitic resistance of a free creature against God. It is not 
a thing in itself, but 'the evil condition of thing. ' It is 'a condition of' 
the creation, proceeding from the freedom of the will of man, who was 
invested with creation's weal or creation's woe. 11: 219 It is a state of 
being: 'it is the -s: ztate of a creature, - the second state of a creature. 11: 29 
What is this state? It is the state of sin. The horror of the first act 
that brings about this new state is manifested in its deadly consequences, 
It is an 'eternal and unchangeable ... condition' into which the human will is 
brought, It is an alienation of the will from its proper disposition: 'it 
is a spiritual act against a Spirit, against the good and gracious Father 
of spirits, " --")10 This emphasis on the will as the seat of sin, and the 
identification of will with spirit, supports Irving's insistence upon the 
irremediable consequences of the fall, When he addresses the angelic fall, 
a fall from (a purely spiritual state of existence, he insists there can be 
no reconstruction of the former state of relations with the Divine: for 
there is no higher created state than the spiritual. Indeed, as Coleridge 
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states, 'if it be hard to explain how Adam fell; how much more hard to 
solve how purely spiritual beings could fall? "--')' But such an irremediable 
state is not the destiny of embodied spirit. What hope is there, asks 
Irving, for 'the will of a spirit which of its own accord hath swerved 
away, which did not choose to stand when all was in its favour? ": 32 There 
is none, he insists. A revelation of divine omnipotence is, of itself, 
unable to bridge the chasm created by Adam's action. Irving's entire 
thrust is to show how the human predicament may be resolved only by 'the 
revelation of more persons than one in the Godhead, ": 33 It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that he interprets the Son's work as that of redeeming 
the human will from its self-inflicted bondage. 
Irving goes on to distinguish between two forms of sin. What he calls 
'actual sin' is sin as performed by the human person when yielding to the 
sinful disposition in the human nature. "' But this is distinct from 
$original sin. ' If Irving understands 'actual sin' to be the act of a spirit 
or will against the One who is pure Spirit, how does he interpret original 
sin'? This is a question he addresses most specifically in his later 
treatise, Christ's Holiness in Flesh, wherein he is at pains to throw light 
upon the character of humanity assumed by the Son in his incarnation. 
Unde malum faClaMUS - whence comes the fact that we sin? Irving's answer 
is contained in his understanding ot the doctrine of original sin. This he 
approaches from two complementary perspectives. Firstly, he subsumes the 
theological motif of 'original sin' within his all-embracing christological 
hermeneutic. If the Son assumes his incarnated human form by means of 
supernatural, not ordinary generation, and is guilty of neither actual nor 
original sin, then there are two possible corollaries. Firstly, original sin 
tells us something about the human person. It is a state in which the 
human person is born by virtue of natural conception. Irving qualif ies 
this elsewhere, however, by insisting that conception by natural means is 
not the 'cause of our original guiltiness in God's sight. ' Rather, 'it is 
the sign and -seal of God's will and purpose ... 
that we should be so 
concluded sinful and helpless in ourselves, to the end we might be 
introduced into the knowledge of his grace, "3'- But this is not a state 
into which the Son is born. Christ is guiltless of original sin due to the 
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manner of his virgin birth, He is not an individual like other sinful 
individuals because 'He is not a human person: He. never had personal 
subsistence as a mere man. "-36- Secondly, it has to do with the humanly 
generated matter into which the embodied human person is born, It is sin, 
he concludes 'to be born as we are through ordinary generation, 1137 and by 
'sin' here he means original sin, But what does this 'sin' mean for 
subsequent heirs to Adam's lot? 
We turn to the other of Irving's perspectives on original sin. Here he 
focuses attention on the implications of Adam as the apXý of human being, 
Irving refers to this primal state of innocence as a means of qualifying 
'original sin. ' Thus, if in Adam stands the creation of all human beings, 
that is, in him all human beings find their &pXý, created good and 
accountable for that good, then there is a collective solidarity 
responsible for this first act of disobedience and its consequences. For 
Irving, this represents one pole of human nature; our solidarity, our unity 
by virtue of descending from the first Adam. As such, each human being i--- 
implicated in the guilt and consequences of Adam's sin. (The other pole of 
humanity is its diversity, our personality; that for which each individual 
is held responsible due to the actions performed in the body. )1319 But it 
is in light of the initial apXý, of having been created in original 
righteOU-,:. ýness, that the subsequent state of original sin finds its meaning. 
Original sin is the state into which every human person comes to be as a 
result of Adam's primal act of disobedience by virtue of natural conception 
and generation. The character of original sin is reflected in the fact 
that it is both a state to which each human being contributes by 'actual 
sin' and a state which is 'already there, "` Evidence for the latter 
Irving derives from the mortality of infants long before any act of a 
disobedient will, This is an important point in his argument against a 
Socinian anthropology in which each individual is 'in as good and perfect a 
state as Adam, and as able to keep the law as he was. "40 Rather, it is 
suffering and death that proves the human creature to be fallen, and 
therefore distinct from Adam's original state. Remove this criterion and 
the distinction between fallen and unfallen, for Irving, is destroyed. 
'Original sin, ' therefore, denotes the collective solidarity of the human 
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race as derived from its father Adam, In the historical Adam we have 
presented the fall of one human being, who, by virtue of being head of all 
humanity, implicates the fallenness of all subsequent human persons. For 
Irving, 'original sin' is a state into which all human persons are born. 
Original sin, thus, stands 'in our having been created otherwise than we 
now are born. "41 It f inds its meaning in and through the apXý of human 
being, Adam's original state of righteousness, and is intimately united 
with the means of natural generation by which each subsequent human 
person comes to be, Thus Irving concludes his discour se on the topic of 
original sin; 
It is the confession to our being created by a holy God, to our 
becoming guilty by our own act, to our needing a Redeemer; and 
it is the seal of our unity as a family, as one stock and one 
substance. 14-2 
3.1.3. The Consequences. 
They cannot scare me with their empty spaces 
Between stars - on stars where no human race is. 
I have it in me so much nearer home 
To scare myself with my own desert places, " 
Contemporary human identity has become a cauldron of conflicting and 
relativised ego-expressions jostling for a safe anchor amidst the chaos of 
p lur if orm it y, As it reaches out to extend the perimeters of its knowledge 
and dominion, it appears to become, at the same time, more fragmented and 
alienated from the richness and creative profusion promised in the 
Eden 
mandate to have dominion and to prosper. It is into this context 
that 
Irving speaks, a context embraced within the Genesis story of 
Eden and 
exile, of paradise and wilderness. The Genesis presentation of creation 
with its order of relatedness wherein Adam is placed lord and 
from which 
he subsequently falls, with catastrophic results, is no 
Munchausen. it 
expresses that which most eloquently summarises the human story. 
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As a result of the Fall, human being is no longer the embodied spirit 
which exists creatively between two Ilimiti,, as imago Dei and imago mundi, 
as one created and called to exist in that creative tension between the 
opposites of immanence and transcendence. It no longer knows the dynamic 
freedom of existing within its unbounded context of possibilities. Rather, 
it is exiled to a wilderness, losing the sense of the apophatic, of the 
possible. Rather, it becomes grounded in the predictable and the mediocre 
- of being grounded in its own fallenness and predeliction to sinning 
against its Creator, self and environs. As a result, the intented profusion 
and creativity for humanity by its Creator is exchanged for a 'desert 
place: ' the structure of relatedness with God, self and creation is 
exchanged for a lie. Through time and cultural persuasion the human lot 
is accepted as an expression of the status quo. Ultimately, the 
dislocation of human being brought about by the Fall presumes 'false 
shadows for true substances. ' 14.4 In this context, Irving's stress upon the 
immediacy of the Genesis story is a-call to remembrance, for, he advocates, 
'the truth is that men have forgotten what the fall was; and how really it 
is now to be perceived in every thing, without exception, pertaining to the 
age that is now ... It is not that he who suffereth sickness hath therefore 
peculiarly sinned; but it is that sickness stands as the visible expression 
of the corruption of sin. "" 
i. G(>d-ward. Irving is adamant in his contention that the fall of Adam 
does not take God unawares. Adam exists in the environs of perfect 
relations, with his Creator, his partner, and the domain over which he 
exercises his lordship and expresses his creativity, He is not left alone 
in the Garden, but rather, is visited by and communes with the Creator. 
The benifits of this idyllic paradise, however, are ruptured by the first 
act of disobedience. Sin, for Irving, is interpreted as an act of eternal 
consequences. The effected act of sin cannot be separated from its 
personal causality: it is not a thing in itself. Such an interpretation of 
sin drives Irving to confront what he perceives to be the hamartiological 
implications of Arminianism: "'Hate the sin, but love the sinner. " What 
mean they? that sin is something by itself, and the sinner something by 
himself, so distinct from one another, that the one may well be hated, and 
the other may well be loved? "" Not so, for Irving: sin is not something 
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to be down-played, Not only is the person the sinner but 'the substance, 
the dominion which these persons possess, are also sinful, 1147 
But how may Irving assert that the fall does not find God at unawares? 
Again, Irving returns to his christological ontology. Firstly, God creates 
man in such a manner that if he were to fall, there should be a way of 
return. The soulish, earthy existence of the first Adam, is preparatory 
for the spiritual and more perfect second Adam. 14a But this 
anthropological maxim has significance only in light of the anterior, 
christological assertion that such an event of falling already is accounted 
for. How does Irving thus argue? At this point we turn to his use of 
sacrifice. Creation is not an end in itself. Its meaning is derived from 
its Creator's purposes. This is the force behind his entire argument, He 
is not content to focus solely upon God's gracious action in atonement for 
sin. This for Irving is only of secondary importance. Rather, that which 
is of primary importance is how one may defend against committed sin, "' 
This defence Irving finds in the significance of Christ as 'the Lamb slain 
before the foundation of the world, ' 2 Tim. 1: 9,10; Tit. 1: 2. ) As such, 
sacrifice is of a prior ontological order than creation. Its full 
significance is not found in an event contained within space-time 
boundaries, Rather, it is a consideration 'proper to God Himself,, (who) is 
in the essence of His being the Holy One, who cannot be controverted or 
contradicted, and hath no indulgence of sin whatever. ' Consequently, the 
Creator himself takes account of any subsequent indulgence of sin. Thus 
he argues: 
Abhorrence of sin, and destruction to it, is the way of death, is 
an indefeasible consititution of the Godhead, ratified and made 
sure before creation, in order to be creation's beacon against 
sin. 1 50 
Although human sin has real consequences and perverts the historical 
inheritance of all descendants of Adam, the Creator is not impotent, nor 
his intentions thwarted. Of much greater import is the fact that when sin 
arose in the breast and mind of creation's lord, although serious as an act 
against the consititution of God himself, yet it was an act against that 
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which God himself had 'already realized and declared' within himself by 
virtue of the Son's obedience to be the slain Lamb, 151 
ii. Self-ward. 
The light of the divine word brings sin into view. What does the 
Christian understand by sin? Sin is primarily a metaphysical 
phenomenon whose roots lie in the mystic depths of man's 
spiritual nature. The essence of sin consists not in the 
infringement of ethical standards but in a falling away from the 
divine eternal life for which man was made and to which, by his 
very nature, he is called. Sin is committed first of all in the 
secret depths of the human spirit but its consequences distort 
the whole individual. A sin will reflect on a man's psychological 
and physical condition, on his outward appearance, on his 
personal destiny. Sin will, inevitably, pass beyond the 
boundaries of the sinner's own life to burden all humanity and 
thus affect the fate of the whole world. The sin of our 
forefather Adam was not the only sin of cosmic significance. 
Every sin, secret or manifest, committed by each one of us, has a 
bearing on the rest of the universe. "2 
Irving stands resolutely within the stream of Christian tradition which, 
like that expressed by the Archimandrite above, asserts that a radical 
inversion of human being has occurred. Alongside the noblesse of human 
being exists the pitiable squalor of its brokenness. Hope may spring 
eternal in the human breast, according to Arnold, but it is a hope all too 
dismembered by our common lot, so cynically expressed by Parker, to be the 
food of worms. We strive heavenward to transcend our earthbound 
existence like condemned creatures, too willing to exchange one cage for 
another in the hope of gaining utterance of the unutterable or rest from 
or for our restless spirits. 
Irving's favourite allusion for expressing the human plight is the story of 
Aeschylus' Prometheus. Herein Irving finds expressed most beautifully the 
present bondage of the human will. Prometheus is identified with Adam: 
both possess souls that once were free but have come into bondage; and 
both are assailed by tormentors. But Prometheus, for Irving, presents the 
high dignity of humanity in its refusal to give in utterly to the dark 
forces of the purely earthly and material. He is a presentation of the 
human soul facing torment and temptation, which holds out in hope of a 
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better form of existence, Prometheus is the 'will enduring the bondage of 
all the creation, and groaning within itself, waiting for the redemption Of 
the body, and meanwhile saved by hope, and in the strength of that hope 
preferring its bondage to all the power and liberty which is contained 
within the bounds of creation under its present laws, 111-3 Herein is the 
object and content of the human oppression-, 'Who is in captivity? ' The 
human will. 'What is the bondage? ' The oppression of the devil, the world 
and the f lesh. 'What is the redemption? ' The deliverance of the human 
will from its bondage. 154 
Irving seeks to explain the dynamics of sin both in terms of the 
creature's place within creation, and in terms of an ontology of will. The 
former explains how Adam's sin brings about a new state of being, It is a 
fall from the highest and most noble of human parts, the personality. ' r-15 
Through the person sin enters the mind, takes hold of the body, and then 
through the body to those creature's placed to serve him, until through 
them to the earth itself. "-'- In this manner, Adam loses his lordship to 
that which has authority over him, and expresses itself through his bodily 
members. It is a fall from the most noble of human parts, the personality. 
The latter, this inversion of being, results in a drastic reversal in the 
manner by whcih the human will operates. Whilst Adam relates in obedience 
with his Creator God, there is a harmonious relation not only between God 
and Adam, but also between his will and body, between his reason and 
understanding. But his act of disobedience necessitates a reversal in this 
relationship between will and body, No longer is Adam able to respond in 
his will and reason to the Divine Will and Reason. Rather, Adam's will is 
enslaved to his understanding, natural feelings or bodily senses. 
Consequently, God's revelation to embodied spirit no longer meets and 
relates to the entire person, but merely to 'different parts of the natural 
man, I There results not only a bondage of will but a blindness in 
spiritual perception, for God's revelation becomes restricted to the senses, 
feelings or understanding. For Irving, therefore, bondage of the will 
represents a falling into a state of pure immanence; a state of existence 
in which Adam becomes bound to the influences of the purely physical, 
animal or material, "-' This is the lie, the untruth of human being. It is 
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a 'No' to all that it is created to image, At worst it is an expression of 
the diabolical, at best, imaEo mundl, but even here, an image of the earthy 
which itself suffers due to its relatedness to its primal lord, 
iii. Creation-ward. The modern mind suspects a somewhat nervous tension 
in maintaining a relation between the human and the created order. Is it 
not obvious that human being is of a different order of being? Are not 
our environs, if not indiscriminately thought of as the means of eternal 
resources that which we may exploit to our own end? The modern world- 
view, with its blatant denial of the order of being and the finitude of the 
created order, may be understood as the modern expression of the 
diabolical. The outcome of our erroneous cosmology confronts us, 
eventually with the stark reality that created order is becoming that 
which it should not, 
But the concern with the ecological becomes a redundant activity on its 
own. What basis is there that gives the extra-human significance and 
meaning'? For Irving it is the theological significance derived from the 
Genesis story and the creation mandate that Adam both prosper and have 
dominion. Yet Irving is seen to be dissatisfied in leaving the discussion 
at this level. Much more importantly, he wishes to establish a metaphysic 
within which the ontological significance of creation may be affirmed both 
in relation to its origins and in light of its creator's intention. This, 
we have seen, he derives from an ontology of derivation. Firstly, the 
significance of human being is derived from the place given to it by the 
Creator: as imaEo Dej. But human being also derives its significance from 
the role it plays in being called to have dominion over the extra-human 
creation. It is called into the partnership of vice-regency with the 
supreme Lord, Secondly, and as a corollary of this, the extra-human 
derives its meaning from its relation to the one under whom it stands in 
the created order. Creation stands or falls with it appointed lord: it 
derives its order of being from the quality of that possessed by human 
being. In its primal stages, creation stands harmoniously in relation to 
its lord: it is possessed of one who stands harmoniously with his Lord. 
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The Fall, however, reverses this order of being. The 'fine gold of Adamls- 
dust"'-e is exchanged for a lie, and in so doing, creation is denied its 
two great desires; to see God and be able to name his name by virtue of 
its created lord. "-3 Rather than being the idyllic setting for human 
innocence, 'the world, by the first transgression, hath become the free 
stage for the controversy between good and evil., ',,, Through the human 
act of disobedience the created order experiences the tension, turmoil and 
dislocation brought about in becoming the context within which human being 
becomes elevated above the mediocrity of sin, As we have seen, Irving's 
ontology facilitates this radical inversion in the mode of human being, 
Irving understands human being in light Of its TtXoq: human being is in its 
becoming. When Adam falls, he falls not into total isolation from his 
Creator. Although he comes to know and experience as intimately his own 
the mediocrity of sin, it is a knowledge that is itself contained within 
the canopy of God's grace and sovereignty. Adam falls from his creation 
state into another constitution; 'the gospel by the promise, ' namely, that 
'he, and all his children ... should exercise faith and hope upon Him that was 
to come. "'-' 
The Fall serves as a preparation for that which is to come: Adam, the 
living soul, falls into the earthy, allowed so to do in order that he be 
raised up to the spiritual. I As a result of Adam's disobedience both he, 
his heirs and the setting in which human history is accomplished become 
participants in the anticipation in which ail creation is immersed. It is 
within this order of being that the extra-human of creation waits in 
ant icipat ion. It is an order of created being in which the human derives 
its value and meaning as per-sonal, and the extra-human its value as 
meaningful and significant not in its relation to any primal apXý, but via 
Christ, Both receive personal identity and ontological particularity by 
being placed in relation to the incarnate Son, "ýý: 3 
It is this christological emphasis that pervades Irving's entire doctrine of 
human being, Human being is in its becoming: in its becoming conformed to 
the image of the image of God. By means of his christocentric 
hermeneutic, Irving establishes a means of bringing together divine being 
and human being in incarnation. What has been of significance in both 
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Parts I and II is the fact that whilst Irving maintains a thoroughgoing 
christocentric hermeneutic, it is one that holds together only by virtue of 
its pneumatic dimension, in light of the place of the Spirit in both human 
and divine being. The significance of this is not to be missed, for 
despite his pneumatic understanding of incarnation, and consequently the 
being of God, Irving does not allow it to dictate his perception of Jesus 
Christ. At all times, the subject of the Christ-event is the eternal Son 
of God, who is the object of the hope exercised and anticipated by fallen 
creation. 
And now, thenceforward, all heaven and earth looked forward for 
the Man, by emminancy called THE SON OF MAN; that is, the child 
for whom manhood was created, and through whom the great secret 
was to be revealed, and the Divine nature for ever manifested in 
an outward form; - which was, as it were, the great deliverance 
for which the womb of all creation had longed, and made an empty 
and abortive effort to produce it at the birth of Adam, when 
things were not yet ripe for hte great discovery ... It was the purpose and decree of God, promulgated from the foundation of 
the world, and gradually growing into manifestation by slow 
degree and manifold pangs of creation, according to the 
importance, the infinite and all- comprehending importance, of the 
issues which rested with it. For ... the nucleus of the whole 
scheme, the great end and first beginning of all: and that which 
went before was but the germination of the seed before it 
appears above the earth, or the preparing of the soil for the 
casting of the seed into the earth. And so God, and angels, and 
men, and devils, and whatever else existeth, all looked forward to 
the Man in whose outward from the Godhead was to become 
eternally manifest, For that in man it was to be manifest, God 
himself had purposed from all eternity; and the angels, no doubt, 
had heard the rumour of it; wherefore the morning stars sang 
together, and the angels of God shouted at His birth: and Satan, 
with his apostacy, had also heard a rumour of it, wherefore he 
solicited Him with his wiles to forsake His allegiance: and the 
knowledge was kept alive, amongst the sons of men, by every 
revelation made to the patriarchs and the prophets; until at 
length in Bethlehem, in the stable of Bethlehem, - fit emblem of 
the world into which He was born, - the child of infinite hopes 
and longings was brought into being', whereupon instantly the 
heavenly host waked all their choral symphonies, and sang, "Glory 
to God in the highest; peace on earth, and good will to the 
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Macmurray's anthropology. as expressed in his critique of Kantian and 
post-Kantian perceptions of 'person, touches, at points, that of 
Irving, Since error in theory implicates failure in practice, our 
misconception of what it means to be a 'person' derived from the 
noetic, Cartesian verification of existence can lead only to a 
misconception of our own reality, (PR: 149. ) The 'person' is not 
derived from a science of mind, but by agency, It is practical. In 
this sense, Kant highlights the practical dimension of reason. But 
the premis, that reason is primarily theoretical, contradicts the 
conclusion, that reason is primarily practical, (SA: 62-85. ) Such a 
contradiction, contends Macmurray, entraps the 'practical' within the 
mind, and can do no justice to religious experience, (SA: 63. ) 
Macmurray argues for an understanding of the human person in terms 
of Self -as-Agent and Self - As- Subject, incorporating the bodily and 
mental differentia of human being. Whilst both appear to be mutually 
exclusive, they are of pivotal importance in describing what is the 
human 'person, ' (SA: 95-98. ) In 'Persons in Relation' Macmurray seeks 
to transfer the centre of human reference away from the mind to the 
body as a means of affirming the personal, ý12. ) In so doing, there 
is a shift from the solely subjective and negative, Self -As-Subject, 
to a fuller embracing of the human, as embodied Self-As-Agent, The 
ego-entrapped 'thinker' becomes 'person' in relation to other embodied, 
thinking beings. 
Macmurray stands in the same tradition as Irenaeus, Luther, Irving in 
his assertion the human personhood comes about through the rhythm of 
-135- 
what he calls 'Withdrawal and Return, ' (86-105. ) Human personhood 
does not exist 'at an instant. ' It is the ongoing product of action 
generated in time, Human personhood is the process of personal 
development, the human effort of discerning what is good and bad, 
helfpful or unhelpful, real or false, (107-108. ) Such a process 
implies the theological, for it is an attempt to determine the 
personal not by any existential or logically unfounded 'leap' from 
'pure, reason to the 'practical. ' Such a metaphysic is doomed to the 
impersonal. From the standpoint of the agent, the quest for the 
personal demands not asking whether the world is personal or not, but 
whether God exists or not. however, in order to determine whether 
our view of reality is or is not adequate, we must ask, not if GOd 
exists, but 'is what exists personal? ' (PR- 214-216. ) What is of 
interest in Macmurray is the assertion that such knowledge is not 
derived from personal intuition, but from action. In this he 
parallels Irving: both agree that the personal is derived from a 
personal Creator who is objectively 'there. ' However, both would part 
company at the deeper level from which the respective ontologies 
develop, for although Macmurray wishes to argue for the personal on 
the basis of the theistic, he does not delineate the criteria by which 
he may assume that the theistic is personal except that it cannot be 
pantheistic, (FR, 223). Irving, alternatively, is at his most fluent 
when stating his criteria. 
Theology, or Divinity, hath no other aim than to make known to the 
reason of man, the one living and true God; who is no where seen, 
but in the face of Jesus Christ. If the word of God itself be 
only the Spirit taking of the fulness of Christ, and showing it in 
all possible forms and varieties to the mind and heart of man, 
what else ought the system of theology to be, than an endeavour 
of the Church to give the same subject, the only subject, even 
Christ, such a form and representation as may be profitable to 
every day and generation of men. If they pretend to teach any 
thing besides Christ, they pretend to teach what is beside and 
beyond the comprehension of man: for in Christ all that can be 
comprehended of God is summed up. If they think that any thing 
is taught of God, without teaching Christ, or any thing 
apprehended of God, otherwise than by apprehending it in Christ, 
they err grievously, subverting the foundation of truth, and 
rebuilding up a fabric ol I speculation which hath no reality; of 
falsehood, which hath no being. For example, the words election, 
effectual callin8,, redemp t1 on, jLlstification, sanctification, 
adoption, &c. have no religious meaning, nor power of truth in 
them, till they are referred to Christ, and understood as revealing 
certain features of His character, certain parts of His fulness, 
which is the fulness and character of God, They are mere 
verbiage, idle and unmeaning words, worthless, and worse than 
worthless terms, until they have been expounded in the person of 
Christ, and seen alive in Him, and felt as revealing something of 
the living and true God. And they will profit no man's soul, in 
the way of morality and religion, until they have been so re- 
collected into the person of Christ, and seen in living vital 
action in His glorious work. Religion is the commerce and 
intercourse of an intelligent creature with an intelligible (-', od, of 
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an accountable creature with a holy, governing, and Judging God; it 
is the transaction of' a person with a person, not of a person with 
words, nor yet things, but with God, who gives Himself forth in 
word first of all, that afterwards that word may become flesh, 
living flesh; so that in learning words we have learned nothing, 
unless we make them flesh, living flesh. The Scripture is all 
alive with personality: systems of theology are altogether, or 
almost emptied of it, 
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there is spiritual knowledge, 'the power of knowing, and worshipping, 
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and knowledge is 'liberal, catholic, and complete, ' (ibid). 
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Adam a life-giving Spirit. Howbeit, that was not first which is 
spiritual, but that which is of the soul: and afterward that which 
is spiritual. Tha f irst man is of the earth, earthy: the second 
man is the Lord from Heaven, As is the earthy, such are they also 
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which Irving vehemently defends in terms of' divine nature, and not 
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accounted for in its relation to a holy creator, but that the 
character of God is vindicated before any violation or offence occurs. 
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139. See fn 22 for Itensive symbol. ' P. Ricoeur: "'Original Sin: " A Study in 
Meaning, ' in The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics 
ed. D. Thole, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. Sin is a 
rational symbol declaring the radical nature of sin. It is more true 
to say that sin is something which 'inhabits' human being than to say 
that human being 'commits' sin, (p283). It is interesting to note how 
Irving and Ricoeur give similar meaning to the mysterious aspect of 
evil, to the dual character of sin: that we inau87urate evil (actual 
sin), but also find it (original sin). 
The Adamic myth reveals at the same time this mysterious aspect 
of evil, namely, that if any one of us init iates evil, inaugurates 
it ... each of us also discov ers evil, finds it already there, in 
himself, outside himself, and before himself ... For every 
consciousness which awakens when responsib ility is taken, evil is 
already there. In tracing back the origin of evil to a distant 
ancestor, the myth discovers the situation of every man: evil has 
already taken place. I do not begin evil; I continue it, I am 
implicated in evil, (ibid). 
Like Irving he asserts that 'sin is not a something, but a subversion 
of a relation. ' ("The Hermeneutics of Symbols: I, " op cit. p3O3. ) Both 
Irving and Ricoeur denounce any attempt to belittle the significance 
of sin by suggesting its 'non-being. ' It has being in that it is the 
subversion of an intended objective reality, a reality which refuses 
to be thwarted by sin, but overcomes only by grace. It is in light 
of both Irving's and Ricoeur's interpretation of sin, both actual and 
ori8,1nal, inauSurated and found, that any hamartiological obscuring 
between human nature and human personhood in relation to the saving 
work of Christ is contested. If we proclaim humanity to be taken 
into Christ's new humanity solely by virtue of the Son's assumption 
and subsequent vindication of human nature there are three important 
corollaries, Firstly, we undermine the inherent per-sonal dynamic of 
sin, Sin is not an abstract, spiritual commodity removed impersonally 
by Christ. Rather, it is an inadequate mode of being, an offensive 
form of relating rooted in the dark and conscious veering of a will 
out of relation with its Creator God. Secondly, we remove the 
inherent contradiction of sin: the tension between sin as 'already 
there' and human freedom and responsibility of action. Thirdly, and 
of crucial importance both to the doctrines of God and Christ, we 
confuse the distinction between the human person and human nature, 
Any vindication of the latter at the expense of the former undermines 
the church's hamartiological tradition of affirming we are both 
responisible for our own (actual) sin as well as the mode of being 
(original sin) into which each of us is born. Only a christology that 
meets with and resolves both characteristics of the tensive symbolism 
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is, for Irving, a characterless and impersonal form of religion. 
140. CW. 5-. 214. 
14 1. CHF: 4. 
142. op cit: 5. 
143. Robert Frost, 'Desert Places, ' The Poetry of Robert Frost, London-, 
Jonothan Cape, 1976, p296. 
144. W. Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, Act 3, scene 2. 
145. CW. 5: 43. 
146, op cit-. 107. 
147. OGD: 133. 
148. CW. 5: 80-86, 
149. PW, 2: 165. 
150. ibid. 
151. op cit: 164-165. 
152. Archimandrite Sophrony- The Monk of Mount Athos. London: Mowbrays, 
1973, p22. 
153. CW. 5: 567. 
154, OCD, 89. 
155, op cit: 132. 
156. CW. 5: 322. 
157. op cit: 52, 
158. CW, 5-. 116. 
159. op cit. 84. 
160. MW. 5: 393, 
161, CW. 5: 324. 
162, op cit, 86,90. 
163. See fn 120. 
164, CW. 5: 84-86, 
141- 





one man's trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one 
mans act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all 
men. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, 
so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous. (Rom, 5-18- 
19) 
Foundational to any proclamation of the Christian Gospel is the belief that 
through the person and work of Christ the capacity for human waywardness 
and rebellion against its Creator has not merely been arrested, but has 
been replaced by a capacity for obedience and relatedness. God, in Christ, 
has reconciled a fallen world unto himself: the dynamics of such a 
reconciliation being rightly understood, by and large, within a theoloEia 
crucis, a theology dominated by the passion, crucifixion, death, burial and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Without the crucified and risen Christ, we 
can do nothing. This is the theological paradigm by which the historic 
Church has sought to understand its faith. Thus, greater significance has 
been accorded some interpretations than others, which in turn have moulded 
the future development of theological thinking, as we have noted 
throughout Parts I and II. The great christological debates of early 
Christendom moulded the character of subsequent Christian doctrine. In so 
doing the early Fathers established a theological paradigm which whilst 
preserving the uniqueness of Christ did so in a manner that precluded any 
meaningful parallel development of the doctrine of the Spirit. 
There are three possible responses to such a statement. Firstly, that it 
is a wrong interpretation of theological history and therefore not worth 
pursuing, It is hoped, however, that this is not a valid criticism and that 
we are justified in considering one of two alternative responses: that, 
firstly, if this is a valid statement, we are justified in dismissing the 
ent ire corpus 0f Patristic thinking as obsolete and irrelevant; or, 
secondly, that it should act as a stimulus to creative exploration and 
expansion of the tradition we inherit but believe to be deficient in a 
given area, in the hope that in so doing we add to the corpus of faith 
held by the Church. This latter response is that which I believe to be the 
Most adequate. Therefore, when we turn to consider Irving's christology, 
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we bear this response in mind-, that he seeks to bring out that which is 
aiready there within the historical affirmation of faith, It should come 
as no surprise by this stage in our discussion, that the manner by which 
the person and work of Christ will be advanced in any meaningful manner 
is, for Irving, intimately related to the less developed doctrine of the 
Spirit. 
In Parts I and II, I have sought to show where Irving locates the person 
of the Spirit in relation to the being of God and human being, This 
method is foundational to the present thesis for two reasons, Firstly, the 
nature of theological development: for in his appreciation of the person 
and work of the Spirit, Irving expands his theological paradigm to 
incorporate a more dynamic and explicit pneumatic dimension, In so doing, 
his christology becomes relevant in the manner by which we may understand 
better the being of God as Trinity, the person and work of Jesus Christ as 
Saviour and Lord, and the dynamics of spiritual life to which human being 
is called in light of incarnation, Secondly, such a method provides a 
foundation for presenting more clearly an understanding of the relevance 
of Christ, The intention in Part III is to show how Irving unites the two 
in his christology, wherein the being of God and human being meet in 
intimate and personal union in incarnation, Therefore Irving's christology 
is the explicit concern of Part III, and in particular, his understanding of 
the humanity of Christ both in its relation to the being of God, and to 
the teleological character Irving attributes to human being which is well 
accomodated by Merton's sentiment regarding the nature of human dignity: 
Souls are like athletes, that need opponents worthy of them, if 
they are to be tried and extended and pushed to the full of 
their powers, and rewarded according to their capacity. ' 
Irving's anthropology is typified by his belief that human being is in its 
becoming: and becomes so only in so far as it stands against, battles with 
and seeks to overcome all that stands in its path to actualisation, It is 
that which ought, surely, to characterise any sprituality founded upon the 
Christian kerygma: a becoming 'slaves to righteousness, ' (Rom. 6: 18) a 
slavery occurring rightly in that which Merton identifies as 'soul': the 
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place where human identity is formed; in the conscious, rational and 
willful centre of human existence, 
Yet when we turn to consider interpretations about the one baptised by 
John, annointed by God with the Holy Spirit and power, who went about 
doing good and healing all that were oppressed, because God was with him, 
(Acts 10: 36-39) we confront often a sphinx-like figure, who although 
considered totus homo, is left devoid of the barest vestiges considered 
adequate to human spirituality? The previous citation of Tertuilian, which 
begins Part II, perhaps hints at the problem, for to a greater degree than 
the tradition to develop after him, Tertullian understood more deeply the 
relevance of Christ's humanity as being identical to that possessed by 
those in need of salvation, and consequently, one whose spiritual formation 
developed in similar fashion to his fellow human beings, It is not 
insignificant that such an insight emerges from a Montanist background 
with its openness to appreciate the work and person of the Spirit. 
The trouble, however, is that the pneumatic dimension to Christ's identity 
and spirituality is more or less missing from Chalcedon's most important 
formula which was to have such a profound influence upon subsequent 
christological interpretation, This is not to presume that the whole 
question of the Saviour's humanity and his spiritual growth was not a 
topic of discussion, This is not a mere querulous point to be raised and 
then summarily dismissed, Only the most uninformed commentator on 
Christian doctrine could suggest that the humanity of the Saviour was an 
undiscussed issue of patristic theology. In the cauldron of christological 
debate it was a focus of attention for the most important christological 
battles, And for good reasons: belief about he, who in faith, is proclaimed 
verLis Deus, verus homo surely remains abstracted from orthopraxis unless 
the practical implications of such a statement of faith are 'unpacked'. 
What, in retrospect, appears significantly lacking in the development of 
christological formulae is a parallel interest in the pneumatic nature of 
the one is proclaimed 'truly' God and 'truly' man. The 'how' and 'wherefore' 
of human development as portrayed, for instance, in the Lucan depiction of 
Jesus as the one who 'increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favour 
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with God and man, ' came to be overlooked (Luke 2: 52), If after all it is 
through the Spirit that human obedience which leads to righteousness is 
procured, what does it say about the adequacy of our christology if we 
occlude this pneumatic dimension from our understanding of the Saviour's- 
humanity'? We stand well short of meaningful Communication and 
christological adequacy if, in affirming Jesus Christ as verus Deus, verus 
homo, we fail to address this pneumatic omission, Rather than adhere 
blindly to Christian truths expressed within the syntax of ecclesial 
formulae, the ongoing hermeneutical task of systematic theology should be 
to outline the dynamics which facilitate a pneumatic dimension to 
incarnational language. The depth and range of our discussion must 
include not only the 'master-image'2 or 'master- truth'ý' expressed through 
incarnational syntax, but also those expressed in pneumatological and 
sanctificational syntax, ie, a making sense of the person and work of the 
Spirit in incarnation. 
The task, then, of systematic theology is to expand our 'epistemic 
priority14 beyond the purely incarnational to incorporate the inspirational, 
as well as show the relation between the two. If the task of systematic 
theology, as Kaufman argues is the 'attempt to state as correctly and 
straightforwardly as possible a theological perspective, "- then the task 
facing us in Part III is to do just this in relation to the manner by which 
Irving establishes a christology of efficiency-, one which facilitates both 
incarnational and inspirational theological perspectives, If on the other 
hand, the ultimate aim of systematic theology, as Lacugna argues, is not 
simply analytical but constructive, of going beyond the inadequacies to 
take up the 'challenge to advance new ways of thinking and speaking about 
God', then the task in Part III involves us in showing how Irving does Just 
that in relation to his pneumatic understanding of incarnation, For if the 
Christian kerygma wishes not to eschew the traditional belief of 
incarnation, the enfle-shment of Deity, then it must enter the 'logical 
space"- created by such an affirmation of faith, namely, to go beyond the 
act of enfleshment to both the grounds and means by which such an 8,, --t 
both comes to be and is found to be efficacious to the human need of 
salvation. it is a logical space between what we may caricature as 
incarnational and inspirational, Alexandrian and Antiochene type 
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christologies, namely, the difference in christOlogical method between the 
that which stresses respectively, the divine and human agency of 
incarnation, 
How may we go about this? Herein are we brought to the central purpose 
of our thesis, for the intention in Part III is to outline how Irving adds 
content to the 'logical space' lying between an affirmation of incarnational 
and inspirational type christologies. It is the argument of this thesis 
that Irving best delineates the means by which this 'space' may be 
interpreted by means of his christology whose efficacy hinges on the place 
he attributes the Spirit in incarnation, 
The upshot of this is the need to explore the means by which content may 
be developed within this 'logical space'. The method assumed in this 
thesis has been to outline what Irving identifies as the two poles within 
which incarnational and inspirational paradigms may exist: to establish the 
parameters of discussion, namely, the Being of God as Trinity and human 
being in its becoming. Such an assumption rests on two criteria: firstly, 
that these are the paradigms used by Irving in order to establish his 
thesis, and are outlined in Parts I and II. And secondly, that in the place 
Irving attributes the Spirit in both, there is facilitated a means of 
talking meaningfully of an efficient christology, for by means of his 
interpretation of both the divinity and humanity of Christ a way is opened 
up for us to talk about the pneumatological and sanctificational relation 
of the Spirit to the incarnate Son. 
Our task is one requiring recognition of both the particular and the 
pro8, ressive in christological interpretation: pBrtiCUlar in that the context 
within which questions are raised, problems confronted and solutions 
proferred creates its own 'perceptual Shift"7 ýby changing the way in 
which we perceive the dynamics of incarnation); and progressive in that the 
ensuing perceptual shift itself creates a 'paradigm change" by which 
subsequent interpretation may be developed. 
Within and because of these different and developing traditions, the task 
of modern theology with its new context ol' questions, problems and 
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solutions is to make sense of both the Christian kerygma and its 
interpretations, whether they be purely theological or christologic; al, 
It is my contention in this thesis that Irving's; christology may help us in 
such a task, In the same way that his doctrines of God and human being 
appear to draw from different traditions, so his christology appears to 
unite several disparately opposing facets, Irving achieves this by means 
of his paradigmatic perceptual shift which makes 'space' for the person and 
place of the Spirit in incarnation, Also, 1 wish to accede to the point 
Surin makes, in Part I, about our theological method: 51 that progress 
towards a modern understanding and interpretation of the person and work 
of Christ must rise above a method which sets one historical approach 
against another. We should not caricature the major christological 
traditions of Christendom, for example, those of Alexandria and Antioch, as 
if each were the antithesis of the other. If Surin's critique is correct, 
then in relation to incarnational and inspirational christologies we ought 
not to interpret them as opposing interpretations of the same data but 
understand them as solutions to different problems, as answers to 
different questions, and wait alongside that great cloud of witnesses 
which has moulded theological history in its endeavour to add light to the 
mystery of faith, 
Therefore, it is hoped that between the two christological schools there is 
a third alternative: of moving into the creative space between both 
orthodox foci of Alexandria and Antioch, incarnational and inspirational, 
'above' and 'below' or whatever category used to identify their content, and 
explore a possible via mL-djans through them. It is, in short, to enter 
into the 'logical space' about which we have been talking. 
It is this method which Irving, either consciously or unconsciously, has 
adopted. In order to explicate both the assurance of the Saviour's 
divinity and the believer's assurance of salvation, Irving enters this 
'logical space' and developes. his theology and anthropology in order to 
bring greater foci-is upon the person of Christ. In order to do sc., 
heoperates on three levels: the theological, the anthropological and the 
christological, Whilst it is wrong to suggest that each may be considered 
-148- 
independent of the others, the structure of the present thesis, n;, 
identifying Irving's doctrine of God as Trinity and his doctrine of human 
being separately, has been adopted in order to highlight the means by 
which Irving establishes his christology, In so doing, the argument of 
this thesis has been both foundational and progressive: foundational in 
that is it founded on Irving's understanding of the being of God and human 
being; progressive in that by this method we are then able to move toward 
the means by which he unites both in the Christian affirmation of 
incarnation. 
Therefore, whilst Irving's entire thrust is christological after a 
particular fashion, the fulcrum by which his christology develops rests on 
an understanding of both the being of God and human being, for with them 
he arrives at both an ontological and functional interpretation of 
incarnation. It is between both foci that he constructs his christology in 
such a manner as to give content to the 'logical space' existing within the 
creative tension of what we may identify as incarnational and inspirational 
type christologies. Thus, whist the person and work of Christ remain at 
the fore of Irving's theology, they do so only in so far as Irving 
maintains his underlying theology and anthropology. 
However, if these are the building blocks of Irving's christology, the 
binding medium by which they are constructed is his soteriological concern. 
And quite rightly, for it is only in light of the human condition and its 
subsequent solution from within the community of sinners, that the 
Christian proclamation of Good News makes sense, 'Those who are well have 
no need of a physician, but those that are sick' for Christ 'came not to 
call the righteous, but sinners, ' (Matt. 9: 12-3). Now, this is hardly a 
novel insight to Christian doctrine: it stands at the very heart of the 
Christian faith, the basis of each and every credo. It is that which 
dictates the entire ordo salutis. The content of Parts I and II 
substantiates the foundation of Irving's doctrine of Christ, in order that 
the 'why' and 'wherefore' of his christology, and consequently his 
soteriology, may be better understood. This has been undertaken for two 
methodological reasons. Firstly, the attention and stress in previous 
Irving research has focused solely upon irving's doctrine of Christ and the 
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brouhaha caused by his understanding of the humanity Of Christ, 
Subsequently, there has been little, if any, detailed research into the 
intimately related doctrines of God and human being in Irving's thought, 10 
Parts I and II have sought to delineate Irving's doctrines of God and 
human being as self-contained presentations gleaned from the data 
contained in his sermons and publications in order to present fully for 
the first time each doctrine as it stands on its own, From this survey 
Irving emerges as a theologian who both maintains the axioms he h, 3, -=, 
inherited, yet, yet does not mouth them uncritically, While he may be 
renowned for his particular, and to those familiar with only the Irving 
caricature, his peculiar, doctrine of Christ, the previous discussion show,. -, 
this christological particularity to be equally a characteristic of his 
doctrines of God and human being. His doctrine of God as Trinity reflects 
a fully personal understanding of the Divine being integrated with an 
essential, rather than appended, pneumatology, For Irving, there are no 
divine nor human relations outwith the presence of God as Spirit. 
Consequently, Irving's doctrine of God as Trinity may be understood as a 
re-orientation of the data aiready there: a re-presentation of 16pOý 56ýa; a 
making sense of what was to become increasingly a doctrine viewed as a 
secondary, albeit important, expression of Christian belief. 
Therefore the method undertaken in the previous chapters is one that is 
not altogether foreign to that employed by Irving. Although he did preach 
a series of sermons on the doctrine of God, neither in his sermons nor in 
his apologetic publications do we find an overall systematic presentation 
of his theology or anthropology, Rather, we confront the thinking of one 
who allows the issues at hand to interact with the tradition inherited, in 
order to arrive at a more adequate understanding of the Christ event. In 
so doing, Irving's theology underwent a distinct reorientation, but one, as 
has been outlined in our previous discussion, that is not so much 8 
movement away from the tradition, as an attempt to develop the data ý---ind 
concepts already contained in that tradition, what is so interesting about 
Irving is not merely that he seeks a dogmatic re-examination by means ot 
a thoroughly christocentric hermeneutic, nor that he uses, rather than 
rejects, traditional formulary language. Rather, in uniting the historic, 31 
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figure of Jesus Christ with the Judeo-Christian God, Irving seeks to do so 
by means of an essentially trinitarian hermeneutic, and whilst doing so 
believes he is engaging in relevant theological discussion. 
What interests us here for the argument of our thesis, is the manner by 
which Irving's understanding of salvation is expressed by means of an 
essentially trinitarian interpretation of the agency in incarnation. In and 
of itself such an understanding hardly suggests a paradigmatic change, 
However, when we add to this the place Irving attributes the Spirit, we 
are able to identify two significant factors, The first is how far it 
extends the tradition from which it emerges: a factor highlighted in Parts 
I and II. The second involves a study of comparison, in that whilst Irving 
appeared to be defending a dying and outlived theological paradigm, in 
expanding its pneumatic dimension he reveais its precocity in relation to 
how we may develop a modern christology, 
However, in identifying his trinitarian understanding of incarnation the 
question is whether it is economic, (that the expression of Divine Being in 
a three-fold manner is solely in relation to the way in which Divine Be ing 
relates to the creature's need of salvation), or essential (that it is the 
very expression of Divine Being itself). In Part I Irving has been seen to 
argue vociferously for the latter. What is of interest here is that at the 
time he was formulating his own essential trinitarian christology, his 
immediate German contemporary, Friedrich Schleiermacher, was developing an 
economic interpretation of Divine Being in relation to incarnation. It is 
to this particular interpretation we now turn in order to assess whet her 




Why should Irving's attempt to unite his christologY with the doctrine 
God as Trinity be considered an unusual method? The answer lies in 
the 
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fact that although the doctrine of the Trinity is part of the Christian 
story, as a result of the Auf'k1, Yrun8, there was an increasing uneasiness 
regarding the primacy given to what was increasingly being viewed as 3 
secondary expression of Christian faJth. By Irving's time the paradigmatic 
shift brought about by the Enlightenment, with its Cartesian shift to a 
human centre of interpretation, coupled with Kantian rationalism and 
skepticism, led to a serious undermining of previously accepted 
interpretations of Christian doctrine. 
Not surprisinglyt therefore, did the doctrine of Christ undergo serious re- 
consideration, for the Enlightenment, according to McGrath, raised three 
major christological problems. Firstly, the 'two-natures' doctrine of the 
ancient and catholic Church was questioned as absurd and illogical. 
Secondly, it became more difficult to maintain the uniqueness of Jesus 
Christ without recourse to supernaturalism. Lastly, as the historic,: _il 
reliability of the Gospel records were more and more questioned, there was 
an increasing skepticism concerning knowledge of the historical Jesus. '' 
However, if the philosophe found difficulty in accepting the ancient 
distinction between the divine and the human in the figure of Jesus Christ, 
this was heightened by the growing difficulty in giving assent to the 
complexities inherent in the doctrine of God as Trinity. In a climate 
where 'person' was synonymous with 'individual', it was not surprising that 
the idea of three persons yet one God totter ed close to the verge of 
incoherence, The language of Chalcedon had become the Babel of the 
Enlightenment, Consequently, in light of such a critical shift in thought, 
there arose the need to make new sense of bot h the God of Jesus Christ 
and Jesus Christ himself. The result was a critical rejection of 
traditional dogmatic paradigms. Therefore, the problem facing Irving and 
his seriously minded theological contemporaries was, according 
to Willi-3ms, 
that of explaining 'how the trans-munda-ne, transhistorical monarchia of 
God' could be 'united with the historical econ omy of redemption, and in 
particular, its self-disclosure in Incarnation. "'. 
Williams here is discussing the problem facing Irving'--- greatest and Tmost 
immediate contemporary, Friedrich Schleiermacher, to whose solution 
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attention is now turned, not in order to construct a straw man, but rather 
to illustrate the seriousness with which Schleiermacher took to safeguard 
the historical figure of Jesus Christ in his relation to being of God. In 
so doing, the perceptual change deliberated by Schleiermacher in his 
proposed solution may be highlighted in order to evaluate better the 
contribution Irving makes to this same problem. 
2.2. Towards an Anthropological Solution. 
Like Irving, the object of Schleiermacher's christological goal was the 
desire to establish the relevance of the historical Jesus Christ for the 
believer. This he sought to achieve phenomenologically by approaching the 
question and entire doctrine of God 'through a reflective analysis of 
religious consciousness and its object. "'3 It is here that Schleiermacher's 
doctrine of Christ becomes central: Jesus of Nazareth is the linchpin of 
the religious self-consciousness and consequently of all Christian 
doctrine, for according to TeSelle, Schleiermacher 'tried to give an account 
of the Christian consciousness as a specific feeling of dependence upon 
Jesus of Nazareth as the unique actualization of the ideal and denied the 
possibility of ever going beyond the direct dependence upon Jesus. "' 
In order to understand the manner by which Schleiermacher answers the 
problem set by Williams above, we turn briefly to consider two major 
aspects of his thought. First ly, what he means by a 'feeling of 
dependence' and secondly, the way in which Jesus Christ is the perfect 
actualisation of the ideal. 
Schleiermacher ident if ies human being in terms of self -consciousness 
consisting of two eleme nts: one expressing the existence Of the subject 
for itself, and another its co-existence with an Other. "s This self- 
consciousness expresses itself both actively, in a feeling of Freedom, and 
Passively, in a feeling of Dependence. "- The 'Whence' of this feeling of 
dependence is identified as 'God'. 
17 'God' however is not to be identified 
in any dogmatic manner, for the identity of God cannot be extrapolated 
f rom human religious self-consciousness. Rat her the term merely 
'presupposes an idea which is nothing more than the expression of 
the 
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feeling of absolute dependence, "19 Schleiermacher will allow only that týod 
is given in this feeling of absolute dependence in some way, What is 
important about his feeling of absolute dependence is its relation to self- 
consciousness-, human being is essentially relational, Human being ic,, to 
some degree, being- in-relat ion with an Other, Human being is intimately 
linked to the sense of the Other. To this extent there is a similarity of 
interpretation between Irving and Schleiermacher regarding the essence of 
human being-, human being is that which depends on God for its raison 
dl6tre. 
With this notion of self-consciousness as dependence upon the Other who is 
ident if ied as 'God II the foundation is set for Schleiermacher's 
interpretation of the Christ event. In Jesus of Nazareth there is the 
historical actuaiisation of one whose God- consciousness is absolute. That 
which unites Jesus Christ with human being is the common human capacity 
to be fully dependent upon God, to be fully conscious of God, and in so 
doing, be fully self-conscious, fully personal. However, it should not be 
misunderstood that Schleiermacher correlates the being of God with that of 
humankind: rather, it is that as one becomes more fully dependent upon God, 
one becomes more human, What marks Jesus Christ from the rest of 
humanity is the fact that with him alone has the capacity been fully 
actualised: the feeling of complete dependence upon God, receives content 
and fulfillment only in the life of Jesus Christ. It is by the one who 
manifests through his life and historic influence upon the Church that in 
him there has been a complete actualisation that there is a full 
realisation of the being of God within humanity. consequently, for 
Schleiermacher, the uniqueness of Jesus of Nazareth consists in him being 
the one in whom the capacity for human being to be fully dependent upon 
God is actualised, Since the being of God in a person and one's God- 
consciousness are one and the same thing" it means that in the full 
actualisation of Jesus Christ's self-consciousness as one fully dependent 
upon God, there is also the fullest expression of Divine Being, However, 
as we shall see later in Part III, although there is a parallel 
understanding between Irving and Schleiermacher concerning the place Jesus 
Christ holds as Ad, §m, as the one in and through whom comes the new 
creation, there is a thoroughly unparallel manner in the way 
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understand how this comes about. 
understanding we concern ourselves here, 
_2.2,1. 
An AnthrpýRp "oiical _. 
ýjoLut ion. 
It is with Schleiermacher's 
We have yet to outline the dynamic which enables Schleiermacher to present 
Jesus Christ as Archetype, In doing so, Schleiermacher must avoid the 
Aufkl, Yrung criticism of introducing a supernatural means in order to 
establish the uniqueness of Christ. Firstly, he advocates that traditional 
christological expressions are to be critically re-assessed, His solution 
is to take leave of the two-nature doctrine in preferance of his 
phenomenological approach, He attempts to overcome the problem of 
supernaturalism as well as the problems inherent in any traditional 
expression of the divine and the human in Jesus of Nazareth by subjecting 
such formulations to a phenomenological criterion. It is his belief that 
'the ecclesiastical formulae concerning the Per-son of Christ need to be 
subjected to continual criticism'20 for the simple reason that dogmatic 
formulations have little relation to the Christian self-consciousness, So 
Schleiermacher rejects the traditional christological formulation for one 
he considers better, namely, that 'in Christ the creation of man first 
comes to completion, 121 Consequently, we begin to note a parting in the 
way between Schleiermacher and Irving, for whilst both hold to the central 
belief that Jesus Christ is the apex of human being, Schleiermacher does 
not believe, like Irving that the modern solution necessarily involves 
traditional dogmatic expression. 
What, therefore, is Schleiermacher's solution? In order to establish the 
uniqueness of Jesus Christ, he turns to the figure of Adam. Like Irving, 
he both holds to a teleologicai interpretation of human being, and 
interprets human creation in light of the person and work of Christ. 
But 
unlike Irving, he approaches this f rom what appears to be an 
anthropocentirc hermeneutic- the human religious self - consciousness 
Schleiermacher uses this phenomenological christology with its feeling of 
absolute dependence on God in order to present Christ a--- the one who 
is 





avoid the Achilles' heel according to Enlightenment criteria, by what means 
is Jesus Christ unique? Schleiermacher presents the dilemma well- 
On the one hand one must conceive something in Christ that 
specifically distinguishes him from other men, and on the other 
hand holds fast to the view of really human conditions of life, 
One cannot say that these two tasks would really be carried out 
in mutual agreement in the course of the usual method of 
treatment-the truth of the matter is that those who hold fast 
to, dogma-fall into a docetism which holds that Christ in his 
true life is no true man, and all artificial aids that have been 
employed do not achieve what they were intended to achieve. On 
the other hand-those who take their departure from the attempt 
to represent the life of Christ completely as a genuinely human 
life usually end up by conceiving Christ in such a say that no 
intelligible reason remains from making him in any way such an 
object of faith, a central point of the world (or: of mankind), 
and this is the division that characterizes contemporary 
theology. " 
Schleiermacher turns to his understanding of Adam, the first creation, in 
order to avoid this Enlightenment criticism and to steer himself between 
the above Scylla and Charybdis. Adam, the first creation, is an 'imperfect 
state of human nature, 124 for in Adam the God-consciousness 'was 
inadequate and impotent, and only later broke forth in perfection in 
Christ, 1-2r- Whilst the human experience of sin and the need for redemption 
determines Schleiermacher's method he is equally insistent that the 
Redeemer must be exempt from the human condition of' sin. In order to 
avoid the charge of resorting to a form of supernaturalism in order to 
substantiate the uniqueness and sinlessness of Christ, Schleiermacher 
posits a parallel between the persons of Adam and Christ, the first and 
second creations, If Schleiermacher's solution to the uniqueness of Christ 
is to say that in him we find one who, unlike the first Adam, is fullY 
dependent upon God, one with a complete God- consciousness, how doeq- he 
arrive at this without falling prey to the charge of supernaturalism? 
Schleiermacher resolves this by insisting that Christ parallels 
Adam ir, 
that both are created from divine activity, rather than human, 
Three 
important points of similarity interest us here. Firstly, like 
Adam, the 
God-consciousness of Christ developes within time, Secondly, 
in an attempt 
to remove Christ from the human community of sin, Schlelermacher advocates 
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that Jesus Christ is created as 0-riginal 
human being, a humanity not affected by 
sin, And thirdly, 
this is achieved by a new implanting of the God-consciOusness 
at the beginning of 
Christ's life, 21- In Christ the 'existence Of God' is Possible 
of being creative. 
At this point Schleiermacher delineates the means by which 
the Redeemer does indeed stand outwith the community of sin, yet as one rapable 
of redeeming, by presenting 
Christ as the Second Adam, the second creation. 
This Second Adam is altogether like all those who are descended 
from the first, only that from the outset He has an absolutely 
potent God- consciousness. 27 
This is hardly a throw away line for any serious modern theologian to make, let 
alone tuck away innocuously in a much larger discourse of argument, Is this 
not a blatant leap in the supernatural? How does one come to have an 
absolutely potent Crod-consciousness?. What is of most interest here is the fact 
that Schleiermacher divorces his solution from the Synoptic presentation of 
Jesus Christ as one in relationship with God through the Spirit. Rather, he 
posits a thoroughly monopersonal analysis as to how Jesus Christ is sinless, It 
is by presenting Jesus Christ as an archetype of a new order of creation that 
Schleiermacher attempts to clear this hurdle. 
Firstly, he admits that the emergence ot Christ is to some degree, a 
supernatural event, but one of the same kind as that of the first creation. If 
in the act of creating both Adam and Christ there is a divine agent, then for 
both their coming into existence constitutes a new act of creation. Secondly, 
however, whilst the creation of the first Adam consisted in the creation of 
human nature with an inadequate God- consciousness, the second Adam is created 
with the capacity to attain a full God- consciousness. The inadequacy of the 
first Adam is reflected in the human condition to sin, But the second Adam 
expresses his new humanity by virtue of his complete God-consciousness. This 
he achieves by means of an external influence, but one which is in continuity 
with the creation of the first Adam. Thus Schleiermacher argues: 
Though its existence transcends the nature of the circle in which 
it appeared, there is no reason why we should not believe that 
the appearing of such a iife is the result of the power ot 
development which resides in our human nature. -2a 
-157- 
So, whilst the Second Adam emerges 
from out of the human community, he does sc, 
in a discontinuous manner, 
he does not emerge from within the human context of 
sin, If the 
first Adam possesses the latent Possibility Of absolute God- 
consciousness, then 
this development in Jesus Christ is not to be understood as 
a totally supernatural event, 
Rather, Jesus Christ is the one who exists at the 
highest level of human existence, whose God- consciousness is at all times fully 
developed in temporal relation to his human development, It is this idea of 
temporal activity between the God- consciousness and the human development that 
highlights the means by which Schleiermacher understands how it is possible for 
Jesus Christ to live a sinless life. In every state of human development, his 
feeling of absolute dependence, God- consciousness is the highest operating 
principle in his life. In this relation of self-consciousness and God- 
consciousnesst Jesus Christ is seen to be the Archetype, Schleiermacher's 
proposal consists in uniting the humanity of Jesus Christ with the 'Other' who 
constitutes the 'Whence' of the feeling of absolute dependence, In so doing 
Jesus Christ is, therefore, the example of humanity at the height of it--- 
potential, 29 for in Christ the creation of human being first reaches completion. 
Christ achieves this by virtue of his God- consciousness which distinguishes him 
from all other human beings whilst at the same time reveals the undivided being 
of God in him, Thus, that which is latent and inadequately expressed in human 
being is actualised in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is true human being. But 
because Schleiermacher has established the grounds of human being to be a 
feeling of absolute dependence, it means that in the full and perfect expression 
the feeling of absolute dependence there is also the fullest expression of 
divine being. 
If the self-activity of the new common life is original in the 
Redeemer and proceeds from his alone, then as a historical 
individual he must have been at the same time archetypal, that 
is, the archetype must have become completely historical in him, 
and each historical moment ot this individual must have borne 
within it the archetypal, `ýO 
I 
UP tO this point, it is clear that Schleiermacher avoids discussing the 
doctrine 
to Christ in relation to the doctrine of God, Rather, he seeks 
Christojo8y in relation to the human feeling of absolute dependence upon 
God. 
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The task in hand is to address 
the relationship Schleiermacher POsits between 
the absolute God and 
the historical Jesus Christ. This he approaches 
phenomenologically, 
Firstly, the human religious self-consciousness is taken as 
the standard for theological construction, In its sense Of sin and need c,;, ' 
redemption, it is aware of 
its feeling of dependence upon the Other, Secondl%7, 
Jesus Christ is identified as the one in whom the sense of absolute dependence 
is actualised. This teleological interpretation will be discussed below, but at 
this point it is necessary to turn to Schleiermacher's doctrine of God, 
As has been noted, Schleiermacher was critical of traditional formulationq on 
the basis that they could not be inferred from the religious self-consciousness. 
Thus was he not only critical of the two nature doctrine as a christological 
paradigm, but he was even more critical of the traditional doctrine of God as 
Trinity as a means of identifying the person of Christ. We can identify three 
major reasons for doing so. 
Firstly, the doctrine of the Trinity is not a direct expression of the Christian 
self -consciousness, Consequently, concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, he 
argues that the dogmatic formation of the doctrine is not an immediate 
utterance concerning the Christian self-consciousness, but only a combination of 
several SUCh utt eran ces. 31 In saying this Schleiermacher is not to be 
understood as rejecting the validity of the doctrine of the Trinity: although it 
is given a centrai place in nis theoiogicai construction, it is not one derived 
as an immediate consequence of the Christian self-consciousness. 
We rightly regard the doctrine of the Trinity, in so far as it it 
a deposit of these elements, as the coping-stone of Christian 
doctrine. -: 32 
Nevertheless, Schleiermacher remains firm in his resolve: that which we meet 
in 
Jesus Christ, and comes to us as a result of Jesus Christ does not 
lead 
immediately to a recognition of an eternal distinction in the being of 
God. " 
The doctrine of the Trinity is to be divorced from what he considers to be the 
essential doctrines of the Christian faith. 
It is important to make the point that the main PivOts of 
ecclesiastical doctrine - the being of God in Christ and 
in the 





detects internal difficulties with regards the concepýs 
of trinitarian 
formulation, These, he argues iead to a confusion regarding the 
T. relationship between 
the Divine Essence (and the three persons of the Trini y. 
Wrier all causality belongs to the one Essence, or all causality belongs to the 
three persons-35 
Thirdly, due to the external political 
ecclesiastical formulations, Schleiermacher 
considerations which influenced 
argues that 'a multi t Lide 0f 
definitions' were developed which had 'absolutely no-relation to the immediate 
christian self-consciousness. 1-3G 
What, therefore, does Schleiermacher make of the doctrine of God as Trinity if 
he does not fully reject it'? Firstly he questions the way in which the doctrine 
has been developed: 
We have the less reason to r-eE,, -grd 
this doctrine ass t-inally 
settled since it did not receive any fresh treatment when the 
Evangelical ('Protestant. ) Church was set up; and so there must 
still be in store for it a transformation which will Eo back to 
its very beginninEs '37 
Secondly, he questions the content of the doctrine as it now stands. In this he 
anticipates LaCugna's earlier comment: there needs to be a 'thorough-going 
criticism of the doctrine in its older form' in order that the way may be 
prepared for a 'reconstruct ion of it corresponding to the present condition of 
other related doctrines. '-3a The task facing Schleiermacher is to introduce his 
own understanding of the trinitarian identity of the God of Jesus Christ. 
However, it is in his sequel to the Glaubenslehre that Schleiermacher picks up 
the threads of his doctrine of the Trinity, and to a Sabellian interpretation Oý 
the Trinity that he turns. -3"I Having delineated his theological criteria, and 
in 
so doing, judged the traditional presentation of the being of God as inadequaýe- 
he returns to those trinitarian distinctions posited by Sabellius who considerel-, 
that the 'Trinity was not essential to Ciodhead as in itself considered, t, ur on1v 
ln reference to created beinEs and on their , 
iccount. '40 ý, onsequently, ýhe Cn 
did not exist before the incarnation; the Spirit did not exist before the 
creation of human beinw. and before creation there was no Father, only PL'r"-: - 
divine unity. 
W, 
to the created order that , he It is only in relation, therefore, 
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Godhead is identified as 
Trinity, According to him, 'the whole TrinItY Is God 
revealed; but 
the divine Being as he is in and of himself ancy in his Simple 
unity, is Crod concealed 
or unrevealed'. 41 
To the Father in his relation to the created order Sabellius attributed the 
function of governing the world; to the Son that of redeeming it; to the Spirit 
the t8sk Of sanctifying and operating on the community of believers. " The 
'Spirit' is not a 'Person' but the 'vital unity of the Christian fellowship as 
moral personality; and this, since everything strictly excluded, we might denote 
by the phrase, its common spirit. "' 
What, therefore, are the dynamics of this moral personality or common spirit 
according to Schleiermacher? Firstly, this common spirit comes to us through 
Christ, 
If we begin with Christ and hold to the proposition that the 
union of the Divine with His human personality was at the same 
time an enrichment of human nature as a whole, it follows not 
only in general that even after His departure this union must 
continue, but also (since this continuation is to proceed from 
the union itself) that wherever it exists there must be a bond 
with Christ, and vice versa. And since after the departure of 
Christ the enlarged range of connexion with Him can only proceed 
from the fellowship of believers, these three facts - being drawn 
by that union into the fellowship of believers, having a share in 
the Holy Spirit, and being drawn into living fellowship with 
Christ - must simply mean one and the same thing. " 
Secondly, Schleiermacher compares the dynamics of the common 'Spirit' of the 
Church to that of a state or nation. The Spirit is the one through whom the 
Church has become unified 'in the same way that a nation is one through the 
national character common to and identical in all, "' 
LastlY, it is a receiving of the Spirit which is greater than that possessed by 
Christ, for it is the community of a greater number of believers than that 
experienced by which Christ. " Herein is the gulf between Schleiermacher and 
Irving at its greatest: for Schleiermacher, the Spirit is not the Spirit that 
colne t'O Us thr'OuEh Christ, Rather, it is the communal 'spirit' of a collective 
group established because of Christ, 
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It will be clear 
from the previous discussions of Parts I and II that Irvins 
differs from Schleiermacher 
in major areas, What unites both scholars is not 
simply the 
fact that they are contemporaries, but more importantly their mutual 
desire to make sense of the 
historical Jesus, and to establish an essential link 
between the him and his Church. 
It has been thought appropriate to consider Schleiermacher's christology in 
order to highlight the perceptual or paradigmatic changes he profers as 
solutions to christological problems, Firstly, what is his solution to the 
relation between the historical Jesus and the Divine Being? And secondly, what 
is the relationship of the historical Jesus with the Church? 
Schleiermacher answers the first by means of a two-foid re-definition of the 
doctrines of human being and God, as outlined above. Since the religious 
cunsciousness does not tell us anything about the Divine being in itself, we may 
talk of the Christ event as the revelation of the Divine Being as Trinity only 
so far as it involves creation, And it is considered in a trinitarian manner 
simply because this is the manner by which the Christian revelation expresses 
itself. " The doctrine of God as Trinity is the means by which the Divine Being 
operates in its relation to the created realm: not as that which is essential to 
the very being of God. As t ar as the unity of God is concerned, Schleiermacher 
is content to assign that to the realm of the unrevealed. Consequently, he sees 
little relevance for the Spirit in incarnation. 
However it is with Schleiermacher's relation between the person of Christ and 
the Christian Church that concerns us at this point. It would be a 
misrepresentation to say that he does not unite the two, By virtue of the 
synonymy on the one hand between the being of God in Christ and his perfect 
God-cOnsciOusness, 
and on the other the being of God in the Church he does 
indeed present a union between the two. However, it is a union that does not 
come through Christ but as a result of Christ. 
In the Christian Church, as individual influences no longer 
proceed directly from Christ, something divine must exist, Th is 
something we call accordingly the Being of God in it, and it is 
this which continues within the Church the communication of the 
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perfection and blessedness of Christ., 4-B 
At first inspection, Schleiermacher's christology appears to resemble a 
well argued integration of the two ancient christologies of Alexandria and 
Ant ioch. On the one hand, he identifies and stresses both the human and 
divine dimensions of the Christ event. His is a clear atteMDt to SafRam: irri 
both dimensions. On the other hand, he gives a sense of priority to the 
divine in Christ: it is this which actualises the human latent potential, 
To this extent, Schleiermacher's is an Alexandrian type christology despite 
the apparent stress on the fully actualised humanity of Jesus Christ, 
This Alexandrianism is perhaps most evident in Schleiermacher's 
pneumatology for the Schleiermacherain Christ has little need of the 
Spirit. He arrives at this point on at least three grounds, Firstly, 
despite the fact that he seeks to criticize and replace older, traditional 
formulae, Schleiermacher fails to address a presupposition that is at the 
heart of most non-pneumatic christologies: the sanctificational dimension 
of incarnation. Schleiermacher presumes that the meeting of the divine 
with the human demands at that same time a banishing of all that marks 
the human context that demands salvation. Consequently, concerning the 
sinlessness of Christ he asserts: 
Whatever is involved in the ideality of the contents of His 
personal spiritual life must also be compatible with this purely 
human conception of His historical existence. Thus, in the f irst 
place, His development must be thought of as wholly free from 
everything which we have to conceive as conflict ... At every 
moment even of His period of development He must have been free 
from everything by which the rise of sin in the individual is 
conditioned. -49 
Secondly, he attributes sinlessness to Jesus Christ on the basis of his 
unique creation: a creation from outwith the sinful community, a humanity 
8s it was originally created. It is the product of the Divine Being with 
Jesus Christ in the temporal relationship of the being of God in him at 
every stage of human growth unimpeded by the vicissitudes of sin, 
Thus. 
and thirdly, Christ's sinlessness is not derived from any annointing Of or 




during the ministry Of Jesus Christ., His 
Sabellian leanings preclude any essential and dynamic pneumatic dimensior, 
to his christology, 
In light of our desire to establish a christology of efficiency, there are 
two major aspects of his theology that interest us. Firstly, there is the 
relation of Divine being to the figure of Christ. Does his Sabellian 
interpretation of the doctrine of God avoid Baur's criticism that there is' 
no link between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith? Surely there 
is in that Jesus Christ is the one who introduces the new, second creation, 
and whose influence is carried into the Church by the Spirit, However, i, -: -, 
this an sufficient interpretation of the person and work of the Spirit, let 
alone of Christ? 
It is our contention that Schleiermacher's interpretation of the Divine in 
relation to the human in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
is insufficient in that it rests upon an inadequate presupposition 
regarding the dynamics of Divine Being, 
However, secondly, this theological inadequacy rests upon a prior 
soteriological inadequacy regarding the human context of incarnation. In 
that Schleiermacher resorts finally to a Sabellian interpretation of Divine 
Being in its relation to the economy ot saivation, he follows merely the 
logic involved in a particular interpretation of the human= of 
incarnation. If the pneumatologicai and sanctificational dimensions 
inherent to the Synoptic presentation of Jesus Christ are ignored, both the 
work of the Spirit in incarnation and the relation of the Divine in Christ 
to the Spirit -are annulled, In pursuing a monopersonal interpretation of 
incarnation, Schleiermacher divorces the Spirit from the arena c, f 
Incarnation, In so doing, he forges a double divorce within the dynamics 
of salvation: a divorce both between the person of Christ and the Spirit, 
(both in terms of the Son's relation to the Father and the incarnate Son's 
life Of faith), and the person of Christ and the believer's present 
experience. 
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Consequently, if Jesus Christ is the bearer of perfect humanity, 
undisturbed by sin, 
if the Divine Being brings about his sinlessness, then, 
to what degree do we confront one like us, one tempted like us in all 
respects yet without s 
in? Schleiermacher highlights and maintains a 
fundamental weakness of the very tradition he seeks to criticisse, namely, 
the source of sanctification as derived by virtue of the divine presence, 
rather than in the dynamics of Jesus Christ's active relationship with the 
Spirit of God. In so doing, he undermines both his doctrine of God, who 
essentially is relegated completely to the realm of the unknown, and his 
doctrine of Christ, whose humanity is made so completely other that he has 
little to say to the mass of humanity as it struggles with the very depths 
to which it is capable of piunging, and in light of which any 
christological theodicy must be found sufficient. 
The question, however, still remains to be answered: What may we identify 
as an efficient christology? If Schleiermacher's theological interpretation 
is deemed inadequate, his christology inefficient in effecting its goal, 
what then is a more adequate alternative'? The intention in highlighting 
Schleiermacher's christology here has not been to parody or belittle his 
influence and input to modern theology, One would be grossly insensitive 
both to Schleiermacher's theological acumen and his Christian devotion to 
accuse him of belittling that which he inherited from within the believing 
community. ', ", His is a genuine attempt to make meaningful the person of 
Christ to his time. If he is at fault, it is in rejecting one set c-f 
presuppositions, namely, those inherent to any Chalcedonian christology, for 
ones more in tune with his own Zeitgeist. In so doing, as one married to 
the spirit of a particular age, he was, in his theological construction, to 
find himself quickly a widower. To the post-Holocaust child, born of 
another age, involved with another Zeitgeist, who has it so much nearer 
home to be scared by the 'desert places' of twentieth century mindlessness 
and mediocrity, the Schleiermacherian Christ f ails as an ef f icient 
christological expression, 
WhY is this so? It is our contention that it does so for two M-3ý, Cr 
reasol's, both of which stem from his ec-onomic interpretation of the 
being 
and character of God as Trinity, and in particular, from his interpretation 
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of the place, or 
lack of place, he attributes the Spirit in incarnation. 
We have seen, firstly, that Schleiermacher makes as a Priori the premis 
that the trinitarian being of God belongs solely to its relation to the 
created order. Consequently, 
the knowledge we derive of the Divine 
identity from incarnation is an indirect knowledge for God is Lit t erly 
transcendent, Whilst Irving and Schleiermacher both agree that God ie= 
beyond human comprehension, the former refuses to cleave apart Divine 
action from Divine being in the manner assumed by the latter. In so doing 
Schleiermacher incorporates a fundamental theological weakness to hi, -z 
christology'. in rejecting the intention of traditional formulae, he confuses 
a natural incapacity of human being with an essential distinction of divine 
being, It is our contention that Irving furnishes us with a more adequate 
progression of thought, for aithough God is indeed completely other and 
unknown because he is greater than human comprehension, in his action in 
creation and salvation, there is a revelation of his being in finite form 
which is revealed to be trinitarian. 
In turn, we are able to address the second criticism of Schleiermacher, By 
divorcing the being of God as Son from that of Spirit, by reducing divine 
agency to modalistic terms, Schleiermacher introduces a fundamental 
soteriological weakness to his christology. We can identify this in two 
ways: firstly, in identifying the Spirit as the common spirit of the church 
in similar terms to that of a national spirit, Schleiermacher dangerousl'; 
anthropomorphises the Spirit. In so doing, tie denudes the Spirit of any 
essentially personal identity and adds to the gulf he creates between the 
being of God and human being, 
Secondly, when Schleiermacher couples his Sabellian interpretation of the 
being of God with his hamartioiogicai ii-Isistence that Christ is free from 
all taint and struggle of sin, he is consistent in going on to remove any 
meaningful pneumatic dimension to his christologY, However, in so doing, 
he undermines the significance of Christ in relation to the believer in 
his 
or her struggles of life, and makes the significance of Christ t0t, 3117 
teleological, in that Christ becomes the standard towards which human 
being strives, without incorporating the equally important s-tress that 
ýe 
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has become this standard 
from out Of the midst Of common humanity, 
sharing to a degree 
the plight of our cOmmOn ancestry, 
It is noteworthy that whilst Schleiermacher interpreted the Trinitarian 
being of God in purely economic terms, Irving sought to give meaning to 
the person and work of Christ in essentially trinitarian terms, Both men 
sought to bring fresh meaning to the significance of Jesus Christ by means 
of the paradigmatic change brought about by their shift in interpretation, 
It is our contention that the perception of incarnation assumed by Irving 
in which he gave place to the person and work of the Spirit in incarnation 
and to the being of God himself, facilitated a paradigmatic shift which 
radicalised his perception of the action of God in Christ in incarnation. 
Through expanding the place of the Spirit in incarnation Irving was able 
to make sense of traditional trinitarian language in its relation to 
incarnation. By means of his essentially trinitarian interpretation of 
incarnation, and one in which there is given greater meaning to the 
personal work of the Spirit, Irving is able to identify the place of the 
Son both qUd God and qua human in a manner that facilitates meaningful 
assurance of salvation to the believer, 
3. TOWARDS A CHRISTOLOGY OF EFFICIENCY. 
3.1. Introduction.. 
Within the bounded context of theological possibilities, Edward Irving', --- 
christology offers a striking alternative to that offered by 
Schleiermach er. It is, for Irving, an attempt to establish a christology 
that may be deemed efficient to the task at hand: a task that involved a 
'perceptual, change in his christological paradigm, in order to re-assecs; s 
the Spirit's relation to Christ in incarnation, 
Irving, s christological motivation operates on two levels: firstly, thaý 
which has been identified in Part I in terms of revelation, as the Qurel', ' 
theological element of incarnation which Irving identifies as concerned 
primarily with the grace ot God as the means of expressing the glory Of 
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God, The soteriological 
thrust to Irving's theology, consequently i. 
central, for it is 
in the manifestation of God's grace, namely his saving 
action in incarnation, 
that his glory is revealed. It is a concern that 
moulds his entire thinking, 
the incarnation is not only the expression of 
God's justice, but of God's grace and in so doing, of his glory. s, it is 
also a theological method 
from which is expunged any element of neces, --, ýt-y 
for Irving precludes any notion of necessity from the act of incarnation: 
The incarnation of the Eternal Word hath for its only beginning 
and origin the purpose of God to make known unto angels, and 
principalities, and men, the grace, and mercy, and love which 
there is in His own eternal essence. 52 
According to Irving, the sole purpose of incarnation is 'to make known ... the 
grace and mercy, the forgiveness and love, which (God) beareth towards 
those who love the honour of His Son. "-'3 As Part I has discussed, the 
incarnation is the means by which the very being of God is revealed, and 
it becomes so through the agency of' saivation. 1-4 The one who reveals God 
is the one who saves- 'soteriology cannot be divorced from Christology', 11 
It is in incarnation that, 'for once, mercy and truth did meet together, for 
once, righteousness and peace did kiss each other'. " It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that Irving's christology is determined by a strong 
soteriological concern, for the proper approach to Irving's christology, 
like that of the New Testament, is through his soteriology. As Mozley 
rightly states, 'the fundamental distinction between Christ and men is that 
between the Saviour and the saved', F5 7 However, what constitutes such a 
paradigmatic shift in perception is the manner by which Irving uses the 
person and work of the Spirit to unite his cl-iristology and soteriology. 
What is of import here is the manner by which Irving understands how 
grace can be given, the fallen be forgiven, the curse removed, sin stemmed, 
and the Divine wrath abated without any change in the 'Holy Will' of God. SIB 
And in particular whether the manner by which this occurs is one which 
t. 8cilitates an efficient christology, namely, one which offers not only real 
hope of salvation, but which actualises such a hope, for this, the c-econd 
Mot ivat ion 0f Irving's christology, is the soteriological thrust th3t 
determines his entire understanding of Christ. In stating his reasons 
for 
Pursui. ng thIs line of inquiry, he states that: 
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When-I perceived that-the church was coming into peril r)f 
believing that Christ had no temptation in the fl d 
with and overcome, I felt 
esh to conten it my duty to inter calate in the 
volume on the Incarnation, a Sermon. (No III. ) shewing out the 
truth in a more exact and argumentative form, directed specially 
against the error that our Lord took human nature in its 
creation, and not in its fallen, estate, And another, (No IV) 
shewing the most grave and weighty c0i-iciusions flowing from the 
true doctrine, that he came in order to redeem us from the 
same. 69 
It does not serve the purpose of our argument to outline the orthodoxy of 
Irving's argument here, such a task has already been undertaken and 
accomplished with clarity and precision by Dorries who establishes the 
orthodoxy of Irving's understanding of the humanity of the Saviour. r-C, 
Rather, it is, as it were, our task to take up from where Dorries ends: to 
establish whether such a christoiogy is efficient or not. Does it 
accomplish that which it sets out to achieve? Does it have an inner 
coherence? To answer these questions, we must focus our attention on 
Irving's doctrine of Christ, in order to determine whether Irving has 
established a Christology of efficiency. 
It is at this point that we may begin to assess the efficiency of Irving', 
overall soteriology, namely, his understanding of the dynamics of 
incarnation, for it is by means of the specif ic understanding of 
incarnation that Irving unites the agent of incarnation, the Triune God, 
with the object of salvation, human being, implicit to his soteriology is 
the intimate relation he believes to exist between incarnation and 
atonement, It will come as no surprise that it is here, within the 'logical 
sPdce' opened up between the two, that Irving expands his understanding of 
incarnation in order to give space to the person and work of the Spirit, 
In sO doing he expands his understanding of the relation between 
incarnation and atonement. 
The question of the atonement. Aoth not so much grow out of. as 
it is involved in, and throughout implicated with, being of the 
very essence of, the incarnation; not as circumstance of its 
manifestation, but an original and substantial element in the 
idea itself., -, 
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If there is any one fundamental 
theme to Irving's- argument, it is that the 
idea of atonement becomes effective only in and through incarnation. 
Therefore is it in the deep mystery of atonement that Irving asks his mos- 
profound questions, 
for his is not the character to be content with mý--! -e 
mouthing of doctrine. 
Rather is he driven to explain the how and 
wherefore ot his cf-edO, To one who believes in the holiness of God and in 
a humanity that is expunged from this holiness by virtue of its 
disobedience, the deepest mystery lies in the act of reconciliation; how is 
the unholy creature to be reconciled to the holiness of God without 
compromising that very holiness'? For lying at the very heart of his 
understanding of the incarnation is the intention of Godhead in effecting 
reconciliation, of bringing about holiness in the human creature, But how 
does this reconciliation occur? The answer he gives is, by and large, 
determined by the context within which he argued, a context in which a 
theologia crucis was unquestioned, for this was not a point of discussion. 
Like Pokorng, Irving understands that, 'without Easter Jesus' life would be 
a shipwreck that would reveal only the negative side of things - the 
limits of human possibility', that, 'Jesus would be of so little importanc---- 
that one could not take him seriously either as a question or as a model 
of shipwreck, 11-2 
As we shall see, the context of debate lay not in the act of 
reconciliation, but in the dynamics necessary to deem it efficient in 
achieving its goal, for Irving is interested more in the positive side of 
things educed from the incarnation, Consequently, we find little stress on 
the place of the cross in Irving's theology. This is not to say that it is 
unimportant: rather the contrary - what one assumes is never explicitly 
Stated. More importantly, it is not simply that Irving's intention demands 
a shift in focus away from a direct theolo8,1, a crucis. This would be 'n 
miss the entire thrust of not only his but of New Testament theologY, fc, r 
there can be no separation of crucifixion from incarnation. We cannot 
interpret the statement, 'For our sake he made him to be sin who knew 
sin' (2 Cor. 5: 21) to refer solely to the crucifixion, Much more is it Ir" 
te 
interpreted within the rubric of 'sin' which embraces not only the ný:, "icn 
Of sacrifice on the cross, but of the complete incarnate, filial obedience 
Of Christ, 
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Lying at the heart of 
Irving's christology is the notion ot - sacrifice, fcr 
as we have noted 
in Part II where Irving establishes a foundation upon 
which to build a meaningful understanding ot salvation, the Son is the 
Lamb slain before the foundation 0f the world, But whilst Irving 
identifies this in terms of the Son's eternal obedience to the will of the 
Father, it is also clear that such obedience only has theological meaning 
in light of the Son's sacrificial giving of himself on the cross, for the 
suf f erings of Christ come not merely by imputation, but by verv 
participation in that which is in need of reconciliation, This notion of 
participation becomes the driving force behind Irving's christology: the 
how and wherefore of participation that facilitates reconciliation between 
the holy God and the unholy creature. However, without a recognition that 
undergirding Irving's entire Christology is a theologia crucls Irving's 
stress on the reconciling work of Christ would be vacuous of any real 
meaning. 63 
This goodwill of God to our race, this pity of God, this desire 
on his part, to see us righted, is the very basis of the work of 
redemption; which has no origin except in the love of God to man 
and man's world lost, If God hated man and man's world for their 
sin, and pitied them not, what did redemption spring from? A 
good cannot spring from hatred, but is the form of love. 
Redemption is the greatest good, and therefore is the form of 
the greatest love, But redemption contemplates not a world in 
freedom of holiness, but a world in bondage to sin; and therefore 
there is no cause nor origin for redemption, save in the goodwill 
of God to a sinful race and a sinful world. Of this pre-existent 
love, of this unchangeable love, which there is in God's heart to 
His creatures, of this His special delight in man, and the 
habitual parts of the strong angelic herald is to my mind the 
strong demonstration; while, at the same time, it is the 
demonstration of the total inability of every creature but the 
Lamb which was slain, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, to do this 
mighty work. 64 
What is so significant about Irving's christology is the fact that he 
deems the orthodoxy of such a statement insufficient in itself tc, 
establish the efficiency of his christology. Rather, he perceives the 
riecessity of involving the person of the Spirit. This comes as no 
skirprise: this paradigm development runs throughout the argument of 
Parts I and II, wherein the specific relation of the Spirit with the 
Son who through his obedience to the Father in incarnation reveals the 
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very being of 
Godhead and brings about a new state of human existence, 
But what is, perhaps, most 
interesting about Irving is his stress -;., n 
identifying the centrality of the Spirit for any adequate christology. 
Irving anticipates both the assertion characterised by Bromily, that there 
can be no pneumatology apart 
from christology, er- and that Of Moltmann who 
, uccinctly asserts 
that, r 
'Christology must presuppose a pneumatology if it 
intends to do justice to the history of Jesus as witnessed to by the 
synoptic writers and if it is to preserve the historical tradition of 
primitive Christian christology. "' For Irving there is nothing new either 
in Moltmann's assertion that christology must begin biblically with a 
1pneumatological christology' and end with a Ichristological pneumatology'. 
However, Irving's method, which embraces both the christological and the 
pneumatological, and maintains them in this orderr-7 may be best summarised 
in McDonagh's words: 
The close association of the Holy Spirit with the person and 
achievement of Jesus Christ in his life, death and resurrection 
is the immediate foundation of all Christian understanding of the 
Spirit ... Holy Spirit as Spirit of God is also Spirit of Christ, 
even Spirit of Jesus for the New Testament believers, 
The ... spiritual and intellectual struggles which issued in the 
great conciliar definitions from Nicea to Chalcedon and beyond 
turned on the being, personal character, and salvific: role of the 
Spirit, The historical eclipse of the Spirit in the theology and 
praxis of the Church may have been due to the exaggerations of a 
Christomonism as the historical emphasis on the Spirit may have 
seemed at times to obscure the specific nature and uniqueness of 
Jesus' achievement. Yet our whole Christian tradition insists on 
the indissoluble bond in divine origin and historical human 
activity between Jesus and the Spirit. Any understanding then of 
the relationship between the Holy Spirit and human identity must 
take account of the relatonship between the Holy Spirit and 
Jesus, own identity as understood by the first disciples and the 
subsequent tradition, '--e 
What is so significant about McDonagh's extended quotation is the manner 
in which it serves as a prolegomenon to Irving's christologY- for it 
highlights the important relation the Church has held in faith to exist 
between the persons of Christ and the Spirit, If Irving's theologic, 31 
inethod of identifying the signif icance of the incarnation from a 
soteriOlogical perspective is valid, then the efficiency of the resultant 
christology must be assessed in light of the intended goal, that which 
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requires redemption, 
namely human being. Furthermore, if Cullmann's 
succinct statement 
is correct, that 'all Christology is founded upon the 
life of Jesus)'c-s' then we immediately confront perplexing questions about 
the manhood of Jesus, for, as Moule points out, it is 'a subject in which... 
drawbacks may be particularly great, in view of the wide range of the 
answers that have 
been thrown upon by the continual debate over this 
question, "' 
The overall concern of our thesis is the answer Irving gives to this 
problem in his understanding of the incarnation, This leads us to the 
present task of identifying Irving's belief concerning the manhood of Jesus 
Christ . Due 
to the fact that this particular understanding lay at the very 
heart of the calumny surrounding Irving's own deposition from the pulpit 
and subsequent false accusations and misunderstandings it may appear 
repititious to give space to an area of his thought already given over to 
7 research, I The criticism, however, is not a valid one, for in order to 
establish the argument of this thesis, that Irving's understanding of the 
incarnation facilitates an efficient christology, ie, one that is capable of 
the assurance of salvation, it is necessary to outline what he understood 
to be locus operan-s of redemption, the humanity of Christ, In light of the 
underlying theme of our, thesis, that such a christology is only sufficient 
in relation to the priority it gives to the Spirit both in terms of agent 
and object of salvation, Moule's suggestion, that 'the roots of that subtle 
relation between the individual and the corporate' have a pneumatic 
foundation, lying somewhere in the relation between Jesus and the Spirit, " 
is doubly valid, Irving's contribution is underrated, for in terms- of 
Irving research, apart from isolated articles, 7-3 there has been little 
discussion regarding the pneumatic-trinitarian foundation of Irving's 
theology in its relation to the efficiency of his christology. 
3.2'. T Lhhe Place of Incarnation-, That Which isAssumed. 
One of the major concerns which moulded Irving's theological development 
Was the desire to overcome, what Batson identifies as 'the divorce between 
category and experience, '-7'4 of being able not only to communicate the 
inessage of salvation, but to sustain its assurance. Therefore of primary 
-173- 
concern to 
Irving w88 the desire to communicate to those under his 
pastoral care 
the assurance of salvation. It is this soteriological 
concern which drove 
him to focus on the 'crucial importance of (the) aspect. 
of creatureliness ... assumed 
by the Logos. 71- Unfortunately, importance is 
not the partner to priority, and the question of the creatureliness of 
Christ has never had an easy passage throughout the history of Christian 
thought, It is to this creaturely dimension of incarnation, however, that 
attention is now turned. 
In a perceptive article assessing the Pauline concept Of crdrý Brannick 
identifies two c riteria which succinctly summarise what Irving identifies 
as the place of redemption 
71- -, namely, solidarity and poWer, 77 These are 
apt criteria to adopt in delineating Irving's christology, for at its very 
centre is a concern to identify the very sphere in which redemption is 
fought and won. In his solidarity with the human race, Christ identifies 
completely with humanity in its being that which it should not, It is a 
humanity in solidarity with that requiring salvation: a situation or 
dimension which is more 'cosmic' than ethical; a bondage, or 'power sphere' 
in which people exist and from which they require release: a realm of 
'solidarity with the human race' which Ware insists requires 'not merely an 
exterior, juridic al imputation of our guilt to Christ, but something far 
deeper and more costly: an inner, organic sharing ... in all our brokenness. "' 
For Irving the efficacy of any given christology is the degree to which 
Christ shares in our brokenness and yet is able to initiate freedom from 
this power sphere, Consequently, implicit in his understanding of the 
dynamics of incarnation is the notion that the Divine Son is incarnated 
into this sphere, It is a concern with what Gunton calls, 'the ontolo(Sy 
Matter, "' Therefore, Irving's christology centres around the humanity of 
Jesus Christ as the Saviour of human kind, for like Meyendorff, he 
correctly understands that 'the true dimension of the humanity of Jesus 
c8n be understood only in the context of soteriology-'ec' About this, the 
history of Christian thought is to greater or lesser degree agreed: it is 3 
concern that curries the entire history of christological development. 
Where there has been less concord is in the context within and mean--- by 
which this development has been delineated, namely, the creatureliness of 
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incarnation, for 
inherent in Judeo-Christian anthropologies is the belief 
that human being 
has become that which it was not and requires divine ai, ý 
in becoming what it should 
be. 91 The question, therefore, is whether 
incarnation occurs in the former or latter state of human being, 
3,2,1. Th an T Christ as Fn RML 
-_ . _--e-H-u-ma-nAty-_gof 
Chr 
_asFallen 
H man Nature. 
What, therefore, is the place Of incarnation, and subsequently, f 
redemption? For Irving, it is intimately bound UP With the manner in 
which we identify the humanity of the Saviour, Sykes identifies four 
possibile interpretations to the 'bald statement that the divine word took 
our f lesh, ' Firstly, that at the moment of assumption, it was 'instantly 
transformed to be ... a new type of humanity'. Secondly, that it was af lesh 
'weakened by sin but not 'naturally' tainted by it'. Thirdly, that it was 
'sinful flesh, natura vitlata, ' and fourthly, that it was 'humanity as it was 
before the fall'. " 
Irving is quite adamant that in order to establish an adequate christology, 
one that initiates meaningful salvation, it can only be one type of 
humanity and not any other, Thus he considers as a 'rather novel position' 
that which Sykes has identified in the last of his categories, one which 
believes that Christ, 
assumed human nature as it was found in Adam before he fell, as S 
it was created by God ere ever sin was heard of, - that he was 
tempted no otherwise than Adam was tempted, - that sin is but an 
accident of, and not essential to, our nature, - that Christ's body 
was not mortal nor corruptible, - that he did not live by faith, 
- that his holiness was inherent in his human natur e, - in a word, 
that he was Adam over again, with the Son of God as the person 
informing and sustaining the Adamic nature, 9-: 3 
Although C Irving argues, on soteriological grounds, that this tends t) 
doceticism and is therefore incapable of offering real salvation, his is 
primarily a theological. argument. Such a view of the agency in incarnation 
results only in a binitarian form of agency, involving only two persons of 
the Godhead, the Father and the Spirit, who would work upon the human 
118ture which would then be assumed by the Son. 
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In addition, Irving rejects 
the humanity Sykes identifies in the first 
his categories, that, 
his substance was the Virgin's, but that the H01Y Ghost, in 
generation, changed it into a new substance, by purging 0, _It the impurities of the fallen flesh, and fixing it in a new st"e, 
wherein it should be liable to all our sinless infirmities, such 
as hunger, pain, and capability of dying. e4 
Fundamental to Irving's entire argument is his understanding of the 
humanity of Christ, which is, as it were, the master-key to his entire 
theology, for in a theology of revelation, the category of 'place' or 
, sphere' in which redemption occurs, engages the most mysterious elements 
of theology, Is the One we identify as Creator and Saviour able to 
condescend not only to the realm of the finite and created, but to that 
which has gone array and abandoned its destiny? Such an inquiry touches 
at the very heart of the character of God: can his Love transcend its 
holiness and transform not ex n1hilo but ex perditione, ex corruptione? 
Such categories as dismissed by Irving above serve only to obfuscate the 
dynamics of salvation, for the agency of salvation is placed in that which 
human being was intended to become, rather than in that which it has 
become, 
What has been overlooked in the furor of debate and subsequent caricature 
of Irving is the intimate association Irving makes between the location, 
agent and means of salvation. For him, the locus oper-ans of r-edemption 
provides a 'logical space' within which to develop a pneumatic dimension of 
incarnat ion, It is here that Irving finds a fertile and relatively 
undeveloped ground in which to cultivate his own appreciation of the 
person and work of the Spirit in his relation both to incarnation and 
soteriology, His entire christology is built upon the belief that 'the work 
to be accomplished must always be the measure of the power necessary to 
accomplish itl. ar- What lies at the heart of Irving's concern here is to 
establish a christology in which the person and work of the Spirit gre 
central, If the work of Christ in redemption is perceived in terms of 'the 
bearing of so much inflicted wrath, vengeance, and punishment' then, Irving 
argues, there will be little concern for the work of the Spirit-. it will 
be 
assumed that the divine nature itself is sufficient to bear 'the mighty 
-176- 
load' and sustain 
the Sufferer', There is little need for 
and that a person, and a divine person also. principle, Accordingly, t; -, e 
Holy Spirit in the work of 
Christ is almost or altogether avoided; which, 
however, is declared to have 
been the power in which He performed His 
mighty works, and offered 
His blameless sacrifice. lee 
Rather, the crux of the matter involves locating the context of salvation 
in a common category between the one in need Of salvation and the One who 
brings about salvation. Furthermore, in this location is also to be found 
the intention of redemption, Thus, at the very heart of Irving's treatise 
on the incarnation is the union of both the location and intention of 
salvation. It is 'manhood fallen, which He took up into His Divine person, 
in order to prove the grace and the might of Godhead in redeeming it, 18-7 
Herein is the means by which mercy and truth, righteousness and peace 
kiss: in the union of divine intention with human location in incarnation. 
Whilst Irving identifies three types of human nature, that of the first 
Adam before he fell, that as it now is and has been since the fall, and 
lastly, that which will be in the resurrection, 1919 it is with the second 
that Irving concerns himself in advocating a christology of efficiency. In 
the act of salvation, the Creator takes human being as it is and takes it, 
as Saviour, to what it shall become. Herein is the manifestation of the 
freedom of God: the capacity to assume human being in the very lowest 
form of its existence. The grace of God is revealed in his ability indeed 
tO transcend himself and redeem humanity in a manner that is, to Irving, 
most obvious, for 'that Christ took our fallen nature is most manifest, 
because there was no other in existence to take'-" Therefore, only 
'fallen human nature' suffices as the 'place of redemption'. " 
Although Irving does not explicitly argue so, it is possible to understand 
his use of this category in two ways. Firstly, from an anthropoloEi, --31 
perspective, as that of solidarity. Wo ven throughout Irving's thought is 
this notion of solidarity, one he uses in two ways, On the one hand, 
human being stems from the one source, the first Addm- It is a solidarity 
Of nature, and as such, participates collectively in the Adamic fall.. 
Irving maintains a clear distinction between human person and human 
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191 a component of 
his christology which shall be discussed nature, in deta--, L 
at a later stage, 
It is of interest here, however, that whilst human being 
is particularised 
in terms of personhood, its commonality is the root stock 
of human nature, 
This organic anthropologogy, therefore, implies that once 
human being is overtaken by sin, it is not only a state common +, --, all 
human kind, but that into which the Son is to come if the Christian rospel 
is to offer an effective and adequate salvation, Whilst 'there is a kind 
of necessity to use 
the term flesh' when we talk in terms of 
incarnation, 91 Irving's desire is to spell out just what this means both in 
terms of the agent and agency of incarnation. 
Irving's understanding of sin as the 'state of a creature, - the second 
state of a creature ... common to us all', `3 a 'Simple, single, common power 
... diffused throughout, and present 
in, the substance of flesh of fallen 
human nature, "' enables him to interpret the Westminster Confession's 
assertion that, 9r- 'The Son took upon him man#s nature, with , 911 the 
essential properties and common inf1rmitles thereof, 19, S- in terms of a 
'fallen human nature'. The Son does so because he is incarnated into this 
organic mass, 97 Consequently, whilst Irving argues for the notion of 
participation in our humanity, he is able to accomodate the language of 
imputation, only in so far as he has set the limits for such terminology. 
Thus when he does use the language of imputation, in arguing that 'in the 
flesh of Christ, all flesh stood represented; - that, in the flesh of 
Christ, all the infirmities, sin, and guilt, of all flesh was gathered info 
one$, " the negative connotations are lost in light of his thoroughly 
participatory notion of incarnation. Herein lies the manner which enables 
Irving to assert that although redemption occurs at the locus of fallen 
human nature wherein death comes as a consequence, it is still a voluntary 
death. It is the freewill act of an already self-existing being, who out 
`ý love for the Father's glory, and redemption of the world, becomes the 
Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world, doing so by means of 
Participation with fallen human nature, 9'5' 
Secondly, we may understand his use of the term 'fallen human nature' from 
a hamartiological or cosmoloElcal perspective. It is solidarity identified 
in relation to what we may best understand in Brannick's words ; -: ýs an 
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, apocalyptic notion of an evil aeon 
in which humanity e7ists which 
explains the enormity 
and 
represents or manifests 
power of sin'. It is because apocalyptic 
'a person or a personal aspect' as an 
j, ",. ase -, 'r i 
'aeonic 
force' therefore that Paul can represent 1 c76A at once as a human mocie of' 
existence and as a cosmic, 
demonic force'. 100 
This is an important distinction, for it enables us to assess the biblical 
warranty in Irving's use of 
'fallen human nature' to Christ as a means of 
establishing his solidarity with that requires salvation, For Irving, the 
locu, s operans of incarnation is the realm wherein humanity is held captive 
to a force greater than itself. Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, Irving's close 
compatriot, in a similar vein, argues that, 'the devil took possession of 
the flesh, and it is only through the death of the flesh that the devil can 
be overcome - the voluntary death of the flesh. "01 Although we shall 
have more to do with this interpretation of sin at a later point in our 
discussion, here it is significant to point out that this aeonic dimension 
of creation makes a major contribution to Irving's understanding of the 
solidarity of human existence. 10ý 
It is therefore with this double sense of solidarity that Irving identifies 
what he means by the term 'fallen human nature': it is a solidarity with 
both the common fallen stock and common oppressor of human nature, It is 
a life of one characterised by the qualities exemplified in Judith, not in 
terms of divine condescension, but in actual identification with human 
being in its fallenness-, 'For thy power depends not upon members, nor upon 
men of strength; for thou art God of the low ly, he lper 0f the 
insignificant, upholder of the weak, saviour of those without hope, (Judith 
9: 11). As such, Irving's is a christology of offence: for as Gunton points 
Out, 'the heart of the offence is not the divinity of Jesus. but the fact 
that the divinity is given through and with 'this lowly, poor, impotent 
man, ' It is this which Christendom cannot face, for such -a christology 
I offends both the individual and the established order. "" 
The 10CUS and perimeters of incarnation and therefore christolDgy are 
established within the solidarity of fallen humanity, In turn we 
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identifY two major concerns 
that motivate Irving in this 
the theological and 
the soteriological, 
FirstlY, then, the theological, wherein we may identify three MaJor 
concerns, on the one 
hand Irving wishes to highlight the divine Opposition 
to sin in a manner that makes sense of the seriousness of the divine 
reaction to the human condition. 
It is at this point that we most clearly 
gain an insight in to 
the reason why Irving cannot be satisfied with a 
merely imputational christology, 
for imputation cannot show clearly the 
seriousness of sin before God. Thus Irving argues that the guilt of sin 
and the divine 'abhorrence of the sinner' are demonstrated in the Son being 
sent 'in the likeness of sinful flesh-by making the Word flesh; by making 
Him consubstantial with the sinner. 110-4 
Secondly, he desires to demonstrate that the Son is Lord both of spirit 
and matter. Consequently, the nature assumed in incarnation cannot have 
been angelic, for this would constitute him only Lord of spirit, Rather, fo 
be deemed Lord of matter, it is necessary for him to partake of the human 
nature, the vinculum creationis, between that which is purely spiritual and 
that which is purely material, IcIF- 
Lastly, although a point that shall be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter, and one that weaves itself throughout Irving's thought, as we have 
noted in Parts I and II, there is the notion of will. In order to maintain 
his goal, Irving distinguishes nature from will so that he may identify the 
divine intention of incarnation, At his point we begin to move closer to 
the true locus in the dynamics of incarnation. However, at this stage, it 
suffices to highlight Irving's theological motive in identifying the 
humanity of Christ as a 'fallen' humanity, 
By punishing man in his nature, as it were, rather than in his 
will, it shewed that the will was under the stern bondage of the 
untractable nature; under the obstinate, perverse law of the 
flesh; and could not be recovered otherwise than by the smiting, 
Judging, and destroying of that flesh, or natural man, which sin had made its stronghold; that there could be no peace between the Creator and the creature until there was a redempti0r, from the power of that natural law, which had overpowered the 
spiritual wi)l and divine purpose under which the creature was 
-1 
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formed at first. "" 
In addition, when we -turn 
to consider Irving's soteriological concern, we 
confront one of 
the over-riding concerns behind his understanding of 
incarnation in relation to its saving hope, This is the desire to expand 
its significance beyond what he calls a 'doctrine of debt and payment, of 
barter and exchange; of suffering for suffering, of clearing the account 
and setting things straight with God'. "" Rather, his concern is with that 
of assurance, with the sufficiency of the Gospel, as that which is 
attainable through one who has already overcome sin in the flesh and in so 
doing not only redeems a fallen creation back to God but effects the 
dynamics necessary for attaining holiness in the flesh, It is no source of 
comfort to the penitent sinner to know that one who was unfallen upheld 
the law: for such a one is an unfallen creature and therefore unfamiliar 
with the struggles and mortality of those under the curse of the law. 109 
As Irving rightly points out, the mystery of human being is found between 
the foci of the one and the many, of being alone and being with. 
Consequently, the efficiency of any given Christology is undermined if the 
focus remains on only one of these foci, for, 'we are not unfallen 
creatures bearing another's sin; but we are fallen creatures, bearing our 
own-And by loading an unfallen man with ever so much sin of another, you 
do not make him a fallen man; and that he should bear it, and that he 
should keep the law without offence, is no proof to me that I shall be 
called to keep the same law'. 10'3 
Secondly, in that Irving identifies the place of redemption as that of 
fallen human nature, he attempts to make sense of the sufferings of 
Christ, who although possessing a fallen human nature suffers whilst 
remaining sinless. I -ed, for The question for Irving is not whether he suffer 
'Christ suffered for the sins of others'. Rather, his question is, 'How can 
suffering for another reach an unfallen creature? " " In order to answer 
this question, Irving unites two distinct ideas: that death comes to those 
who have not willfully acted against God, and that suffering cannot come 
to an unf'Bllen creature, We may summarise his argument thus' 
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1, Sin is the deliberate act of the will. 
2. Suffering and death are 
the possession of a fallen creature. 
3. Human nature is proven 
fallen in that it suffers an d dies. 
4, No unfallen creature can suffer, 
5. Remove this distinction and the difference between fallen and unfallen 
is removed, 
6. Children die, 
7, Children do not exercise their will. 
8. Therefore there must be a distinction between will and nature. 
9. Therefore it is possible to have a fallen nature, thus suffer and die, 
yet not disobediently exercise one's will. 
In the first of his criteria, we confront again the centrality of an 
ontology of will in his argumentation, whilst at the same time are faced 
with a somewhat tortuous and a posteriorl form of reasoning in order to 
answer his question. Death and suffering come by sin, But sin is the 
acting of a sinful will. Thus, suffering can only come to human beings in 
one way, the way of Adam: by a sinful act of the will. But in an age of 
infant mortality, and to one who knew at first hand the reality of such 
death, such a hypothesis could not stand the facts were it to rest at this 
po int , Irving was well aware that suffering and death come to those who 
have had little opportunity to willfully act against their Maker. Yet 
suffering and death do come to such. Therefore, Irving allows this fact to 
speak for itself: the solidarity of human nature testifies to the fact that 
'suffering can come to a fallen creature, without any sinful act of its 
own ... and that death can come to a fallen creature without any sinful act 
Of its own', the proof being manifest in every child that dies. "' 
Irving then combines this with a second criterion, namely, that suffering 
c8nnot come to one who is unfallen: for, 'there is not such a thing in the 
records of being, as that an unfallen creature should suffer. The will 
'n'st f8ll first by sinning, before suffering can be felt'. ` It is here 
ýIe Ineet the most tortuous of Irving's argument, He holds as a priori the 
premis that suffering and death cannot come to an unfallen creature. 
-ý, erefore, the answer is to be found in our understanding of what it means 
tO be fallen. Both the particular and univer-sal character of sin are 
i 
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identified in terms of 
will. It is particular in that by a deliberate 
choice of will, each 
human being sins against its God. However, this is an 
insufficient definition of 
the fallenness of human being, for it rannot 
apply to those who 
are incapable of willful disobedience. Therefore, 
Irving identifies a universal character to will: it is fallen in that it is 
a part of that which 
Irving identifies as 'fallen human nature'. Suffering 
and death come as a result of our solidarity with the first Adam. all 
humankind is born with a fallen will. Thus the univer-sal character of sin 
is realised in human natur-e- The sin of the one involves the imputation 
of the many, for 'God visits the sins of the fathers -upon those who have 
as yet no power of will whereby to commit a sin. " II Thus Irving explains 
suffering and death for those who have commited no individual act of sin, 
by means of distinguishing between human will and human nature, Suffering 
and death prove the fallenness of human being, If suffering and death 
come by an act of will, then children are unfallen. But if they are 
unfallen, they should not die. What proves them to be fallen? Simply that 
they suffer and die. The circuitous argument is concluded by arguing that 
if an unfallen creature can suffer and die, then the only proof between 
that which is fallen and that which is unfallen is removed. Therefore, in 
light of both the fact only fallen creatures can suffer and die, and that 
children who have never willfully sinned suffer and die, there must be a 
distinction between nature and will. 
What then may we identify as the place wherein the Divine achieves 
redemption? It is through identification with f'allen humanity. Christ 
must be 'as truly afa llen man, as He is truly God, " '' Herein trinitarian 
intention and human location concur, within a soteriological syntax, 
To make flesh was the great end, work, and accomplishment of the 
Incarnate God, and was brought about by the consenting and 
harmonious operation of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, according to 
their eternal and necessary relations and operations; the Father 
sending the Son; ... the Son assuming f lesh;... the Ho ly 
Ghost 
proceeding from the Father and Son, to be its life and strength, 
and holiness, its resurrection and glory, To this f lesh we have 
applied the word "sinful, " or "of sin, " in order to express the 
state Out Of which God took it; the words "sinless and holy, " to 
express the state into which Crod brou8-ht it. "' 
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What is the divine 
intention in incarnation? It is to bring 'f leshl out (), 
the state of sin 
into that of holiness. 'What he took to work upon was 
sinful, sinful 
flesh and blood: what he wrought it into was sinless, 111r. 
This is one criterion 
by which we are to establish the efficiency of his 
Christ0109Y, What he 
identifies as the place of redemption, however, iz 
only the first of 
three criteria that we must identify if we are to assess 
adequately whether or not 
Irving establishes a christology Of efficiency. 
It is therefore to the second of these we now turn, 
3.3. THE AGENT OF INCARNATION: THE ONE WHO ASSUMES. 
If the efficiency of our christology is determined by salvific criteria 
that arise from the locus of human being, then surely our theology should 
attempt to show how Jesus Christ is 'significant for salvation, ' how he is 
the ground of its reality and being. ' 17 This, however, is no mandate for 
an anthropocentric diagnosis of the human condition, of identifying the 
human need and then adding a divine solution. Rather, it is a thoroughly 
theocentric diagnosis, for it is a diagnosis based both on a divinely given 
Law which makes known the dilemma of human being and identifies the One 
who fulfills the Law. The Spirit we receive in salvation is the Spirit of 
the One who fulfilled this Law, The Church catholic has sought to respond 
to this by affirming faithfully the belief that the significance of Jesus 
Christ resides in the status of his person: that God is not in Christ in 
the same way as he is in ordinary men and women, or even saints. It is 3s 
a response to 'this THE christological problem" 19 that Irving presents his 
understanding of the one who stands at the centre of the Christian faith, 
and does so in a manner that faces the task not ignorantly, but squarely 
and fully, It is in this manner that Irving's is an attempt to address 
what McIntyre identifies as the severe strain under which classical 
christOlogy has come in modern settings, a crisis 'resolvable only by a 
radical reassessment of the basic shape of the doctrine as expressed 
today.,, is 
It 's a question about the 'Who? ' of incarnation, a question identified by 
Borlhoeffer 
as the question about transcendence. In that incarnational t, 31k 
irIvOlves that of the Son, Bonhoeffer argues that the immanent question, 
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the 'How are you possible? 
' is insufficient, Rather, 'the question, "Who? 11, 
expresses the strangeness 
of the one encountered, and at the same time it 
is shown to be 
the question concerning the very existence Of the 
questioner. " 
20 This is not to suggest however that we seek to divorce 
the question of immanence 
from that of transcendence: Irving understocý, ý- 
only too well the necessity of an 
intimate and essential relation between 
the 'who' and the 'how' of christology. Rather, it is a case of both. /and. 
The ontological must precede the functional, ": 21 and that the ontological 
and the functional must 
be combined. 122 Therefore as we turn to that 
which Irving identifies as the 'Who' and the 'How' of incarnation we hold, 
as a point of method, this sense of both/and constantly in mind, In so 
doing the means by which Irving brings about his paradigm change, by which 
he gives meaningful place to the relation between the Son and Spirit, will 
be better highlighted. However, the two are kept distinct in our present 
method only in order that we may highlight more effectively the remaining 
two components we have identified in Irving's christology, Here, it is 
with the 'Who? ' of incarnation that we are concerned, 
Irving's understanding of the 'Who' of incarnation is a consideration of 
this identification towards both a theological and soteriological end. We 
have discussed in detail Irving's argument as to why in order that there 
to be a personal revelation of the Father's love towards his creation the 
Son must share the same order of being as the Father. 121 In Fart II we 
have highlighted his understanding of human being in its becoming that 
which the Creator desires, an end achieved only in and through the person 
and work of Christ, who as Second Adam establishes a new order of 
creation. 124 What we have noted in both is that Irving unites the 
ontological with the functional by means of not only the person of the 
Son, but also the person and work of the Spirit, 
Our concern here, therefore, is with delineating the dynamics by which 
Irving achieves this union between the Son and the Spirit in incarnation. 
is a concern with ontology: with the ag-ent of incarnation. Herein lies 
1he foundation upon which Irving's entire christology rests: on the 
identity of the one who saves, Here we meet with a dual use of agent 
which enables Irving to show how the divine and the human do truly meet 
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in saving action 
in the person of Jesus Christ, Only in light Of the clear 
distinction Irving 
holds between the being Of God and human being, is it 
porsible to make 
sense of the double identity he attributes the agent of 
salvation: identities 
which serve to establish the very heart of his 
appreciation of 
the person of Christ, and which facilitate the pneumatic 
dimension which serves to unite his doctr ines of God and human being, 
The efficacy of what Jesus Christ does stands or falls on whom we identify 
him to be. Whilst Irving's is an unequivocal identification of the divine 
Son as the agent of redemption, at the same time, it is not a univocal 
identification with what we may describe as an Alexandrian christology, 
Characteristically, Irving refuses to be labelled in such a manner. Indeed, 
to do so would be not only to misrepresent Irving but to miss the entire 
thrust of his doctrine of Christ, for Irving's is a subtle blending of two 
complementary but importantly distinct approaches to the person of Christ. 
The method assumed in our present study has been assumed in order to 
facilitate clarity of perception regarding Irving's understanding of the 
agent of incarnation, and consequently salvation, Thus we have sought to 
distinguish quite separately Irving's doctrines of God and human being, 
Both reflect the fact that Irving's theology can hardly be identified as 
that belonging solely to one particular school of thought. Consequently, 
on the one hand, his doctrine of God enables him to establish an 
essentially theological foundation for his christology. Our discussion in 
Part I has highlighted the manner in and by which Irving identifies the 
being of God in his trinitarian relations. In so doing, Irving develops a 
framework which enables him to stress the primacy of the person of the 
Son, 
Yet on the other hand, our discussion in Part II highlights that which 
Irving identifies as the object and goal of salvation. This has been taken 
up, in turn, in the immediately preceding discussion where we have sought 
to identify the 10CLI-15 Of incarnation. To this extent, it may be argued 
that Irving still remains firmly rooted in a thoroughgoing Alexandrian 
'Logos-sarx, 
christology, TO some extent such a view is justi fied, as we 
shall see below. but it is not the whole story, for to rest at this point 
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would be, 
firstly, to undermine that which Irving has argued in Part r, 
that his is not a mere 
Logos christology alone. Rather it is ýhe 
revelation by a 
Son of the love of the Father God. However, secondly and 
of much more 
importance both to Irving's own christology and the purposes 
of our thesis, 
to label his christology as Alexandrian is to ignore the 
place he attributes 
to the Spirit in his relation to the humanLIM Of the 
Saviour, Up to this point in our discussion, such a stress has not been 
fully demonstrated, and shall not be so done until we first determine 
exactly the identity of the agent of 
incarnation. It is therefore our aim 
at this Juncture to highlight how Irving identifies the agent of 
incarnation from both perspectives taken up in our thesis in Parts I and 
11: from the perspective of the divine and that of the human. In so doing, 
our aim is to show the complementary roles they carry in identifying the 
agent of incarnation, 
Who is the Agent of Incarnation? In answering this question, Irving is 
seen to stand clearly within the tradition of a Chalcedonian christology. 
For the purposes of our thesis, it is best to analyse Irving's answer to 
this question from a dual persective, which, whilst not systematically 
presented in his writings, stands as a complementary whole, 
33.1. The Theological Persl? pctive. 
Firstly, the theological-, Irving is adamant that, 'the only person in Christ 
is the person of the Son of God; whose identity doth not change by his 
becoming man'. 1 21- Irving does not waver on this point, A constant 
identification of the person of incarnation as the divine Son lies at the 
heart of his christology, Without it, there can be no revelation of the 
Father, for only God is capable of revealing himself. Whilst the person at 
the very heart of the Christian Gospel must be the Son of God, Irving's 
thoroughgoing use of the principle of oper-a trinitatis ad extra -FUnt 
indivisa implicates the Father and the Spirit. Thus, he argues: 
He was the person of the Eternal Son, manifesting forth the will of the Father and the work of the Holy Ghost, as well as the Word of the Son, i n manhood, yea, in fallen manhood. He took up the creature in its lowest estate in order to justify God therein, by proving how good even that estate was. 
1: 26 
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It is, a stress on 
the divine status of the Saviour- a reiteration of 
ancient formulae 
that Christ is one person in two natures. What is 
important to note at 
this point is the use Irving makes Of the notion of 
'person'. On the one 
hand, for theological reasons, Irving wishes to 
safeguard both 
the divine agent and agency of incarnation, whilst at the 
same, for soteriological reasons, 
he wishes to safeguard the full humanum 
of the agent of incarnation. 
The means by which he attempts to do sr-) 
must have served only 
to exacerbate the hostility which first arose 
against Irving's christology: for the status of the one who becomes 
incarnate is starkly juxtaposed to that into which he is incarnated, This 
is perhaps expressed no more clearly than when Irving argues thus: 
The person acting and suffering is the eternal and unchangeable 
Second person of the Godhead, He is the I who was in the bosom 
of the Father from all eternity; and in every action He is 
conscious God, When He saith, "I will, " it is the Godhead that 
willeth. From the infinite Godhead, therefore, is the origin of 
every volition and action of Christ. The f ountain is there in 
the infinite, And how proceedeth it into the finite? ' 27 
The answer to that question, however, can be answered only after we have 
highlighted the remaining tw o aspects of Irving's thought at this stage. 
It is this double thrust of intention', however, that has to be remembered 
when we turn to consider how Irving understands the IOCLIS operans and the 
modus operans of incarnation in their relation to the agent of incarnation. 
_Jcal 
Perspective. 
Pursuing a firmly Chalcedonian christology, Irving is adamant about who the 
agent of incarnation is not. He is not a human person. Here we confront 
both a theological and soteriological consideration, already highlighted in 
Part ii, Why cannot the Son be a human person? Firstly, for the 
theological reason given above, that since only God can save, God alone 
must be the author of salvation: human being is unable to attain such a 
90111- Secondly, on soteriological grounds, Irving returns to that which he 
identifies 
as the grounds not only of our natUral human solidarity, but 
also the personal: his distinction between original guilt, that in which the Saviour 
participates, and original sin, that in which only human persons 
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part icipate. 
Thus whilst in a human person there is the unity of original 
sin and guilt, 
(for original sin and the act of sinning are, for Irving, 
inseparable), there 
is, in the Saviour, only the taint of original guilt, as 
we have noted above, 
Thus, the Son is 'acquitted from all charge of 
original sin, by 
the fact of his not having been created, ' for: 
as Christ was man, and not a man, he cannot be spoken of A- a 
human person, without being brought in guiltY of original sin, 
As a divine person he is clear of it, and no one can impute it to 
him. His not having natural generation, clears him of it 
altogether. I" 
The question to be asked here is whether Irving is guilty Of 
Apollinarianism, for in denying that the Son assumes a human per-son, does 
he not deny there to be lacking that which is essential to being human? 
This we shall address later in our discussion, for before we can do so we 
must first assess Irving's intention in making such a statement. 
His historical setting establishes him as a child of both the ancient and 
the modern, Irving stands within the fold of orthodox christology in this 
assertion. His is a thoroughly ancient understanding of the agent of 
salvation, Yet by virtue of being a child of his age, his anthropology is 
assessed by a criterion alien to that of his ancient predecessors, namely a 
psychological understanding of personhood, The question to be asked at, 
this point is whether this is a criterion that Irving himself uses, In 
that he stresses there is no human person in incarnation, one could argue 
that Irving omits from his christology an element presumed in earlier 
expressions which held to the full humanity of Christ. However, as we 
have seen in Part II, and discussed earlier in this chapter, Irving uses, 
the notion of 'original sin' as a theological tool in order to identify the 
solidarity of humanity in its bondage to sin. Furthermore, Irving partners 
original sin with human personhood. His doctrine of sin and its resultant 
Interpretation 
of human personhood forces Irving to deny to Christ a 
purely human person, In so doing, he extricates the Saviour from the 
charge of being a sinner, whilst maintaining his solidarity with fallen 
humanity, 
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Irving, as the child 
of a particular age, stands firmly upon the traditions 
of the past whilst 
asking questions and seeking answers too ripe for ýýe 
indocile age in which 
he found himself, When we turn to the question of 
agency, we confront, 
of necessity, the question as to where is the human 
Person of Christ, 
Needless to say, this is hardly a modern question: it 
lies at the heart of the most ancient of 
Antiochene christologies. But the 
question assumes a 
different hue in light of the opposing mind-sets held 
by ancient and modern questioners, 
To the former, it is an ontological 
question, which, in 
the history of dogma has been considered never quite 
adequately resolved, 
To the latter, it is a psychological question, and one 
presumed by those who 
have crossed the Rubicon of Enlightenment, 
impossible to resolve, With Irving, there is room to argue that perhaps 
unwittingly, by virtue of the place he attributes the Spirit in his 
christology, he furnishes us with pointers as to how we may pursue means 
of holding the two opposing mind-sets together. 
It is our contention, firstly, that Irving uses 'person' as a theolos-ical 
tool with a specific function: its meaning lies embedded firmly in the 
soteriological context within which it is used. Only God can be both 
author and agent of human salvation. Secondly, it is our contention that 
Irving holds together two ancient and hitherto disparate christological 
methods by means of the place he give the Spirit in relation to the 
humanity of Christ. His insistence that there is no human person involved 
in incarnation should be understood in terms of the more ancient and 
ontological use of 'person' in what we may call 'Alexandrian' or 'Logos- 
flesh' christologies, In denying human personhood to Christ, it. is not 
Irving's wish to undermine the humanity of Christ. It is, rather, an 
anhYPOst8tic interpretation of the humanity of Christ. If his were a 
Psychological interpretation of incarnation, this would be a damning 
ommission, However, when he talks of human personhood in this way, he 
exPounds an ontological view of incarnation, and one in which he seeks to 
safeguard the divine agent of salvation through incarnation, As we shall 
argue later, Irving complements this christological perspective with that 
another perspective which underwrites the humanity of the Saviour. 
However, here, Irving merely extends the logic of Chalcedon. It is a 
stress upon the divine agent of incarnation. 
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unless we appreciate 
Irving's concern as he approaches the question of 
agency we shall misunderstand 
him, for his is a concern with both the 
purely theological and 
soteriological intentions of incarnation. With 
respect to his 
theological questions, the person of incarnation is the 
divine Son. of this Irving 
is emphatic, But when we turn to consider the 
soteriologic8l intention with which 
Irving is so concerned, we discover a 
double concern, wherein one dominates the other but not to its exc1usj(-rj. 
What do we mean by this? Simply this, that as one who is steeped in the 
ancient tradition of the 
Church, Irving primarily understands this question 
about the person of incarnation from a theological perspective: it is an 
ontological question. Thus he gives an ontological answer: it is the 
divine Son. To this extent, he talks of incarnation in purely Chalcedonian 
terms, of one person and two natures. Here 'nature' is understood 
ontologically, as that which constitutes the Christ as a full human being, 
Thus, when the identity of the agent of incarnation is considered from 
within this ontological context, Irving clearly stresses the person of the 
divine Son. Irving's stress on the divine agent of incarnation in light of 
the human need for salvation demands that priority be placed on the 
personhood of the Son, for it is God who saves, 
However, when Irving considers the question as to the identity of the 
agent of incarnation from a soteriological concern he appears to make a 
considerable shift in emphasis, but due to the fact that his main concern 
throughout his writings is with the divine agency of incarnation, this 
second consideration is less obvious. However, it is only within this 
context that the pneumatic dimension to Irving's christology makes sense, 
for it is a context within which he wishes to stress the full humanity of 
the one who brings salvation, 
Irving, therefore, combines his ontological concern with a soteriologica-l 
Mquiry in between a manner that demands making a distinction human 
lature and human person, 12s If his separate concerns are not identified, 
Irving-s 
soteriological concern may serve to vitiate his christology by 
blurring the ontological primacy, In stressing the divine agent with 
-es"ect to his soterioiogical intention, Irving exposes his perception of 
*. ýe humanity 
of the Saviour to an element of dubiety. It is our belief, 
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however, that 
this is not the case. True, his bold stress on the humanum 
of incarnation 
in terms of 'fallen human nature' coupled with an even 
bolder insistence 
that there is no human Pe-rson involved in incarnation 
serves possibly 
to damn Irving's christology as a form of Apollinarianism, 
This criticism, however, 
is founded upon a misrepresentation of his 
intention and therefore serves only 
to confuse that which Irving seeks to 
clarify. Irving's 
intention is, on the whole, to safeguard the assurance of 
salvation. To do so, 
he holds in tension two complementary christological 
perceptions, These we 
have sought to clarify in terms of the agent of 
incarnation and the object of incarnation, the locus Operans and the modus 
operans of incarnation. 
The theological and subsequently ontological concerns set the parameters-, 
there is no independent human person. However, the soteriological concerns 
give us insight into Irving's understanding of human nature. And it is an 
important inquiry, for in response to the immediate and crudely 
Apollinarian accusation that in this christology the person of the Son 
must replace the human person, in a manner that the divine Logos replaces 
the human logos, Irving must be seen to maintain a full humanity if his 
christology is ever to be deemed efficient, 
Our argument is thus-, that from a theological and ontological perspective, 
Irving holds to the sole personhood of the divine Son, with his definition 
of human nature meaning all that it does to the ancients, namely that 
whatever it is that constitutes us as human beings that too we find in 
Christ, As a result, Irving refutes any accusation of Apollinarianism by 
the ontological thrust of his thoroughly Chalcedonian christology- the 
S8viour is one person in two natures. '-: 310 Herein 'person' is understood in 
Purely ontological terms, However, Irving's assertion that there is no 
human person demands explanation if his christology is not to be discarded 
8s merely a re-mouthing of an ancient and, to some, redundant christology. 
UP tO this stage in our inquiry, we have focused upon what we have 
identified as the ontological or theological dimension to Irving's doctrine 
ýf Christ in its relation to his understanding of salvation. So Irving 
stresses the divine agent of salvation in terms of a Chalcedonian 
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interpretation of personhood. 
It is the divine person of the Son who , r. 
his incarnate form, 
brings about our redemption, as he obeys the Father's 
will by the help of 
the Spirit. 
When his attention turns 
to his saivif ic concerns, Irving seeks to 
establish how Christ can 
be in solidarity with our need of salvation whilst 
at the same time 
be free from the penalty of sin, When we remember that 
Irving's hamartiology f acilitates the possibility Of one being both 
, sinless' (being free of original sin and therefore actual sin) and at the 
same time be 'sinful' (being familiar with human guilt, the natural 
consequence upon human nature of a Fall) then are we able to consider the 
question as to how can the Saviour be one with us in our fallenness whilst 
at the same time not be guilty of the sin of that common stock. By means 
of a bald Logos- f lesh-type christology Irving thus talks of the ag-ent of 
incarnation in the following manner: 
You have original sin taken away in Him by the manner of His 
conception, He is not, as it were, an individual of the sinful 
individuals; He is not a human person; He never had personal 
subsistence as mere man; He see the whole mass and lump of 
fallen, sinful flesh; He submits Himself unto the Father to be 
made flesh; His Father sendeth the Holy Spirit to prepare a 
body. 31 
What then are we to infer from this eradication of the essence of sin from 
Christ? Does this suffice to establish Irving's christology efficient for a 
meaningful doctrine of salvation? For Irving, to stop at this point would 
be to sound the death-knell for his appreciation of the relation between 
Christ and the believer. The mere removal of original sin, for Irving, is 
" 'ficient to establish Christ's sinlessness. "sut Unlike Schleiermacher, 
Irving understands the uniqueness of Christ to reside not only in his 
divine status, but in the manner by which he inaugurates a new humanity 
through the sanctifying presence of the Spirit. We are now at a point of 
being able to focus more specifically the means by which Irving 
establishes his argument. 
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wNs oF urARNATION. 
'Tw 
act of se1imihm-itation. 10" som 
Irving's christologY stands 
in direct line Of succession of those 
theolOgies since 
Chalcedon, which, in the words of Schoonenberg, have 
expressed 'the plenitude of 
Christ by attributing to him, divine nature and 
human nature'. Yet his is also one which attempts to combine the duality 
of dogmatic teaching with 
the plenitude of the writings of the New 
Testament which present the life of Christ in an altogether different 
dualism, namely that of his 'life on earth and of his presence in heaven, 
the condition of the "servant" and his power, his self-emptying and his 
exaltation'. 132 
By virtue of his understanding of the who of incarnation, Irving is able to 
delineate his perception of the 'how', the dynamics of incarnation. Herein 
do we gain insight into Irving's understanding of the modus operans of 
incarnat ion, 
Firstly, lest we should lose sight of the essentially trinitarian dimension 
of incarnation, we should remind ourselves of the trinitarian foundation 
expanded in Part I, a foundation upon which Irving establishes his entire 
doctrine of incarnation. 
Before the infinite Godhead in the Son could act in the finite 
form, whether before taking that form or after, He must act not 
of Himself only, but with the consent and concurrence of the 
other persons of the Trinity. And this is not a small matter, 
but is in fact that which determineth all the rest. "' 
Of importance here is the manner by which Irving presents the Son's mode 
Oý incarnation in terms which make f ull use of the Isoteriological 
dramalia, 4 expounded in the christological hymn of Philippians 2. For it is 
Only in relation to the soteriological goal of incarnation that the 
'heOlOgical notion of kenosis, and consequently any use of the notion of kenosis must strictly accord with soteriological intentions. 
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How then does 
Irving set out to accomplish this,? Far from being required 
at this stage 
to introduce any new datum in order to answer this question, 
we need only allude 
to that which Irving makes of the pre-incarnate act of 
obedience on 
the part of the Son in order to create and become the Lamb s 
, air, 
before the foundation of the world. ' Of importance here is Irving's 
use of kenosis within a 
wider context than that of incarnation alone, We 
may identify this as 
the first of two ways in which he uses the notion of 
self-limit8tion or 
kenosis. 
Firstly, he contextualises the notion of self-limitation within the counsels 
of the Godhead itself. Although this could be interpreted as an act of 
gross presumption on the part of Irving in attempting to illumine the very 
being of God, it is better interpreted in light of Irving's thoroughgoing 
ontology of will. Two considerations are worth noting here, On the one 
hand, Irving wishes to facilitate a' union of being between Creator and 
Saviour, On the other, and at the same time, he wishes to give primacy to 
the place of Christ in a way that shows that the Christian hope of 
redemption is not a second attempt by God to get things right, Therefore, 
before creation, there was established in the very being and counsels of 
God, a way of redemption. 
Irving establishes such a possibility with the notion of kenosis on the 
part of the Son, The incarnation is a willing act of self-limitation which 
highlights the divinity of the agent of incarnation: it is the self- 
limitation of a divine person in terms of solidarity with that which is to 
be created and redeemed, for we may attribute the actions of creation and 
redemption solely to divine agency, Irving's christology is safeguarded 
from the threat of minimalism wherein the status of Christ may not be 
elevated any higher than that of supreme humanity, whilst at the same time 
's 85fguarded the truly human context within Which redemption is 
wrought, 136 
Irqjjg, s understanding of kenosis parallels Moule's later interpretation of 
ý LPPians 2: 6, that, 'Jesus did not reckon that equality with God meant 
on the contrary, he emptied himself', an interpretation that MOule rightly states renders 'God-likeness essentially as giving and 
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spending oneself 
Out'- ': 37 And if this is the case, as Hanson comments, 
then the point 
Paul is making here is 'that divinity is supremely 
manifested 
in human self-giving, in fact in the human self-giving of 
Christ #, 138 For Irving 
this can be only in so far as it is the human self- 
giving of the 
incarnate Son, for only a divine agent is able to be so 
selfless. As 
Richard points out, 'selflessness is not the absence of the 
self as subject, 
but the absence of the self as object of anxious 
preoccuPat ion, The selfless self can 
let go, llaý It is this that is the 
scandal of the New Testament: 
the scandal of the God who comes to us not 
in apocalyptic power, but as one who as 'utterly humiliated man ... is not a 
derogation from or even a modification of the glory of God, but precisely 
the fullest expression of that glory as love. "-40 For Irving, then, the 
notion of kenosis is not to be understood in any notion of divine 
redundancy on the part of the Son. Quite the contrary, it is the complete 
opposite; the principle of opera ta trinitatis ad extra sunt Indivisa 
obviates any such notion. Rather, is it an expression of willing obedience 
on the part of the Son to bring about creation and redemption. As such it 
highlights the love of God in its capacity to follow human being into its 
own 'far country"Al and in solidarity with that which requires 
restoration, return it to its proper position and place of being, 
How then does Irving give content to his notion of kenosis? He gives 
fullest expression to this first application of kenosis in the following 
lengthy but appropriate quotation: 
The Son-did before creation assume unto Himself that limited 
form of the Christ, in which the Father saw before time, and 
independent of time, before change, and independent of change, 
His work complete in that beauty and perfectness to which it 
shall yet attain, And in this all-containing form of being, image 
of the invisible God, fulness of the Godhead, the Son did create 
and order creation to the end of His becoming flesh, did take flesh, did redeem it, did glorify it, and is now bringing all things to be under it-There (are apparent changes, as His taking flesh; but this is not a real change of His being as the Christ of God; that is to say, he who taketh flesh, is the very same whom God set up before the world was, by whom God created the world, who spake by the prophets. No change did His spiritual being undergo, in these acts of creating the world, redeeming flesh and the world, His spiritual being is that fulness of Godhead, 
which was the device and the joy of Godhead, in the Purpose, and in the enjoyment of before the light was 
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create6.. 
The rest is but the acting of the Son, thus lirniting 
'H Mself, Unto 
the end of bringing that form of being which He 
twardness from the Godheaa itself; that is, , ad assumed 
into ou A. 
into creation. "' 
-, - Irving accomodates 
a pre-creation act Of willing self-limitation on the 
Dart Of the 
Son in his function as the one through, in and by whom all 
things were made and 
have their being, then his secona use of kenosis is 
epressed in the manner 
by which the Son becomes incarnate. Here are we 
501e not Only 
to point to the central means by which Irving understands 
the cynamics Ot incarnation, as much pneumatological as christological, but 
81so that by which we shall assess whether 
Irving's christology is indeed 
a christologY of efficiency. 
Henceforth we turn our focus from its 
explicitly theological and ontological dimension to its more immediate 
soteriological goal. 
In this the second use of kenosis, Irving uses the idea of self-emptying 
in order to express the mode of incarnation, The Son lays aside the 
'mantle of His uncreated and incommunicable glory, ' takes on the 'veils of 
flesh, ' clothes Himself in the likeness of man, '14-: 3 by means of action on 
the part of both his divinity and humanity, the one by 'self -contraction' 
to the measure of the other, and the other 'by coming into harmony with 
the former through the mighty power of the Holy Ghost-'144 He 'emptieth 
Himself out of His Divine nature, and passeth into the human nature' and in 
so doing becomes 'a very man with man's very limitations'. When the 
focus is turned to this consideration of incarnation, what is of concern 
for Irving is the manner in which the incarnate Son, as man, performs the 
'atner's Wijl, Therefore, in similar manner as the ontological use of 
Kenosis involves not only the Son but, by virtue of the opera trinitatis ad 
extra sunt indi visa the Father and the Spirit, so this second, 
soteriological use of filial self-limitation in incarnation, is never 
separated from its pneumatic counterpart of inspiration. It is in this 
sense that Irving delineater-, the pneumatic dimension of incarnation. On 
one hand, his strictly trinitarian ontology, as demonstrated in Part I, 
attributes an essential role to the Spirit. In his divine person, the Son 
at all times essentially related to the Father through the Spirit. 
Irl turn we consider nis status in incarnation, we should expect there 
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,o 
be a similarly pneumatic 
dimension with regards the person of Christ, 
Although this cannot 
be read off from the New Testament accounts of the 
Jesus 'Ar- for Irving it is the only means by which we may establish 
"ife of 
and maintain 
an adequate doctrine of salvation. Our appreciation of 
Christ's role as 
Saviour is essentially wrapped up in our comprehension of 
him as a divine person of 
the Trinity, The problem here, however, is how 
we identify 
this pneumatic character of incarnation. IS it to be 
identified in terms of 
the divine, or of the human, or of both? Irving's 
solution is to identify, 
by means of his thoroughgoing trinitarian ontology 
and his developmental and 
teleological interpretation of human being, a 
perceptual change within 
the existing theological paradigm which 
facilitates meaningful talk of the divine and human relations of the Son 
with the Spirit in performing the Father's will in incarnation, 
Irving's analysis of incarnation enables him to introduce an element of 
assurance to the C'Yospel proclamation of forgiveness and new life by means 
of his apologetic defence of the incarnation of the Son of God into the 
realm of human fallenness. His appreciation of the manner in which this 
occurs drives him to consider not only the pneumatological but also 
sanctificational dimension to the incarnation. In the act of 'self-emptying 
and man-fulfilling' there is opened the possibility of understanding the 
full humanity of the Saviour, as one whose divinity is limited in order 
that the humanity supported by the Spirit 'might endure the weight of the 
offended holiness and justice of God. ' The divinity is restrained in order 
that the humanity may be sacrificed for sin upon the 'passive golden altar' 
of divinity, 147 
What is Irving's purpose in stre'-, sing the notion of kenosis? It is this: 
that there is a two fold character to every act of Christ, wherein he 
, 1mits himself of his divine status in order that the human nature may 
perform the act through the power of the Spirit. "' If it is by means of 
%s doctrine of God as Trinity and his teleological interpretation of human 
being, ds outlined in Parts I and II, that Irving develops this act Of 
, "'Ivine condescension, then the task befalls us to show how and if he brings them together in a manner that facilitates a perceptual change of 
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i9m, and consequently 
an efficient christologY. 
Self -limitation: the Soul of Christ. 07 The plie_ce 
Now are we able to express 
Irving's innermost understanding of the 
principium quod and principlum 
quo of incarnation, It is, as it were, his 
response to the metaphysical 
question, that 'given the integrity of the 
human existence, how is it possible to speak of the presence of the 
divine? "-49 The solution as to how we may understand the union between 
the human and divine is one to which Irving sets high standards, for in 
the same way that it is necessary to tune two different musical 
instruments in order to attain a harmonious sound, so it is with the human 
anddivine, The question Irving sets himself to answer is thus- 'How shall 
human nature, in the fallen state, be brought to be in harmony with the 
acting of the holy Godhead? ' In that the human will has never acted in 
harmony with the divine will, this is of supreme consequence, for it 
involves the means of displaying how humanity may 'respond, truly and 
justly, in all things' to the divine. Irving's answer is unequivocal: they 
are brought together as one, 'in the person of Christ, where we have 
them. -brought together without any orginal sin'. "' What concerns us now, 
is the means by which Irving believes this to have occurred, for it is here 
that he expounds his doctrine of the Spirit in his relation to the 
incarnate Son, In so doing, we are furnished with that by which we shall 
assess the efficiency of Irving's christology. The question to be asked, 
therefore, is whether or not his answer is sufficient to establish it an 
ef,, icient one in relation to the human need of redemption as offered in 
and through the person of Jesus Christ. 
on the one hand, we may identify Irving's christology as that of an 
'; "5MBtional, Logos-flesh christology which safeguards the divine status 
the ýIgent of incarnation, then on the other hand, we may also identify 
christc)logy as that of an inspirational Logos-man type which attempts 
to s8feguard both the object and means of incarnation, namely, fallen 
being, It is to this inspirational element of his christology we now 
In so doing, we confront the means by which Irving attempts to 
-199- 
the Scylla Of transcendence wherein the agent of way through 
salvation 
is too other worldly to be of any earthly use, and the Charybdis 
,f immanence 
wherein the agent of salvation is too entrenched in the 
trammels of 
human existence to be anything but the example Of human 
shipwreck, and an 
unsuccessful one at that. This Irving does by means of 
vsing the human soul 
Of Christ as a theological tool, whereby he is able 
to combine an inspirational 
dimension to his thoroughgoing incarnational 
christ0109Y, 
Verbum 8SSUMPsit corpus mediante anima: the Word assumed the body by the 
intermediary of the soul. Irving stands in a historic line of 
interpretation in his stress on the soul of Christ as not only the IOCLIS 
wherein Christ is the viator of human being, but also the modUS wherein 
Christ becomes the comprehensor of human being, However, in 
characteristic manner, he diverges from it in his attempt to outline the 
dynamics of such an assumption, 
In First Principles, Origen argues that a medium is required in order for 
the Son to acquire human flesh, for 'it was not possible for the nature of 
God to mingle with a body apart from some medium'. Origen identifies this 
medium as the soul of Christ which acted as 'a medium between God and the 
flesh'. "' This use of the soul of Christ enabled incarnational talk, of 
Logos-soul- body, 'not to appear so incongruous'. ' 1-2 However, unlike Irving, 
Origen insists that although Christ had a human and rational soul, it had 
nO 'susceptibility to or possibility of sin', "'. In its preexistent state, 
the soul of Christ was perfectly united to the Logos, and thereby 
established free from sin, 
Whilst his interpretation of a preincarnate union between soul and Logos 
is highly unorthodox, Origen stands well in the mainstream of 
iriterpretation in his identification of the quality of the soul assumed by 
ýhý Son. For whilst Arius and Apollinarius fought over the very presence 
of 8 SOUI in the humanity of the incarnate Son, "' there was a sense of 
-'3'1m'tY in Patristic thought regarding both the presence and the nature 
thL Soul Of Christ, Augustine, in arguing that the greatness of divine 
fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body so as 
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whole man into something better, 15r- 
,0 change 
the suggests that the 
changes the humanity, 
.., ýjrjity 
of the Son 
Ambrose of Milan, however, 
represents 8 
more explicit rendering, arguing that since there is no 
when the Son became incarnate, it was perfect flesh 
.., erfection 
in Christ, 
he assumed, In order 
to do so he assumed a soul, 'a perfect, human, 
&nd rational soul. 
"r-r- And Aquinas, who, whilst asserting. that the soul is 
the anim8 media invenitur 
inter Deum et c-arnem, l ro 7 equally denies that 
, the grace of the Holy 
Spirit is the mediating form in this personal 
union'. I" 
For Irving, the soul is the medium of disclosure and the locus of 
intention, By means of this 'theological tool"r-9 we confront the most 
intense progression in Irving's theological interpretation of the dynamics 
of incarnation: a progression that holds together in his thinking both the 
divine agent and the soteriological intention of incarnation, It reveals 
both how the Son may become fully human and how human redemption is not 
only effected but also affected, 
He was not merely filled with the Holy Ghost, but the Holy Ghost 
was the author of His bodily iif e, the quickener of that 
substance which He took from fallen humanity-, or-the Holy Ghost 
uniting Himself forever to the human soul of Jesus, in virtue 
and in consequence of the Second Person of the Trinity having 
united Himself thereto, this threefold spiritual substance, the 
only-begotten Son, the human soul and the Holy Spirit - (or 
rather twofold, one of the parts being twofold in itself; for we 
may not mingle the divine nature with the human nature, nor may 
we mingle the personality of the Holy Ghost with the personality 
of the Son) - the Eternal Son, therefore, humbling Himself to the 
human soul, the human soul taken possession of by the Holy 
Ghost, this spiritual substance (of two natures only, though of three parts) did animate and give life to the flesh of our Lord Jesus; which was flesh in the fallen state; ... but the soul of Christ, thus anointed with the Holy Ghost, did ever resist and 
reject the suggestions of evil ... Christ's soul was so 
held in 
Possession by the Holy Ghost, and so supported by the Divine nature, as that it never assented unto an evil suggestion. "' 
jjnpO, t8, t factors are woven together here, the most important 
the Place Irving attributes the soul: it is the locus of incarnation. 
Son unites himself to a human 50ul which is assumed, in turn, by the 
This is, however, no mere inspiration, for whilst the Spirit 
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possesses and 
anoints the soul of 
the incarnate Son, it is the Son, who in 
the Spirit. In so interpreting, Irving avoids the humanitY wields 
charge of ousting 
the filial agent in incarnation. What is Possessed of 
the Son, is ernpowered 
by the Spirit. We confront, therefore, neither a 
merely incarnational 
nor a merely inspirational christology, Rather, it is 
a union of the 
two. The two criteria by which we have been assessing 
Irving's christology are combined: 
the divine and the human, In the former, 
we meet the trinitarian maxim-, 
the opera trinitatis ad extra sunt Indivi-ga, 
The eternal will Of the Father 
is communicated to the incarnate Son in and 
through the Spirit. Herein we confront the starkly pneumatoloEical 
dimension of Irving's christology, Alternatively, the humanity is one that 
requires the Spirit's aid in order both to become that which its Creator 
intends, and to overcome that which Irving identifies as 'sin in the flesh, 
both for sanctification and as proof that the one who yields it is worthy 
of the title of Saviour, Thus, we confront the sanctific-ational dimension 
to Irving's christology, But more importantly, both are combined in such a 
way as to facilitate a perceptual change of incarnation in such a way as 
to bring about a paradigm shift wherein the person and work of the Spirit 
are given an essential place in Irving's interpretation of incarnation, 
By means of both criteria, Irving overcomes the stumbling block that such 
sanctificational talk has presented to previous generations. For instance, 
John Cassian refutes such talk on the grounds that if 'the Holy Ghost gave 
assistance to the Lord Jesus Christ' then not only is the Saviour made out 
to be 'feeble and powerless' but that the Spirit granted things to Christ 
'which he was unable to procure for himself'. "-' Indeed, this is the very 
Point Irving wishes to secure: that both in his divine and human nature 
incarnate Son is unable, of himself, to procure salvation. Such a 
claim stands in harmony with any strictly trinitarian interpretation of the 
it is not the personal identity, or mode of being of the Son 
procure salvation for human kind in and of himself, He is the one sent by the Father and empowered by the Spirit, both in his divine and human 
existence, 
this point in our discussion it should be clear that whilst, Irving ý"ýes that the human nature of the incarnate Son is totally fallen and 
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without a thorough 
communication, inhabitation and empowering of a 
it cannot again be brought up pure and holy', he -stands substance, 
against the notion 
that 'the mere apprehension of it by the Son 
Such a belief would serve only to undermine the 
,h make 
it holy 
the Spirit in incarnation, result in the apotheosis of of the 
,., ýmanjty of 
Christ, and annul the trinitarian agency of salvation, For 
. rving, 
it is the Spirit who sanctifies and empowers the manhood of Christ, 
and in so doing, 
'is the manifestation ... of the Father and of the Son in His 
manhood', 16: 3 
our previous discussion on the agency of incarnation should make clear 
that Irving at all times holds to the the Son as the personal agent of 
incarnation, The dignity of the Christ-event rests solely upon this fact- 
that it is the divine person of the Son as the God-man who is the agent 
of incarnation. In his divine nature, the Father's glory is communicated 
and revealed by the Son through the Spirit. In his human nature, the 
Father's plan of salvation is effected by the Son in the power of the 
Spirit, In his glorified nature, the Father's will is executed through the 
Son by this same Spirit who is now given to the Church. Herein does 
Irving maintain an essential unity of progression in thought by means of 
his thoroughly trinitarian interpretation of the Godhead's relation to 
creation, What is significant here is the manner by which Irving 
understands the manner by which divine being relates to human being in 
., Sht of incarnation. Whilst in his divine being, the Son consents to do 
the Father's will through the Spirit, and in his incarnate being assumes 
being through the medium of the soul through the Spirit, the same 
`lr't is given to the Church through the man-soul of the glorified Christ. 
1ý13t we dir3cover with Irving is an exposition of the soul of Christ in its 
'51len form for soteriological reasons. If the Son as the personal agent in incarnation is incapable of being the sanctifyin0a or empo wering agent * hen a logical space' has been opened within which the personal agency of "'e SPirit may be more fully delineated, It is this 'logical space' that 
Irving, for herein he finds the means by which he may safeguard e trinitarian 
agency of incarnation, whilst at the same time establish 
,,, e eff1c, 5cy of the work of Christ as grounds for the assurance of 
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,, I, ation, 
In so doing, 'by assigning a significant action to the Spirit, 
not only does 
Irving not 'detract from traditional orthodoxy, lir-4 but 
expands that which 
lies at the heart of the Christian faith. 
We have little to say regarding 
Irving's strongly incarn3tional christology. 
by nOw it should be clear where 
Irving's primary stress lies, 
When the fulness of time was come, the Christ, or 'Second Adam, 
had at f irst a body prepared f rom Him from the woman's 
substance, and a reasonable soul given unto Him by the 
Creator-To which the Son of God, the eternal word, having joined 
Himself in consubstantial union, He became the Son of man and 
the Son of God, in "two distinct natures and on e person for 
ever, "165 
This is the platform from which he extrapolates the dynamics of salvation, 
But it is one where by virtue of his trinitarian interpretation of 
incarnation Irving understands both the inspirational to arise from the 
incarnational, and the incarnational to arise from the Inspirational, 
However, he achieves this by virtue of his incarnational emphasis: it is 
the divine Son who becomes incarnate. The basic identity of his credo 
would be undermined were this fundamental tenet of his christology to be 
ignored or belittled, As Hebblethwaite correctly notes, if we cease to 
think in incarnational terms, and opt for an inspirational christology, then 
we lose both the moral and personal force, as well as the religious force 
'If belief, The former reminds us that the Son became incarnate for our 
181v5ti0n, and that God took responsibility upon himself for our salvation: 
the latter that it is into the trinitarian life of God we are caught up, by 
Spirit and sacrament, 16-6 
1n wh8t way does Irving use the human soul as a theological tool tO 
"ýeguard God's trinitarian identity in redemption? To answer this 
; ýý@Stiorj we touch on the more general use made by Irving of the 'soul' Of 
It is the medium of trinitarian agency. However, on this general level, Irving both combines several different approaches in order to serve 
. "'e context addressed, and delineates a certain progression in thought, 
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from a general somatic use of 
language through to an explicit use 
the oul as a 
theological tool. The following quote highlights the 
C) 
, orr, er 
in such a way as to 
throw light on Irving's basic pneumatol gical 
laxim, ' that every 
act Of the Spirit is not his own, but the act and 
, common pleasure' of 
the Father and Son. 167 SO he argues- 
The three persons of the blessed 
Trinity are all concerned-in the 
work; but, as it is 
the office of the Holy Ghost., to carry into 
effect what the Father willeth, and 
the Son informs with word, he 
brings the Son out of the region of Godhead, into the limited 
region of a child in the womb of 
the Virgin. The Son, though 
willing to add to his estate of 
Godhead the estate of manhood, 
cannot do this or any other thing but by the Holy Ghost; and the 
Father, willing to send his Son into this lowly estate, must do 
it by the Holy Ghost, otherwise the Holy Ghost's acting in the 
blessed Trinity were avoided-At the point where a work of the 
Godhead comes into manifestation, and.. outwardness, the Holy Ghost 
is the actor; while it is in the purpose, it is with the Father; 
while it is in the word, it is in the Son; when it becomes act, it 
is with the Holy Ghost-Yet there are not three distinct separate 
stages of a divine work, but forms of expressing it, as it is the 
operation of three persons. 11-e 
however, this somatic language begins to take on further detail when 
Irving attempts to consider the means by which the incarnate Son makes 
known the Trinity. 
Was it-that the incomprehensible Godhead of the Father was 
dwelling in the body of Jesus Christ, who said, He that hath seen 
me, hath seen the Father? No: the Holy Ghost dwelt in the body 
of Jesus Christ; and insomuch as the Holy Ghost proceedeth f rom 
the Father-is one substance with the Father, and speaketh and 
acteth only as He heareth the Father speak and seeth Him act, insomuch doth the Father dwell in the man Christ Jesus, "' 
IT, our attempt to understand Irving's use of the souP, we are unable to 
progress any further, for hitherto we are dealing with its purely 
"'1091cal development. What concerns u-,: -, most 
is the details Of the 
ý*? ' Of incarnation, In order to do so, we must now turn to consider the 
ex' within which Irving's use of the soul of Christ is made most 
"Cally. In so doing, we confront the sanctification, 91 dimension of "`ýrg's Christology. 
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could he design dark foundations rest, 
ificent effect of power, this magn 
earth we tread, 
the sky that we behold 
jy day, and all the pomp 
which night reveals; 
t ese - and that superior mystery h 
vital frame, so 
fearfully devised, 
And the dread soul within 
it - should exist 
only to be examined, pondered, searched, 
Proved, vexed, and criticised'? 
170 
oordsworth's sentiments 
echo well the entire thrust of Irving's 
christologY. Our survey of 
Irving's doctrine of human being in Part II has 
revealed that the general 1C6XOq Of creation 
finds fulfillment in the 
specific TjXoq of human being. By means of 
his christocentric method, 
Irving argues in turn that the cd, \oq of human being is specifically 
actualised in and through the person and work of the incarnate Image of 
God himself, the Son. It is a human becomin87 in relation to its goal: a 
goal actualised through the divine agency of the Son. But it is also a 
human becoming in relation from that which it is fallen and in bondage to 
sin. Far from there being a second creation ex nihilo in order. that human 
being may become that which the Creator intends, one in which the Son 
8ssumes a new and untainted humanity, Irving argues that human being 
becomes from out of that which it already is. It is in the recapitulation 
'I that which already exists that human being becomes that which its 
Creator intends, As such, and in response to the question set by 
A: rdsworth, there is indeed a hope for creation. But unlike Wordsworth, 
who represents Spirit as the Romantic, pantheistic force which undergirds 
creation, Irving presents us with an understanding of Spirit that 
transcends such an analysis, for it is the Spirit of the one who fulfills 
the Law of God, and in so doing brings a new humanum from out of that 
which is dead to sin and makes it alive to God by the very same Spirit. 
I 
Z- - 
415sumPslt corpus medlante anima, Herein we confront not only the 
dimension to Irving's christology, but also that which 
"'Pins his defence of the true humanity of Christ. it is the means by Irving redresses the strongly incarnational thrust of his 
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S'0109y' 
By means of the sanctificational thrust Of his christoloy, 
expands his understanding 
of human nature, 
identifies three consequences 
if Christ had no human soul: firstly, 
feeling and affections are a mere fiction. human Secondly, his 
gs are a 'phantasmagoria', 
and therefore Christ is unable to lift 
fallen creature to the throne of 
Grace. Lastly, at his death on the 
, ross and in the 
tomb, the divine nature is separated from the human, and 
,.; I this be so, 
then there is no assurance that two natures cannot separate 
again and therefore no stability 
for the creature: the risen God-manhood 
be cast off like an unwanted and redundant garment, Consequently, 
-ý,; ing argues that Christ received 
his soul in exactly the same manner as 
. nildren, 
Thus Irving safeguards his stress upon the soul of Christ from 
-he accusation of a pre-incarnate assumption of the soul, resulting in an 
linspirituall God before an incarnate God. In turn, the 'soul' of Christ wa,.:; 
assumed and sanctified by the Spirit and from the moment of conception, 
'so that He was in very deed a holy thing from the beginning of His 
creature being. ' 171 
o4 does Irving stress to such an extent the place of the soul in 
incarnation? The answer to this question lies at his very deepest concern- 
" is that which substantiates the very efficiency of his christology, for 
his understanding of both the soul's condition and need determines his 
-ý---, erstanding of incarnation, With the diagnosis of the soul, Irving is 
to introduce the soteriological and specif ically sanctificational 
'! tension to his christology which facilitates a perceptual shift in the 
by which he understands incarnation. However, in order to 
-'.: erstand best Irving's use of the soul, we return to the one who 
'Jenced him more than any other contemporary, Samuel Taylor 
-' ler idge, 172 
Th" Cole id 
'ýQuence of Coleridge upon Irving was a strong but distilled one, for took nothing from Coleridge unless it would serve his own ends. therefore was Coleridge's influence upon Irving? It was the strong 
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upon Will in his understanding of the Divine. placed he 
stress on the priority of Will leads to two trinitarian 
tions, Firstly, 
it is that 'which supports Being: 11 73 it is 
e of all reality 
and theref o, re in origine causative of its own 
sativ 
It 17A Secondly, it is personal 
Will, for, 'if ... personeitY, by which Y. 
mean the source of personality, 
be necessarily contained in the idea 
ne perfect Will, how 
is it possible that personality should not be an 
essential attribute 
of this Will, contemplated as self, realized 
ýOU, Oq)? 
I 176 
As we have noted in Part I, whilst 
Coleridge identifies the Father as 
ý: solute will, it is the Logos, the Alterity who solves the clash between 
Absolute and individual, creaturely will, for as one who is of both he is 
'ýý, e everlasting middle term uniting the One God with created 
1176 
-ntance, 
Irving's understanding of the Son in terms of Will, which 
ý, as been delineated in Part I of our study, parallels that of Coleridge, 
ýýwever, it is not this that concerns us. What is of importance here is 
,.,,, e grounds Coleridge establishes to conceive of human personhood in terms 
:1 will, It is here we find grounds for arguing that Irving has been 
'--, fluenced by Coleridge, whilst moving sharply away from Coleridge's 
conclusions in order to establish a framework within which he may 
delineate the work of the Spirit in incarnation, In Coleridge's assertion 
*1. ', at 'the essence of (human being) be will, and this will under a 
P!, -ýicular form"77 we meet a means of solving the impasse presented to 
us in Irving's denial of a human person to Christ, for it is when Irving 
': -, Siders the humanum of Christ in relation to his human will that we 
a complementary picture of human nature which redresses the 
'81 lance derived from stress upon the divinity of Christ. 
Opus x"Imum Coleridge identifies the goal of human being in terms Of , iL- 
through 'freed(: )m' 
111' that 'has to struggle upward into Free-Will' 
170 Herein 
cOmes about when the will is 'One with the Will of God. ' Confront his reaction both against mechanismo'79 and passivitY-"Bo he then adds, in parentheses, an astute and enlightening comment: "Iedom is 'found in centre of moral being which is received in z, - ý. 
r'. ;, 
against bonds that prevent it', "B' Howevert in reality it does 
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not live so, but rather lives in bondage to a 'nature under the mechanism 
of cause and effect', 1132 What is of interest here is the fact that whilst 
for Coleridge, the true dignity of human being is found in the struggle of 
the will to become self -determined, to live under the law of perfect 
freedom, it is Irving's concern to extend this to show that human will 
achieves this by means of the Spirit, 
Coleridge presents human bondage as coming about by means of a power that 
determines the will: sin is lack of self-determination and, as such, lack of 
imaging the one who, as Absolute Will, is himself self -determining, 
Coleridge identifies sin, therefore like Irving, in terms of will, for the 
will is that which is the spiritual in human being. Sin is the act of a 
spirit against Spirit, a will against Will. Sin lies at the very essence of 
human bondage: it is bondage of the will. When, in turn, we combine 
Coleridge's notion of person-as-will to the notion of telos-in-freedom, we 
gain insight into his understanding of the significance of Christ, for 
Christ is the one whose will is in perfect relation to the Law of God, and 
therefore rendered sinless. 
The question to be asked here is whether Coleridge identifies 'will' with 
'person'. If he does, then he stands opposed not only to Irving, but with 
the orthodoxy to which he clung in response to his unitarian past, for to 
equate will with person within a duothelite christology is to attribute 
two 'persons' to the Saviour. If Coleridge, however, does not do this, then 
perhaps he offers a helpful clue to Irving's use of the soul of Christ. 
On the one hand, Coleridge appears to be quite straightforward about his 
answer: the will is 'that will which is the true and only strict synonyme 
Of the word, 1, or the intelligent Self'. "-' Yet, on the other 
hand, he is 
less explicit elsewhere, preferring to refer to the will 
in man as 'the 
condition of his personality; the grounds and condition of 
the attribute 
which constitutes him man. "" This second use appears 
to be nearer to 
what Coleridge means by 'will. ' Accordingly it is our contention, 
firstly, 
that Coleridge understands the relation of the will 
to the human 'person, 
not in the former sense, as agent, but in the latter, as medium. 
The will 
is the medium by which we are human. It is 
that which is wielded by the 
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agent, not the agent itself, It is, therefore, an ontological interpretation 
of personhood. Subsequently, Coleridge understands the relation between 
person and will in a similar manner to that of Irving, when the latter 
asserts that 'the personality standeth in the willo, las For both, the 
personality resides in the will, 
Secondly, however, we meet a point of considerable hamartiological 
significance. Both agree that original sin does not stand in the nature-, 
Irving attributes it to the person, Coleridge to the 'self originated 
corrupt nature of the will', to an origin in the will whereby all sin is 
original sin. I Both agree that original sin is the -sine qua non of 
actual sin. Where they differ is their interpretative perspective-, for 
Coleridge, it is the originating location; for Irving, it is the originating 
a8-en t. 
The reason for this difference stems from the opposing presuppositions 
each holds regarding the God's relation to the unholy, for when we turn to 
consider the qualitative nature of the will assumed in incarnation, we 
confront a difference of interpretation. Irving understands the will to be 
one that is in bondage and in solidarity with fallen humanity for the 
Saviour assumes a soul that is TpEnTOq. For Coleridge this is an 
impossible interpretation of the humanity of Christ who assumes a soul 
that is aTpenToq. Coleridge, like the later Jung, would not allow that God 
can dwell in a sick soul. Where Coleridge and Irving diverge in thought, 
therefore, is in their different interpretations of the humanum of Christ. 
Coleridge opposes Irving's notion that human being is fallen in nature. 
We 
realise how significant the difference is between them in this when we 
consider Coleridge's reaction to Irving's stress on the fallen 
humanum of 
Christ, In the personal copy of Sermon-,,;, Lectures and occasional 
LeCtUres, 
gifted to Coleridge by Irving, 1187 we find an enlightening comment made 
by 
Coleridge, when he writes that it is a "'startling assertion" 
to say "that 
only by the constant Action of Omnipotence exerted 
by the H-Ghost was 
Christ himself able to fulfill the Law in the Flesh! 
"" '11"0 In this Irving 
reflects more a Puritan influence than a Coleridgean, 
for it is in his 
insistence that the Spirit is the one who operates directly on 
the 
humanity of Christ that Irving concords with an ordo salutans 
more in 
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harmony with that outlined by the Puritan John Owen, than by the more 
modern Coleridge, 1 *11 
What then can we identify as Coleridge's influence upon Irving? It must 
be, surely, that from Coleridge Irving derived a clear and intelligent 
ontology of will that enabled him firstly, to delineate the dynamics of 
salvation in terms of will, and secondly, to locate the pneumatic dimension 
to incarnation and redemption within the dynamics of will. From Coleridge, 
therefore, is Irving furnished with an understanding of spirit that enables 
him to develop a thoroughgoing trinitarian ontology, for he is given the 
means by which he may intelligently expound the person, place and meaning 
of the Spirit in incarnation, The essential identity of the Spirit within 
the divine relations, if we may summarise Coleridge, is that Spirit 
empowers Alterity in its relation to Will and creation. For Irving, the 
Spirit is the one who communicates and effects the Father's will to the 
Son. The economic identity of the Spirit within incarnation is one wherein 
the Spirit establishes the humanity of the incarnate Son, upholds his 
human will against that which is the common oppressor of humankind, and 
through the risen and glorified God-man establishes a new dimension to 
human being. It is therefore to this, the most central and important 
notion of Irving's christology that we now turn. 
4.4, The Wills: Divine and Human. 
The intimate union Irving establishes between redemption and incarnation 
in terms of will enables him to bring content to the logical space' which 
is opened up in the relation between the Son and the Spirit in incarnation. 
Again, as one unsatisfied by mere affirmation, he seeks understanding 
to 
that which he holds in faith. Subsequently, he explores a possible manner 
by which we may bring together the insistence of two wills 
in the one 
agent of incarnation: the divine and the human. As we turn 
to consider 
Irving's exposition regarding the relation between the two, 
little will be 
said about the divine will, This has been discussed in 
detail in Part I. 
It ls with the human will of Christ that we concern ourselves, 
and for 
three reasons. Firstly, Irving's theology of will emerges 
from within an 
Incarnational context where the major concern is to show 
how the work of 
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salvation can be meaningfully trusted, 
human will of Christ that we gain 
understanding of the humanity Of 
interpretation of incarnation, the rela 
wills is the fulcrum upon which the 
rests. It is with the former, however, 
stage of our discussion. 
Secondly, it is by means of the 
a clearer insight into Irving's 
the Saviour. Th ird ly, in his 
tion between the human and divine 
trinitarian agency of incarnation 
that we concern ourselves at this 
Irving understood well the implication of over-stressing the divine nature 
of the Son in incarnation: it precludes the work of the Spirit - the human 
is subordinated to the divine. It is perhaps here that we gain a sense of 
perspective regarding the historical position Irving holds, for whilst the 
modern christological debate has tended to subordinate the divine to the 
human, we find the opposite concern with Irving: his is the concern to 
safeguard the divine in its relation to the human in incarnation. 
Nevertheless, he does not fall into the abyss of 'monothematicism' wherein 
the human is lost to the divine. Nor does he fall into the abyss of 
severe 'kenoticism' wherein the divine is lost to the human. Rather, by 
means of his understanding of the centrality of the human will in its 
relation to that of the divine, Irving attempts to establish a means of 
avoiding either danger. 
How does Irving go about this? It is our contention that as we turn to 
consider the place Irving attributes the human will in incarnation that we 
gain access to his understanding of the humanum in incarnation, for it is 
here that we confront his seminal thoughts on the place of faith in the 
life of the incarnate Son. 
He, the person of the Son of God, acting faith upon his Father 
through those temptations and limitations of sinful flesh, and 
receiving from the Father, the Holy Ghost, in answer to his 
prayer, did inform his human nature with such strength, light, 
life, and sanctity, as to overcome with its weakness and penury 
the utmost might of the devil. 190 
This element of faith on the part of Christ is identified as 'seminal' on 
Irving's part for two reasons. Firstly, although it does not appear 
explicitly at all points of his thinking it holds an important place 
in hia-ý 
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argument. Secondly, it is possible that in this area of his thought he was 
influenced by the thinking of his compatriot, Thomas Erskine of 
Linlathen. "91 Nevertheless, whilst this may be a latent development in his 
thought, it is far from one that is undeveloped, for it must be stressed 
that it undergirds his entire understanding of the humanity of Christ. 
Herein we are able to move towards our goal of bringing together the 
several strands of thought in Irving's christology, If the Son in and of 
himself is unable to sanctify the fallen human nature into which he is 
incarnated, it is both due to the fact that in his divine nature he 
requires no sanctification and that it is not his personal function to 
sanctify. Rather, it is the human nature that is in need of sanctification, 
and hence empowering by the Spirit. The locus of sanctification is clearly 
established within human parameters. Underlying Irving's christology is 
his belief that whilst the Father's will is accomplished by the Son through 
the Spirit, the dynamic by which this occurs is not bare divine power, but 
through the faith of the God-man, In his human existence that the Son 
exercises faith in the Father, and in so doing, receives the Spirit of 
holiness for sanctification, Thus, underlying Irving's entire christology 
is a stress on the faith of Christ as a human belnE upon the Father in 
order to accomplish the Father's will. 
Though the f lesh, the devil, and the world, seek to bring the 
soul into captivity of sin, he through the soul, apprehending by 
faith the help of the holy Spirit, did resist the devil and the 
world, and the mortal corruptible flesh, and devote all the 
members of his body to the service of the living God. "' 
What is significant about this passage for our thesis is the way in which 
it enables us to see why Irving combines this stress on the soul of 
Christ 
with an equally emphatic stress on the place of the will in incarnation, 
for he immediately goes on to argue that: 
the great combat is for the body, because the body 
is that which 
brings the soul to light. Man is made on very purpose 
to bring 
the invisible God to light, to be his image and his likeness, 
through which he may be seen and known in his working over 
the 
creation, Now God, being a Spirit, carrieth on 
his communication 
only through the Spirit or word, and not otherwise. 
There his 
operation as God beginneth and endeth. He 
leaves the will of 
man to do the rest, For he would have the will of man 
to be 
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recognised as the lord of all visible things, By and through the 
will of man, he would use the body of man to express-what is the 
image and purpose of the divine mind, with respect to things 
created and made. 193 
Herein Irving identifies the human will as both the locus and modus 
oper, ans of redemption. It is the locus in that it is from the will that 
human action, purpose, desire for' knowledge and exertion of power are 
originated. But it is a will which in its natural state is in 'a condition 
of bondage, not willingly obedient, ' one from which it is unable 'to 
extricate itself into the obedience of God and the desire of everlasting 
good'. "31" It is locus in that in its fallen state it is 'loaded with a 
thousand oppressions, and not capable of being extricated but by the 
omnipotent will of the Father'. "- However, it is also the modus by which 
redemption is procured, for as Irving argues above, the will, as that which 
reflects the divine image, must be liberated from the power of sin in the 
f lesh. 1 91- Therefore is it this humanity which Christ 'found all sullied 
and vile, and by His use of the Holy Ghost, did restore to its original 
excellence'. 1 S17 
How does this preliminary discussion of Irving's use of the human will of 
the incarnate Son Christ help to counteract the earlier Apollinarian 
criticism'? That Irving denies there to be any human person is beyond 
question, It has been the contention of this thesis that Irving's 
intention in so arguing has been to safeguard both the status and 
sinlessness of divine agent in incarnation. Such an intention comes to 
the 
fore in Irving's christology whenever he stresses the divine status of 
Christ. It is a consequence of a thoroughly incarnational christology. 
However, such a perspective is only part of Irving's christology, 
for 
alongside this stress on the divine, there is an equally strong 
insistence 
on the humanity of the Saviour, a humanity so completely 
in solidarity 
with that in need of redemption that Irving identifies it as 
'fallen human 
nature', and in so doing placed himself under the scrutiny 
of less 
enlightened contemporaries, Yet it could be argued still 
that Irving 
remains firmly within an Alexandrian- type christology. 
However, as we turn 
to consider his understanding of the human will of 
the Son, firstly in 
light of the influence Coleridge had upon Irving, and 
then in light of his 
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own appreciation of what the incarnate Son must do as human being in 
order to become the Saviour, we confront a humanity that lacks no human 
detail, In his thoroughly sanctificational christology, Irving presents a 
Christ that is fully human. Before considering the manner by which he 
unites both perspectives, we shall permit Irving to have the last word on 
his own understanding about the relation between the divine and human 
wills of Christ. 
The orthodox doctrine is, that there were two wills in 
Christ; the one the absolute will of the Godhead, which 
went on working in its infinite circles, the other a man's 
will, which was bounded by the limited knowledge.. desires.. 
af f ections., actions of manhood; a Divine nature, and a 
human nature, God and man, The doctrine holdeth-that from 
the incarnation onwards, and for ever, the Son of God 
never thought, felt, or acted, but by condescending out of 
the infinitude of the Divine will, into the finiteness of 
the human will; in which condescension, the self-sacrifice- 
humiliation., grace, and goodness of the Godhead are 
revealed: without which condescension these attributes of 
the Godhead could never have been known unto the 
creatures, This condescension it is which giveth an 
infinite value to every act of Christ, - in the Father's 
sight, inasmuch as it makes Him known, and obtains His 
great purpose of self -manifestation: - in the creature's 
sight, inasmuch as it shews unto the creature the great 
freewill condescension of the Son, by which the Son is 
made known, and the Holy Spirit communicated. "' 
4.5. The Son of Man: the Mediator. 
It is when Irving turns to consider the specific identity of the agent of 
incarnation that he furnishes us with a fuller understanding of the 
humanum of incarnation than we have hitherto noted. The one who saves 
is 
he who is fully God and fully human. In the specific identity as 
the God- 
man do we meet the divine Son who has become man for us and our 
salvation: one whom Irving identifies in the following manner: 
It is necessary to observe, that Christ, although not (a 
human 
person, ever acteth as a human person, under the condition of a 
human person, within that defined sphere of creature 
being; and 
this is the meaning of His name, the Son of Man. 
But while thus 
acting within bounds, He ceaseth not to be the 
Son of God. "' 
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What interests us now as we turn to consider his complementary 
understanding of agency in incarnation, namely, that which establishes the 
humanum of incarnation, is the question whether Irving manages to maintain 
the full humanity of Christ, It is our contention that not only does 
Irving do so, but that he accomplishes this by extending his christology to 
incorporate the person and work of the Spirit, 
Thus we are introduced to Irving's understanding of Christ as the Son of 
Man, an identity Irving is careful always to subordinate to that of Son of 
God, for the actings of the Son of God end where those of the Son of Man 
begin, and it is the Son of Man who suffers and acts as one filled with 
the Spirit. 200 This important qualif icat ion hints at Irving's 
christological concern. The Son, as agent of incarnation, acts within the 
limitations of human personhood. Herein we are closest to an explicit 
delineation regarding the human identity of Christ. Yet it is an approach 
grounded firmly within an ontological setting. There is a sense of 
integrity in this method-, Irving's concern is to establish assurance of 
salvation. This he attempts from a purely theological perspective: 
salvation, whilst effected within the realm of the human, comes about by 
the agency of the trinitarian God alone. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that Irving does not approach the question of identity regarding the one 
who saves from the human perspective, It is not a man who saves. It is 
the Son of man. Yet, it is as the person of Son of God that the 
'personality of the Son of Man' is sustained. 21' It is the incarnate Son 
of God, Herein we are able to declare fully Irving's understanding of the 
agent of incarnation. 
The person, the I who speaketh, acteth, suffereth in Christ, 
is 
not the Divine nature, nor it it the human nature, alone; 
but it 
is the Divine nature having passed into the human nature, and 
therein effecting its will and purpose of acting or of 
su ff ering. 202 
But by what means does this come about? It is as 
the God-Man, the 
Mediator, Irving makes central that which Kierkegaard puts so succinctly, 
that 'man needs a mediator in order to come to God, 
'203 Nowhere do we 
confront the soteriological dilemma of the Christian proclamation 
of 'Good 
News' more clearly than at this point. For at the 
heart of the Christian 
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Gospel lies a dual affirmation, From the purely divine perspective, there 
is the gulf brought about be human sin-, the holiness of Divine Being 
precludes turning a blind-eye to sin, Consequently, the reality and 
offence of human sin before God, whose own being is the criterion for 
holiness, has to be confronted and overcome before reconciliation between 
human and divine being can occur, For Irving, the divine response in 
incarnation reveals both the trinitarian being of God and the love of the 
Father as he meets this response of his own character through his Son. 
Herein is the purely incarnational dimension to Irving's christology, yet 
one which involves an essentially pneumatic dimension in light of the f act 
that, for Irving, the Son can do nothing of the Father's will without the 
Spirit. 
If this is that which we may identify as the purely divine perspective of 
the kerygma, what is the human? This Irving identifies in terms of the 
human plight of bondage to sin. An adequate doctrine of salvation must 
not only make reparation over the divine response to sin and the sinner. 
It must also be seen to have dealt with this 'power sphere', Herein lies 
the reason for Irving's insistence on coupling the soul of Christ within 
the context of a fallen humanity. The humility, love and grace of God is 
revealed in the Son's willingness not only to become one with that which 
requires release, but to effect redemption on hLIMan terms. Herein is the 
purely sanctificational dimension to Irving's christology. 
How do the divine and the human; the holy and the unholy; the infinite and 
the finite; the Creator and created meet? For Irving, the answer lies 
in 
our understanding of Christ as Mediator and Surety. It is in the person 
of the one Mediator that Godhead and creature meet; it is as 
Surety that 
the relation between the two is identified, for Jesus Christ is 
'the surety 
of a better testament (Heb. 7: 22). As Surety, Christ is 
the Godward 
assurance that God will 'fulfill his testament' and the manward assurance 
that the debt has been paid, becoming our bondsman or bailsman, 
'20" The 
Godward and humanward aspects of salvation are united in 
the Mediator who 
comes in the 'very condition' of the offended persons' and 
in the 'very 
condition' of the 'offending persons'. "' 
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The Son carries out the functions Of Mediatorship and Suretyship not in 
his divine nature, but in his human nature, as Son Of Man. Why? 'Because 
his divine nature is unchangeable and all insufficient. 1206 As Brunner 
points out, it is as Mediator that the Son makes himself 'one with 
humanity in its sin and sorrow. ' In so doing, the incarnation is seen to 
be no 'mere gesture; it is reality, stark and painful. Jesus drinks the cup 
of human existence in all its alienation from God, to the very dregs. 1207 
What is so significant about Irving's christology is the fact the manner by 
which he argues that the Son does so only in and through the power and 
strength of the Spirit. 
Irving's christological intention is to get behind the status of Mediator 
to the very dynamics of Mediatorship. As Brunner points out, Christ's 
'being' as Mediator cannot be divorced from his 'work' as Mediator, 'for 
this Person is not static but dynamic. '20119 This comment serves as the 
fulcrum by which we may fully understand Irving's intention in uniting his 
doctrine of God as Trinity so intimately with his d octrine of Christ. 
We have noted already Irving's concern to establish the solidarity of the 
Saviour with that in need of forgiveness and restoration, This he f inds in 
the humanum assumed in incarnation, As a consequence we have noted also 
that Trving's is hardly a soteriology by imputation. Rather is it one of 
identification. Yet it is an identification by means of mediation. 
Through the act of incarnation is mediation made possible. This is the 
theological paradigm within which Irving operates. It is a thoroughgoing 
Incarnational paradigm. Whatever we may wish to say about the place 
Irving attributes the person and work of the Spirit, his christology 
is 
essentially incarnational. What constitutes a change within this paradigm, 
however, is the perceptual shift brought about by his appreciation of 
the 
Spirit in his relation to incarnation. Although mediation between 
God and 
human being is accomplished in the event of incarnation, a mediation 
whereby the Mediator brings humanity and in particular, human will, out of 
the aeonic power sphere in which it finds itself in bondage and 
brings it 
holy and obedient, as Second Adam, to the Father, it is 
by means of his 
perception of the Spirit's relations both essential and economic, 
that 
Irving's christology is worthy of our consideration. 
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How then does Brunner's comment above aid our argument? On the one hand 
Irving safeguards the premis that it is only God who saves, by his stress 
on the Son's divine identity in incarnation, Alternatively, Irving 
safeguards the equally important maxim, that only that which is assumed is 
healed, by means of the Son's humanum in incarnation. Both christological 
criteria are united in the Spirit's relation to the Son not simply by 
virtue of the essentially trinitarian relations by which Irving attempts to 
make sense of the biblical and formulary data, but more importantly, in the 
manner by which he perceives that his christology will be efficient only to 
the degree that it is able to offer a meaningful and assuring 'redemptive 
package'. For Irving, this entails the assurance of what he identifies as 
'holiness in the flesh'-. an assurance that what God requires of the 
believer is possible by virtue of the fact that it has been achieved by 
Christ under the same conditions as those in which each Christian exists, 
Through refusing to divorce his christology from his soteriology, of 
refusing to separate the person of Christ from the person requiring 
salvation, Irving expands the christological tradition he has inherited to 
incorporate a means of delineating the pneumatic dimension inherent to any 
trinitarian christology, In turn, his understanding of the dynamics of sin 
enable him to insist upon a priority of wills in incarnation: of the Divine 
will expressed in the Son's obedience to the Father through the Spirit and 
of the human will expressed in the mediation of the incarnate 
Son as Son 
of Man through the power of the Spirit to uphold the human will within 
the limitations of human personhood, and present it holy before 
the Father, 
By means of his essentially pneumatic perception of 
Filial incarnation, 
Irving avoids appropriating the 'being' of the Mediator 
to the Son as God, 
and the 'work' of the Mediator to the Son human 
being. Such an 
interpretation of Irving's christology would be to miss 
the entire thrust 
of his trinitarian understanding of incarnation, It 
is, rather, that the 
latter, the work, depends on the former, the being, 
in and through the 
empowering of the Spirit, both in terms of the nature of 
his being and his 
work, 
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What is meant by this? Simply, that Part I shows Irving's doctrine of God 
to be a thoroughly trinitarian interpretation of divine being in which the 
Son performs the Father's will always in and through his relation to the 
Spirit . In addition, Part II shows Irving's doctrine of human being to 
consist of a pneumatic dimension: human being becomes that which the 
Creator desires only in and through its dependence upon and relation to 
the Spirit, Part III highlights the manner by which Irving understands the 
intention of salvation to be attained: through the medium of fallen and 
rebellious humanity. Irving unites these separate issues through his 
understanding of the Mediator, the Son of Man. As Mediator, the Son 
continues to act in dependence upon the Spirit in order to bring about the 
Father's plan of salvation, for, 'in the days of his flesh, Jesus offered up 
prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able 
to save him from death, and he was heard for his godly fear, Although he 
was a Son, he learned obedience through what he suffered; and being made 
perfect he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him, 
being designated by God a high priest after the order of Melchizedek, 
(Hebrews 5: 7-10). 
As Mediator, the Son brings together in harmony and without default, both 
subjects in the event of mediation: a holy God and a rebellious creature. 
This is the Filial nobile officium of incarnation, However, as Mediator, 
the Son depends upon the Spirit in order to uphold the rebel and fallen 
human will, This is the great comfort and assurance of salvation that 
Irving seeks to establish, for since we have a great high priest who 
has 
passed through the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, we hold fast our 
confession. We have not a high priest who is unable to sympathise with 
our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, 
yet without sin. Therefore we draw near to the throne of grace with 
confidence, that we may receive mercy and find grace to 
help in time of 
need, (Hebrews 4: 14-16). 
As a result, Christ can become Mediator for that which requires 
mediation. 
fallen human being, in a 8-eneral sense that he assumes 
the general state 
Of human being. He is one in solidarity with 
that which requires 
redemption, In his resurrection he is shown to be 
the Proto-type of a new 
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humanity, and the Guarantor of its final Outcome, for in redemption we 
receive the Spirit of the one who himself has overcome sin in the flesh 
and death. Alternatively, Christ is Mediator in the SPecific sense in that 
he assumes a specific human will which, within the limitations of fallen 
human nature, is seen to overcome the rebel nature and present itself 
unblemished to a holy God. 
In this manner Irving safeguards the humanity of incarnation. When he 
deals with that which is in need of salvation, as opposed to the one who 
accomplishes it, he stresses the full humanity of Christ, doing so within 
an ontological interpetation of personhood. It is our contention that this 
priority is meaningful only within an ontological understanding of 
personhood, wherein the notion of person is not reduced to psychological 
categories. In Irving's christology, the agent of incarnation is the Son as 
he limits himself to the form of Mediator, as the Son of Man- generally in 
terms of fallen human nature; specifically in terms of his human will 
which overcomes the general state of incarnation, fallen humanity, through 
the enabling agency of the Spirit. It is a human limitation expressed in 
terms of will in that the act of salvation has to do with the very essence 
of human being, of a will in bondage both to the law of fallen nature and 
to the spirit of the age. 
Herein we confront the two intimately combined double thrusts Irving uses 
to describe the Saviour's humanity. he attributes the g-eneral state of 
human nature in its fallen state, the 'power sphere' in which all humanity 
finds itself enslaved, to the Saviour qua Son of God; he attributes 
the 
specific state of human being, as a will in bondage to this aeonic power, 
to the Saviour qua Son of Man, as Mediator. In light of this 
first double 
thrust we may identify Irving's pneumatological concern in relation 
to his 
understanding of Christ as Mediator in two ways: the purely pneumatic 
and 
the sanctificational. The first Irving appropriates to the 
Son qua God b, ý7 
virtue of the essentially trinitarian nature of his 
doctrine of God: the 
Son in his essential relation to the Father exists as one 
in relation 
through the Spirit. It is God who mediates between himself and 
human 
being: the trinitarian God in his becoming incarnate, 
Herein Irving 
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safeguards the divine agency of mediation: God in his being as Son comes 
to us in incarnation in order to reconcile us to himself, 
The second belongs to the Son qua man, as one who in his economic relation 
with fallen humanity, relies on the Spirit to perform the Father's will and 
overcome 'sin in the flesh, ' so proving himself to be Saviour and Lord not 
in the display of brute divine power, but in humility, Herein, Irving 
safeguards the human dimension of that which is in need of mediation: the 
Son becomes that which is alienated from God and in need of a mediator in 
order that it may become that which its creator intends, 
How then does Irving's understanding of the dynamics of incarnation 
facilitate a change in the paradigm by which God's action in Christ ha--- 
been interpreted? It is in his understanding of the Son in his relation as 
Mediator to the Spirit in incarnation, a relation both qua God and qua 
human being. By means of this dynamic pneumatic dimension to his 
christology Irving redresses the imbalance he has introduced in his 
christology by his Alexandrian stress on the divine agent of the Son in 
incarnation, What is so significant about this in light of the history of 
christological interpretation is the fact that Irving uses an Antioche ne- 
type christology, with its stress on the human identity of the Saviour and 
his reliance upon the Spirit, to do this, In so doing, he brings content to 
the forced 'logical space' brought about by the particular way in which the 
history of christological interpretation has developed. 
He took unto Himself a true body and a reasonable soul. He did 
not take these that they might lie beside Him unoccupied, or that 
they might be used now and then as it pleased Him... He is one 
person, the person of the Son of God, and every act of 
that 
person must include both natures, but never in either nature 
be 
perfected. If He did act in the Divine nature anything without 
the human nature, then there is a person standing in the 
Divine 
nature alone; for that which is distinctive of a person 
is 5 
complete action, feeling, or word. If, again, He did any act 
in 
the human nature alone, where is the divine? ... God gave 
this 
revelation to Jesus Christ, who in becoming man truly came 
into 
limitation of the knowledge, feelings, and complete nature of 
man; 
self -contracted, self-humbled, self-emptied of 
His glory, that He 
might show His love to human nature in its lowest 
forms, and 
redeem it our of its most miserable conditions ... 
That human 
reason which He took, He did inform with His personality 
of the 
eternal Word; and receiving the Holy Ghost from 
the Father, in 
-222- 
answer to His faith, He did instruct and support the human 
nature through all the stages of its existence, which was 
upholden wise, faithful, and true, through the influence of the 
Holy Ghost. And thus every action begun in the Godhead of the 
Son of man, proceeded into the manhood, and out of the manhood 
passed complete-201 
IA. g ýnc u ýsiLo n. 
What, then, may we conclude regarding Irving's christology? There is no 
doubt about the efficacy of Strachan's perceptive statement that Irving's 
christological position appears 'to be unique and deserves the attention 
which it has so far not received'.. 210 In our discussion of Irving's 
doctrines of God and human being, we have seen that the means by which 
Irving achieves this christological uniqueness are themselves far from 
ordinary and well-run expressions of his theological tradition, Rather, 
although they cannot be deemed totally unique, they do represent a 
significant development of elements within his theological tradition that 
have lain undeveloped and are themselves worthy of further attention. We 
have been able to show how, by virtue of these developments, Irving's 
christology is one that we may deem efficient, by which is meant simply 
that it shows a meaningful and adequate sense of continuity in the 
relation between the object of incarnation, namely, human being in its need 
of salvation, and the subject of incarnation, namely, the God who saves. 
That which is central to his overall concern at all times remains 
the 
person of Christ in the work of salvation. What makes his christology so 
unique is the place he accords the Spirit therein, a pneumatological 
dimension to his christology which is achieved and maintained 
because. of 
its consistent continuity with his understanding of the 
being of God, as 
Trinity, and with human being as it becomes that which 
its Creator desires 
by virtue of the Spirit who comes to us in and through 
Christ. In this 
sense, Irving establishes a theological continuity 
by virtue of his 
understanding of the Spirit. 
However, whilst Irving may agree with the sentiments expressed 
by Hook, 
that "any satisfactory doctrine of God depend(s) on 
a satis fa., --tory 
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Christology, " and that the means by which we may attain such satisfaction 
lies in our relatively undeveloped understanding of the Spirit, Irving J., 
seen to diverge significantly from the modern answer incorporated in that 
which may be identified as a . 5plrit christolpEy. 11, For the latter takes 
as its starting point the belief that "our present official Christology, and 
doctrine of the Trinity which is built upon it, is not only expressed in 
the language of a philosophy which is outmoded and long since discredited, 
but also in one which no longer serves the interests of vital religion". 212 
Whilst the blame for this criticism lies squarely with the way in which 
our doctrines of God and Christ have been developed in a 'monothematic' 
manner 213 with little reference to the trinitarian nature of incarnation 
and its relation to human being or to the Spirit, the importance of 
Irving's christology lies in the fact that his solution does not involve a 
divorce from the 'official' doctrine of God as Trinity, '" but, rather, in 
its development in light of his understanding of both the incarnation and 
the nature of salvation, Indeed, Irving may be understood as 
complementing his christology by a "'search for the historical Spirit. '""s 
Our survey of the manner by which Irving expands his understanding of the 
doctrines of God and human being in light of incarnation show he is not 
guilty of Bobrinskoy's double criticism of scholastic pneumatology which on 
the one hand has reduced the doctrine of the Spirit 'to a single specific 
chapter ot trinitarian theology' focusing either in the eternal procession 
of the Spirit from the Father, or from the Father and the Son, ' and on the 
other, limits 'its account of the function of the Spirit to a consideration 
of his gifts within the Church and his sanctifying activity 
in the 
spiritual life of the individual believers. "21' 
We meet, rather, in Irving's christology a method wherein 'the r-haracter 
of 
the Spirit has taken its 'shape' f rom the impress of Jesus' own 
relationship with God. 121 7 Implicit in this christological 
and 
pneumatological method is the need to identify what we understand 
this 
relationship to be: it demands an elucidation of both divine and 
human 
being. For Irving, this involves an exploration of the 
'fundamental 
"interconnectedness" between Christology and Pneumatology. '2'8 
Todos 
Irving presents a meaningful manner by which the 
inexpressible being oý- 
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God may be expressed as a being which 'remains a being which i,; 
coming. 1219 However, for Irving there is no suggestion that God is an 
incomplete being. God's being is not a processional being. Rather, by 
shunning the temptation to develop his christology and pneumatology 
separately, and by bringing them together and talking in a 'unitary 
language about the one, indivisible God who saves', 2220 through incarnation 
and inspirationt Irving establishes a means of continuity between his 
understanding of the affective and effective dynamics of salvation- of the 
human need of salvation and the divine gift of salvation. By means of his 
understanding of the place of the Spirit in incarnation Irving 
'acknowledges that God's humanity as a story which has happened does not 
cease being history which is happenin8, now, 12--i for the Spirit we receive 
in redemption is the same Spirit who annointed, empowered and raised the 
God-man, Jesus Christ. 
It is to Irving's credit that the means by which he has sought to do this, 
namely, the manner in which he has developed his appreciation of the being 
of God and human being, has itself' avoided two fundamental pitfalls, 
Firstly, of pneumatological minimalism wherein the place of the Spirit is 
relegated, at best, to an assumed but uninvolved place in incarnation, and, 
at worst, competeley ignored. 222 Herein we discuss triniterian 
interpretations of incarnation where there is no doubting the being or 
divinity of the Spirit; only that little space is made for the place of 
the 
Spirit, Consequently, little thought, if any, is given to considering the 
status of the Spirit in incarnation, This. by and large, was the context 
within which Irving found himself: a context unable to develop 
fully the 
Spirit's status in relation to the incarnate Son; whether 
it be as Irving 
believed, both onto-relational - an aspect of the nature and character 
of 
the Triune God, and onto-functional - consequential to 
the divine concerns 
of salvation, or as Schleiermacher believed, functional - consequential 
to 
human concerns inherent to salvation. 
Secondly, Irving avoids the pitfall Of what Florovsky calls, 
'anthropolOgic5l 
maxima lism 1, wherein Christ becomes the simple receptacle 
of the Spirit, 
thereby obscuring the truth that the Savior 
is above all the 1royal 
dwelling- place', the living and unique 10CLIS Of 
the full presence of the 
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Spirit, who belongs to him alone. 122, L Irving's is no SPI-rit chrisstojo8-y. 
The agent of incarnation is no mere inspired man, but at all times the 
divine Son, Where Irving advances our appreciation of the being of God in 
incarnation, is in the manner by which he intimately identifies the Saviour 
with that which requires salvation, In so doing, he initiates a paradigm 
shif t which opens up a logical space wherein a more ef f icient 
interpretation of incarnation in its relation to salvation is initiated, It 
has been the desire of this thesis to expand more clearly the means by 
which Irving achieves this through his understanding of the person and 
work of the Spirit in incarnation and the being of God- as 'that which 
realizes in the endless diversity of human lives the set of renewed human 
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initial controversy that arose around Irving's teaching, this is as 
an illuminating insight into the manner by which presuppositions 
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P. E. 
'18 Edinburgh thesis, 'An 
ý--amjnAtjnn of the Views of Davies, in his 19L. 
Edward Irving Concerning the Person and w,, L, nf jpsus Christ, 
' 
assigns under 5 pages to Irving's anthropology. The aim of 
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either doctrines, and whilst D. D. Dorries' erudite Aberdeen 1987 
thesis, Nineteenth Century Brit ish Ohr'st0l: )Zic31 C)ntr)versy. Centrinz 
Ui)on Edward Irvings Doctrine of Christ's Human Natur_e, may ý, -)e 
understood as an expansion of the former part of Nantomah's less 
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developing independently, Irving's doctrines of God and human being. 
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Pentecostal Teaching of Edward Irving (London: Darton, Longman & 
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S. W, Sykes, J. P, Clayton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 
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Constantinople Lecture. Anglican and Eastern Churches Association, 
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79. Gunton: op cit, SJT 41.3, p366, italics mine. 
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Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968, p39, "Almost all 
Christological conceptions have had soteriological motifs, Changes in 
the soteriological interest, in man's understanding Of salvation, 
explain, at least in part, the different forms Christology has taken 
at different times, " P. Tillich: Systematic TheolORY. Vol. 2. Chicajzo: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957, p150, "Christol-ogy is a function 
of soteriology. The problem of soteriology creates the christological 
question and gives direction to the christological answer, " Both 
quoted in P. W. Newman: A Spirit Christology, Lanham: University Press 
of America, 1987, p2. DX Baillie: God was in Christ London- Faber and 
Faber Limited, 1973, p160, "Throughout the Christian tradition the 
supreme human exigency to which the doctrine of the Incarnation had 
to be related and made relevant has been the need of salvation from 
sin, the forgiveness of sins. " 
81, Surin: op cit, p122, 
82, S, W. Sykes: "The Theology of the humanity of Christ", in Christ, Faith 
and History. Cambridge Studies in Christology, eds; S, W. Sykes, J. P. 
Clayton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp53-71, pp58- 
59. One who presents the tradition as it stands in stark contrast to 
that adopted by Irving was Julian of Halicarnassus who believed that 
Christ assumed an incorruptible, pre-fallen humanity which "was not 
only sinless but ... had no involvement in the fallen state of the human 
race", V. C. Samuel, "One Incarnate Nature of God the Word", The Greek 
Orthodox Theological Review, Vol, X. 2,1964-1965. Of interest here is 
the response given by J. S. Romanides to Samuel's paper discussing the 
unorthodox position taken by Julian, one which typifies that 
interpretation of the humanum of' Christ which Irving opposed most 
vehemently: 
The teaching of Julian of Halicarnassus that the Logos united to 
Himself manhood as it was before the fall is not In itself 
wrong and is accepted by all Fathers. What is wrong with 
Julian's position-is that the human nature of Christ was 
considered incorruptible before the resurrection. I would add 
that most Fathers would rather say that the human nature of 
Christ was by nature mortal but not by nature under the power 
or sentence of death and corruption which are the wage-s of --; In. 
In this sense even angels are by nature mortal. Only God is by 
nature immortal, It is for this reason that the death of the 
Lord of Glory in the f lesh was voluntary and not the wages of 
personal or inherited sin. (ibid: 52, italics mine). 
83, LHN 4-5. 
84. LHN 6-7. 
85, CW. V: 244. 
86. ibid. 
87. CW. V: 3 
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88, OCD 50-5 1. 
89, CW. V-. 115, italics mine, Also PW-2: 464-5; Scripture would have much 
more to say on the subject if Christ's humanity were of a completely 
different kind as to make him immune to temptation and sin. 
In The Orthodox and Catholic Doctrine of Our Lord's Human Mature 
pp27-28, Irving identifies seven implications if Christ's flesh is not 
fallen; 
1. He is not tempted in all points as we are, 
2. He cannot be our high priest. 
3. He only had to contend against two enemies; the devil and the 
world, Therefore we have no proof that he overcame the third, 
the flesh. 
4. As he was not one with humanity, humanity cannot be one with 
him. 
5, There is no evidence that, the Spirit has wrestled with 'wicked 
flesh' and overcome it. 
6. As Christ's life is 'no proto-type' of the Spirit's power over 
sinful flesh, neither is is resurrection an assurance of our 
resurrection. 
7. The Gospel narratives are a misrepresentation of Christ, for 
they show him to be passive to temptation as are we. 
90. This is the central argument to Dorries' thesis-, both that Irving's 
understanding of this term stands well within the perimeters of 
orthodoxy and that the d6bdcle that followed misunderstood his use 
of the term. 
91, "Irving... took care, as Nestorius had done, to distinguish between the 
levels of nature and person, " Ware: op cit, pp6-7; Nantomah: op cit, 
ppl36-137; E. Brunner: The Mediator. A Study of the Central Doctrine 
of the Christian Faith, London, The Lutterworth Press, 1934, p319. 
92, L, Andrewes: Ninety-Six Sermons by the Right Honourable and Reverend 
Father in God, Lancelot Andrewes. Sometime Lord Bishop of Winchester, 
In 3 volumes, Oxford-, John Henry Parker, 1891. Vol, lt P89- 
93. CW. V: 218 
94. CW-V-2 17, 
95, Ch. viii §2. 
96. CS 14, 
97, See K. Barth in Kari Barth's Table Talk ed J, D. Godsey, in Scotti 
Journal of Theology occassional Papers No. 10, Edinburgh: Oliver 
Boyd, 1963, pp68-69. U, where he argues: 
Heinrich Vogel says that the human nature taken by 
Christ was a 
'holy' flesh. I say no. lt is our flesh, but if Christ 
takes on 
our flesh, then a sanctification of the flesh takes place, 
and 
then the man in Christ cannot sin. But the sinlessness 
of 
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Christ is a deed, not a quality... Ncýn PO&Se peccare is a deed of 
God, not a quality ... the reality of a sanctified life was a 
fight, not just a being, Jesus had to obey, But it was af ight 
that could not have another result, 
98, CW. V: 174, 
99, PW. l: 105-106. 
loo, Brannick: op cit, 252. 
101, So Erskine writes about Christ: 
So he came into our flesh after it had fallen under the 
condemnation of death, and through his f ulf illment of 
righteousness under these conditions he had overcome death and 
nullified the condemnation. ("Thoughts on St Paul's Epistle to 
the Romans, " in The SRiritual Order & Other Papers, Edinburgh: 
Edmonston & Douglas, 1871, p162-163. ) 
His assumption of our flesh in its actual conditions qualifies 
him in a special manner to act for us. (Ibid, 164. ) 
To Captain James Stirling, Erskine expresses himself thus: 
The devil took possession of the flesh, and it is only through 
the death of the flesh that the devil can be overcome - the 
voluntary death of the flesh; and how is this to be? Simply 
through fa ith in the death of Christ for us. It is thus that we 
have life. (Letters of Thomas Erskine. Ed. Hanna William, 
Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1877, 
102, Therefore, as one moves away from superhuman notions of Christ 
towards this notion of lowly humility, the difference between the way 
by which the Christian God becomes victor and that of the victorious 
gods of antiquity is highlighted. Jesus Christ comes to us not in 
the guise of some Perseus whc? cuts the head from off Medusa with 
the golden sickle of Hermes and flees with his winged sandals, hidden 
by the dark helmet stolen from the Stygian Nymphs, Rather, Christ 
comes as one veiled in human limitation. 
103. C. E, Gunton: Yesterday and Today: A Study )f Continuities in 
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983, p193. 
104, CW, V: 21 1, 
105. CW. V: 106, and Part II of this thesis. 
106. CW. V: 338. 
107, CW. V-. 225, 
108, CW. V,. 212, 
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111, CW. V: 213-214. 
112, CW. V: 214, 
113. ibid. 
114. CW. V: 216. 
115. CHF 36, Italics mine. 
116. OCD 66-67. 
117. B. Marshall: Christology in Conflict, 
p161, 
118. J. MacIntyre: The Shape gf Christology, 
p 140. 
119. ibid: 11. 
120, D. Bonhoeffer: Lectures on Christology, 
Collins, 1978, p30, 
Trans. Robertson. 
121, J. Galot: Who is Christ? A Theology of the Incarnation. 
Gregorian University Press, 1980, p267. 
Glasgow- 
Rome- 
122, W, Kasper: Jesus the Christ, London: Burns and Oates, 1976, pp20-24. 
123. This has been outlined in detail in Part 
124. This has been outlined in detail in Part II. 
125. OCD 29. 
126, CW. V-. 124, 
127. CW, V,, 438-439, 
128. CHF 5. 
129, See fn 91, 
130. CW. V: 167. 
131. CW-V: 159. There is a strong parallel here with Hooker's understanding 
of the 'person' of incarnation in, The Works of Mr, Richard _Hooker,. - 
In 
ree Volumes. 
Vol. II, pp160-161, London: William Baynes and Son, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 
London-, SCM Press Ltd, 1966, 
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If the Son of God had taken to himself a man now made and 
already perfected, it would of necessity follow, that there are 
in Christ two persons, the one assuming, and the other assumed; 
whereas the Son of God , 
did not assume a man's person into his 
own, but man's nature to his own person: and therefore took 
semen, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of 
our nature, before it was come to have any personal human 
subsistence, The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with 
God, began both at the one instant; his making and taking to 
himself our flesh was but one act, so that in Christ there is no 
personal subsistence but one, and that from everlasting. By 
taking only the nature of man, he still continueth one person, 
and changeth but the manner of subsisting, which was before in 
mere glory the Son of God, and is now in the habit of our flesh, 
Forasmuch-as Christ hath no personal subsistence but one, 
whereby we acknowledge him to have been eternally the Son of 
God, we must-apply to the person of the Son of God, even that 
which is spoken of Christ according to his human nature, For 
example, according to the flesh he was born of the Virgin Mary, 
baptized by John in the river Jordan, by Pilate adjudged to die, 
and executed by the Jews. We cannot properly say, that the 
Virgin bore, or John did baptize, or Pilate condemn, or the Jews 
crucify, the nature of man, because these all are personable 
attributes; his person is the subject which receiveth them, his 
nature that which maketh his person capable-to receive, If we 
should say, that the person of a man in our Saviour Christ was 
the subject of these things, this were plainly to entrap 
ourselves in the very snare of the Nestorian heresy, The Son of 
God took not to himself a man's person, but the nature only of 
a man. Christ is a person both Divine and human, howbeit not 
therefore two persons in one; neither both these in one sense , 
but a person Divine, because he is personally the Son of God; 
human, because he hath really the nature of the children of man. 
In Christ. therefore, God and man, "There is (saith Paschasius) a 
twofold substance, not a twofold person, because one person 
distinguisheth another, whereas one nature cannot in another 
become extinct. " 
132. F. Schoonenberg: "The Kenosis or Self-Emptying of Christ, " concilium 
1966 11, Vol, 1.2, pp27-36, P27, 
133, CW. V: 405, 
134, L. Richard: "Kenotic Christology in a New Perspective, " 
t&jise et 
Thdologie 7,1976, pp5-39, p27. 
135. Part II, P124. 
y, 77,1974, pp115 136, J, Macquarrie: "Kenoticism Reconsidered, " Theolog, 
124, p122. 
137. Moule: op cit, 97. 
138. A. Hanson: Grace and Truth. London-, SPCK, 1975, p22, 
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140, J. A, T, Robinson-, The Human Face of God, 
Press, 1973,208. 
141, K. Barth-, CD IV, I, 211, 
142, FW. 1: 231. Also, CW, V, 231. 
143, CW, V: 280, 
144. GW, V: 134, 
145. PW. I-, 14. 
Philadelphia: Westminster 
146. E. Duffy: "The Philosophers and the China Shop, " New Blackfriars Oct, 
1988, pp447-452, p449, In relation to the divinity and the person of 
Jesus Christ Brunner states that the 'Deity is the secret of this 
person, ' The Mediator op cit, 347. 
147. CW. V: 319. 
148. ibid. 
149, Richard-, op cit, 10, 
150. CW, V: 160, 
151, Origen-, First Principles trans, G. W. Butterworth, London: Society for 
Promoting Christ Knowledge, 1936,11 ch. VI. 3, p110. Also John of 
Damascus: Exl2osition of the Christian Faith, NPCF2 Vol IX, Grand 
Rapids: Wm, B, Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983, p50. 
The Word of God, then, was united to flesh through the medium 
of mind which is intermediate between the purity of God and the 
grossness of flesh. For the mind holds sway over soul and 
body, but while the mind is the purist part of the soul God is 
that of the mind. And when it is allowed by that which is more 
excellent, the mind of Christ gives proof of its own authority, 
but it is under the dominion of and obedient to that which is 
more excellent, and does things which the divine will purposes. 
152. M. F, Wiles: "The Nature of the Early Debate about Christ's Human 
Soul, " 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XVI. 2,1965, ppI39-151, p141. 
153, Origen: op cit, II ch. VI. 6, p113. Also IV, ch. IV, pp318-319- 
154. See M. F Wiles: op cit, 148, and H. A. wolf son: "Philosophical 
Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism, " n,, ý,. rtnn 
Oaks Papers, 
12, Cambridge, Mass-, Harvard University Press, 1958. 
1'55- Letter's Vol, III (131-164). Trans, W, Parsons, Wac-shington 
D. C,, The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1965. 
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Ambrose of Milan-, On the Sacrament Of the Lord's Becoming Flesh, 7. 
65-68, in G. H. Ettlinger, Jesus, Christ and- Saviour. Delaware: Michel 
Glazier, 1987, p144. 
157, T, Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, Vol, 48,3a. 1-6, London-, Blackfriars, 1976, 
3a, 6,1, p154- 
158, ibid: 3a. 6.6, p173. 
159. This is a concern that is woven throughout Christ in Christian 
Tradition, Vol 11, A. Grillmeier, trans. J. Bowden, London: Mowbrays, 
1975. 
160. CW. V: 126. 
161. Grillmeier: op cit, 471. 
162. Contra Arianos, 1,469 ET, Library of the Fathers, Oxford, 1842, cited 
in N. S. Clark, "Spirit Christology in the LIght of Eucharistic 
Theology", The Heythrop Journal, XXIII, 1982, pp270-284, p271. 
He is not sanctified, but the Sanctifier; for He is not 
sanctified by another, but Himself sanctified Himself, that, we 
may be sanctified in the truth, How then does this take place? 
What does He mean but this? 'I, being the Father's Word, I give 
Myself, when become man, the Spirit; and Myself, become man , do 
I sanctify Him, that henceforth in Me, who am truth (for Thy 
Word is truth), all may be sanctified. 
163, CW. V-. 124. 
Here we confront an aspect of Irving's theology that parallels that 
of the Puritan John Owen, who identifies several actings of the 
Spirit upon Christ, John Owen: The Works of John . wen4, 
ed. W. H. 
Goold, Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1981, Vol, III, ppl62-168. 
1. The Spirit forms the body of Christ in the womb. 
2. The Spirit sanctifies the human nature at conception. 
3. The Spirit continues the work begun at conception; 
a. Christ exercised grace through a rational soul. 
b. Christ's human nature has simple nescience. 
4. The Spirit anointed Christ with extraordinary gifts in order to 
exercise his office on earth: 
a. Visible anointing. 
b. Christ gave himself to the Spirit in his public ministry. 
c. Christ was full of the Spirit. 
5. The Spirit brought about the miraculous works during 
Christ's 
ministry. 
6. The Spirit guided, directed, comforted and supported Christ. 
7. Christ offered himself up through the Eternal Spirit: 
a. Sanctified to God to be a voluntary sacrifice. 
b. Performed this through graces of Spirit. 
1. Love to mankind. 
2. Zeal for glory. 
3. Submission to will of God. 
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4, Faith and trust in God, 
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tomb. 
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10, The Spirit glorified the human nature of Christ, 
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c, We will seek to be conformed to him. 
For a thoroughgoing and erudite discussion of John Owen's 
christology, see the 1989 King's College, London thesis of Alan 
Spence-, Incarnation and Inspiration-, John Owen and the Coherence of 
Christology. Although coming to an independent realisation of the 
possible influence of Owen upon Irving's christology, I am greatly 
indebted to the stimulating and scholarly insights raised in ongoing 
discussion and friendship with Alan Spence. There can be little 
doubt that Irving had contact with the christology of Owen, but it 
cannot be arrgued that the former's is a regurgitation of the earlier 
Puritan christology of the latter. See also, D. W. Bebbington: 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, A History From the 1730s to the 
1980s, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p8O, One of the major differences 
between the two scholars is the fact that Irving attempts to 
explicitly unite the trinitarian being of God with the incarnation in 
a manner missing from that of the more scholarly and precise Owen. 
164, Clark: op cit, 271. 
165. CW, V: 94, 
166, B. Hebblethwaite: The Incarnation. 
Press, 1987, p72, also p161. 
167, CW. V: 127, 
LHN 28-29. 
169. CW. V: 433. The quote continues: 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
But this is not the mystery of the Father's Godhead... 
The 
mystery of the Father's Godhead, which Christ came forth 
to 
manifest, is this, That in the Father who is the fountain of the 
Godhead, generating the Son, and through and with Him the 
Holy 
Ghost, is hid and contained that incommunicable and 
inexhaustible fulness-The Father-is not any manifestation of 
God, but God unmanifested; and therefore He is so often styled 
God.. To the end that there might by an 
Infinite and 
Incomprehensible to be worshipped through the 
finite and 
comprehensible, it standeth under the person of the 
Father, in 
whom the infinite Godhead of the Son and the infinite 
Godhead 
Of the Holy Ghost is worshipped, as well as the 
infinite person 
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the Son and the 
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